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SUNMARY (IN FULFIU1ENT OF REGULATION 3. 60) 
This thesis considers some theoretical aspects of supply 
planning and undertakes empirical analyses of both demand and supply 
behaviour 1n the Australian electricity industry over the period 1953 
to 1971. 
The research strategy reflects the way in which an econom1c 
adviser to an electricity authority might organize his work. The 
initial step is to spotlight three important areas for analysis: the 
link between demand and supply provided by cost and price signals; 
the planning of supply capacity to meet demand targets; and, finally, 
the forecasting and empirical analysis of demand. 
Part I of the thesis considers a traditionally important 
field of electricity econom1cs - optimal pr1c1ng. Several tariff 
schemes suggested by economists and engineers are surveyed in conjunction 
with the reasoning behind them. Extensive tariff data, especially 
collected for the thesis, is then compared with reported costs (roughly 
in running and capital cost categories) to discover the extent to which 
theoretical tariff principles have been observable in practice. The 
empirical results suggest an imperfect use of theoretical tariff 
principles. This finding clearly prompts several questions: e.g. 
are there significant costs in non-optimal tariff formulation; is the 
peak loading problem sensitive 1n practice to tariff manipulation? 
- ----~-
The empirical studies carried out in Chapters IV and V 
suggest there are significant measurable costs of resource mis-
allocation and that peaks in the load could well be significantly 
varied by tariff manipulation. 
Lv{i) 
Part II of the thesis is a detailed theoretical analysis of 
investment planning in electricity supply to meet specified demand 
targets at minimum total system cost in present worth terms. This 
analysis is set in the context of the celebrated model of Ralph Turvey 
(see bibliography); his principal models are examined and criticised; 
a survey of the background literature is given beginning with the 
classic article of Hotelling on depreciation. Subsequent chapters 
present a practical formulation of an electricity capacity planning 
problem for the Australian situation and a detailed survey and critique 
of the idea of "dynamic marginal cost". 
Part III of the thesis turns to the demand side. A thorough 
empirical study (using a variety of models of demand) ~s carried out for 
the residential sector and it suggests the usefulness of a model that 
simultaneously models the demand for the services of a stock of consumer 
durables and the demand for electricity as an input to the process of 
generating those services. Attention is also paid to traditional 
methods of measuring price elasticity of electricity demand. Finally, 
the industrial and commercial sectors come under scrutiny and the tariff 
data especially collected for the experiments reported in part I are used 
to test and compare conventional "average revenue" and the more 
-- - ---------- -
theoretically correct "marginal price" methods for calculating price 
elasticity of demand. 
This concludes the study. 
as Chapter XIV of the thesis. 
A more detailed summary appears 
---- - ------- --- -
CHAPTER I 
ELECTRICITY IN AUSTlU\LIA 
This is a study of the supply and demand for electricity in 
Australia by an outside observer. The motive for the study is academic 
and the constant if not the only emphasis· is on the application of 
- theoretical and applied economics. Several other approaches might qave 
been adopted. For example, detailed study of energy policy options and 
the cost of alternative primary energy inputs is only in its infancy ~n 
Australia; however to have followed this path, ~n the present state of 
'published statistics, would have put some strain on the usual economic 
calculations. Where such work is being done for other economies (for 
example the U.S. and the U.K.), it has. been preceded .by more analytical 
studies well within the competence of the outside observer and by 
empirical work that can usefully adopt published data. 
TI1e theme of the study ~s to apply to the Australian electricity 
industry some of the advances in theoretical and empirical electricity 
economics that have appeared in recent years. Nevertheless, in many 
places, particularly in part I of the thesis, completely new approaches 
are adopted to understand the economics of Australian electricity. Like 
other developing countries, data for the Australian electricity industry 
is relatively rich on the sales and tariff aspects, but relatively rare 
on the details of investment choice. Consequently the bulk of the 
empirical work in this study is related to demand and price movements, 
while detailed investment programme analysis receives a much more 
I 
theoretical treatment. This pattern of development of critical work 
mirrors that in other countries. 
--- - - ------- -- -
STRUCTURE OF THE STUDY 
The remainder of this first chapter Hill present the ma1n 
facts about the organization of the Australian el~ctricity industry 
and the reasons for taking up the different methods of analysis that 
will be used. After this, the thesis is divided into three parts, each 
of which reflects an aspect of electricity economics which can 
satisfactorily be treated by an academic economist. To a certain extent 
the dividing lines used evolved from the way in which an electricity 
authority's economic adviser might begin his job. The first statistics 
that an authority publishes are about its financial operations: revenues, 
accounting costs, investment undertaken, tariffs charged. (The historical 
development of electricity statistics is readily seen from the admirable 
"Statistics of the Electric Supply Industry" published by the Electricity 
Supply Association of Australia). An imaginary academic economist 
entering the industry has first to work Hith these statistics. He will 
be at the same time concerned with the interdependence between different 
areas of the authority's operations, but Hill quickly recognize Ralph , 
Turvey's point about the necessity of adopting a piecemeal approach to 
the analysis and later iterating between one section and another1 . 
detail. 
On this basis, part I of the thesis looks at Tariff policy in 
Electricity economics began as an attack on the peak load 
pricing problem and the design of tariffs has been its longest pre-
occupation. The strategy of part I of the thesis is to look at the 
tariff setting problem w·ith as broad a v1ew as possible - to include 
economists' and non-economists' suggestions and to examine the 
implications for resource allocation. Here the Australian data 1s 
richest and, while no more. than a beginning 1s attempted, this part of 
---- ---------- -- -
the thesis does try to go as far and as widely as possible in 
examining·tariff and cost relationships in Australian 'electricity. 
(This part of the thesis would not have been possible without the 
co-operation of many of the Australian electricity authorities ~n 
providing tariff schedules in some cases going back to 1942.) 
Having established some tariff information, the imaginary 
economic adviser - again following Turvey - faces up to two fundamental 
problems: the existing tariffs (and other econom~c factors) "tvill produce 
a set of demand targets over the coming years; how are these targets to 
be achieved and how is demand to be forecast? Once more the inter-
dependences have to be temporarily set aside and the problems tackled 
iteratively. Part II of the thesis (which begins with a form of flow 
chart for this sectioning of the economists' problems), tackles the 
problem of the investment prograrr_mes to meet specified output targets. 
This part of the thesis remains theoretical for two reasons; first of 
all it is vrritten by an outsider rather than a particular adviser and 
so detailed and confidential data on plant running is not available; ~n 
any case each state would have to be treated separately. Secondly, 
and more importantly, the analytical problems of choice of technique and 
investment programming analysis must first be. solved and this is an area 
of theoretical ferment at present. Part II of the thesis therefore 
concentrates on analytical issues in planning investment policy, though 
chapter VIII does present a model which might immediately be used by an 
Australian generating authority. 
; 
-- - -- -
Returning to the imaginary economic adviser who has now set 
up his investment programming model, the next hurdle he meets arLses 
from the fact that his investment programme yields measures of marginal 
cost to which tariffs might be related in some way. 
f 
(Exactly what 
marginal costs and how they are calculated is another theme of part II.) 
If tariffs are then based on these up-to-date costs (marginal or average 
or whatever) there may very 'vell be a change in demand and the emergence 
of a new set of demand targets. The imaginary economLc adviser therefore 
must see as his third task, the forecasting and analysis of demand. This 
is the concern of part III of the thesis, which is a study, in the tradition 
of the econometrics of demand, of the various sales sectors for electricity. 
·The aim is to fit standard demand equations of the sort that may yield the 
elasticity estimates essential for forecasting demand response to different 
tariff and cost calculations. 
Thus, while the thesis must remaiu purely academic, I have tried 
to follow the path which a newly appointed economic adviser might take Ln 
an electricity authority. The object LS to produce one of the many 
initial studies necessary for detailed evaluation of Australian energy 
policy. It begins now with some of the factual and organizational 
background to the Australian electricity industry. 
---- - --- -
ELECTRICITY SUPPLY INDUSTRY 
The aim of this section is to provide a general background 
to some of the issues that will be discussed in this stridy. The 
electricity industry in all developed industrial nations tends to 
evolve with the economy itself: there is a large expansion ln the 
demand for electricity as an industrial input as industrial production 
expands and there is a further large expansion in residential demand 
for electricity as the demand for appliances rises with rising living 
standards. This sort of expansion has characterised the post-war 
grmvth of the Australian electricity industry though, as Prest points 
out, there was an earlier phase of growth when electricity replaced 
other fuels in transport and public lighting needs (Prest (1963)). 
Table I, 1 presents some figures on the growth of demand over 
the post-war period. In the decade of the fifties overall consumption 
increased more than two and a half times and in the sixties it was 
almost exactly doubled (equivalent to an annual compound growth rate 
of about 7.2%). Over the decade of the sixties residential consumption 
accounted for a stable 38-40% of thi~ total consumption. To meet this 
rising demand the electricity authorities must undertake massive capital 
investment programmes. Table I, 2 indicates, for approximately the same 
decades, the growth in installed generating capacity. It is interesting 
that the growth rates here are even greater. Over the decade of the 
sixties generating capacity rose by a factor of two and a half. These 
are the sort of trends that highlight one of the perennial problems of 
electricity generating authorities: the problem of peak loads. 
- -- -------------------------~------== 
Table I, 1 1 . . . . A 1· 2 E ectn.c1.ty Consumpt1.on 1.n ~stra 1.a 
(billion Kwh) 
1951-52 1955-56 1961-62 1965-66 1971-72 
10.0 15.3 27.0 38.0 55.9 
Table I, 2 Generating Plant Installed3 . (G\·V) 
1949-50 1959-60 1969-70 
2.4 5.6 14.0 
----- -- -
Electricity cannot be easily stored and consequently has to be 
produced as it is demanded. Enough generating capacity to meet 
maximum demand must be installed if supply restrictions are to be 
avoided. However when demand becomes more peaked the result is that 
more and more capacity has to be installed in·order to meet a fraction 
of annual consumption and to stand unused for the remainder of the year. 
In fact the situation is slightly more complex since newly installed 
capacity usually has running cost advantages over older capacity which 
ensure that new capacity ahvays meets base load; increased concentration 
of consumption at peaks then means that older capacity is moved more 
rapidly into the stand-by sections of the "meri_t-order" running system. 
· The basic consequence remains that the more peaked is demand the lower 
the load factor of the ~uthority's operations. 
Peaks in demand impose additional costs in terms of us1ng up 
scarce resources. This is not an fnsoluble problem and building more 
and more capacity is not the only answer. It is not often realised 
that an alternative to capacity expansion to meet maximum demand growth 
is a restructuring of tariffs to bring home marginal resource costs 
more clearly to consumers. 
This growth of the peak load problem has had an impact on the 
electricity authorities in recent years. At the national level, 
"Energy in Australia" the Department of National Development's Survey 
published 1n 1967 commented (page 24) 
- - - -- -
" Short duration peak loads, particularly winter 
evening peaks have grown at a very rapid rate indeed 
over the past few years ••• The extraordinary growth 
of peak demands means that the utilisation time or load 
factor of the plant is falling " 
The use of off-peak tariffs to spread this load has had only 
qualified support though the State Electricity Commission of Victoria 
reported in 1971 that 
" marketing activity was intensified with emphasis 
on the promotion of off-peak electricity sales ••• " 
(Annual Report (1970-71) page 14, 
State Electricity Commission of 
Victoria) 
Figure I, 1 shows the extent of the SECV's problem: it is 
a reproduction of the Load Curve for the 1971 day of maximum demand. 
The other authorities have very similar patterns of daily fluctuations. 
This whole question of the costs of peak demands and the use 
of tariffs is tackled in detail in a series of empirical studies in 
part I of the thesis. 
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Aside from the problem of peak loads, there are other 
characteristic aspects of the electricity industry. One of these is 
the choice of fuel inputs to use in the generating system. There 
are five candidates for fuel choice ~n most advanced systems: coal, 
oil, natural gas, hydro and nuclear. Only the last is not currently 
used in Austr~lia though recent years have seen some discussion of 
the possible date for introducing nuclear power. 
The extent of fuel m~x is apparent when Figure I, 1 is 
examined again. For the case of V.ictoria base load ~s met almost 
entirely with the brown coal steam raising plants of the Latrobe 
Valley (Hazlewood, Harwell and Yallourn). As the peak builds up 
oil fired plants are called on until finally peak demand is met by 
the Eildon, Kie~m and Snowy hydro schemes. The Snowy Hountains hydro 
electricity partly comes from an interchange with Ne\v South Wales where 
it also meets. the peak which does not coincide with the Victorian peak. 
In New South Wales, coal - black coal this time - aga~n meets 
base load and a proportion of peak load; oil and hydro supplement 
this. The hydro entitlement from Snowy of the NSW Electricity 
Commission is double that of Victoria and in 1971-72 this amounted to 
nearly fourteen .percent of total NSW consumption. 
Queensland uses black coal almost exclusively, though a very 
small amount of power is generated from steam raised by natural gas. 
Host of the planned capacity expansion is for coal using thermal 
equipment. 
------------ -------------------------------~~~~~-
Tasmania of course is almost exclusively a user of hydro 
electricity - it has about half of total Australian hydro potential 
and capacity expansion is still envisaged in hydro schemes. These 
have incurred the wrath of conservationists because many of the 
10 
proposed works may destroy areas of nature reserve. This 1s obviously 
a question susceptible of economic analysis since it could be argued 
that load growth can be diverted by correeted shadow pricing. What 
is needed 1s a measure of the extent to which this can be done and the 
cost savings involved. Chapter IV of this thesis will attempt this. 
South Australia has concentrated 1n the past on the use of 
sub bituminous black coal chiefly from the Leigh Creek coalfield, but 
discoveries of natural gas raised the possibility of using this as a· 
primary input. This is not usually an economic choice \vhere (a) there 
are large coal reserves, (b) transmission losses from coalfield sites 
and vlater cooling problems on coalf1eld sites do not make co-'ll an 
uneconomic choice of input, because natural gas has a large opportunity 
cost when used as a bulk industrial fuel. South Australia's coal 
position is such as to make natural gas an economic choice of input and 
by 1971-72 natural gas burn in pmver stations had risen from zero three 
years previously to 24 billion cubic feet. 
West Australia uses black coal as its chief fuel, partly 
imported and partly indigenous. 
The plant m1x problems presented by these fuel choices are 
of three kinds: 
(i) What is the optimal combinat{on of plant type and fuel use 
bearing in mind that plants differ 1n capacity costs, 
running costs and maintenance needs? 
(ii) Are there budgetary limits on an authority's operations 
which mean that the monetary cost of a pl::mt \·lith high 
capacity installation charges is below its scarce resource 
shadmv cost? Discount rates have a role to play here. 
(iii) What 1s the implication for plant choice of the fact that 
some of these inputs are exhaustible resources (particularly 
II 
hydro sites and gas reserves)? How does this have a bearing 
on the decision date for the introduction of nuclear power? 
Such questions can only be answered by detailed investment 
analysis of the sort carried out in part II of this tpesis. 
taken in practice will have an effect on costs incurred by the 
authorities and hence on the tariffs charged. 
The choices 
A final characteristic of the electricity supply industry 
which is important from an economic point of view is the nature of its 
organization. Electricity supply organizations today are usually 
State owned or run as State regulated public utilities. The 
Australian pattern is for ownership to be in the hands of a State-wide 
authority; these differ in their organizational details (for a good 
guide see Prest (1963)) but tend on the whole to be based on the British 
pattern whereby the generating authority is a public c?mm1ss1on, 
with tariff making, distribution and marketing operations carried out 
either by the same or similar state bodies or by local councils using 
the generating authority's bulk supplies. 
There are strategic, national interest and economies of scale 
arguments for state ownership of the generation side; the chief 
organizations are set out in Table I, 3 with the other regulatory bodies 
involved. 
The authorities have instructions not to interrupt supplies, 
and "Energy in Australia" (page 22) mentions the avoidance of supply 
restrictions as one of the chief headaches of the early post-war era. 
Beyond this there is no conunittment to an economically determined 
pricing or investment policy; there is even no explicit suggestion 
11. 
from State or Commonwealth government about the appropriate use and 
choice of a discount rate. In developing Australian energy policy this 
is the largest gap to be filled. Nevertheless each authority has 
borrowing committments which compel it to work closely with the 
appropriate State Treasury. State Treasury loans, semi governmental 
bond issues and internal financing have all provided capital funds for 
expansion (Prest· (1963), page 34) and it is probable that some form of 
resource allocation analysis takes place in the States' budgetary 
negotiations with. their authorities. In this context, whether or 
not used as a price basis, marginal cost calculations are explicitly 
or implicitly made. The detailed calculation of marginal resource 
costs cannot be avoided by any authority and the .long life of its 
Table I, 3 
STATE 
NSW 
NSW 
. VICTORIA 
QUEENSLAND 
S.A. 
W.A. 
TASMANIA 
ACT 
NT 
13 
Organisation of the Electricity Industry 
ORGANISATION 
Electricity Commission 
Electricity Authority 
State Electricity 
Commission 
State Electricity 
Commission 
Southern Electricity 
Authority, Northern 
Electricity Authority, 
Brisbane City Council, 
and others 
Electricity Trust 
State Electricity 
Commission 
Hydro Electric 
Commission 
FUNCTIONS 
Generation and bulk supply 
to distributing authorities. 
Regulatory body. 
Generation and regulation, 
tariff setting etc. 
Generation and bulk supply. 
Operation of distribution 
systems. 
Generation and operation 
of system. 
Generation and regulation 
of supply. 
Sole electricity authority. 
ACT Electricity Authority Operation and regulation 
using power from Snmvy 
Mountains Hydro-electric 
Authority (in conjunction 
with Snowy Mountains Council) 
Administered by Common-
wealth Goverrunent 
Department 
14-
capital equipment make it essential that some form of dynamic marginal 
cost model is used. Such models ~vill be examined 1.n part II of this 
thesis. More detail of the Australian electricjty industry in its 
var1.ous State organizations will appear as the study develops. 
IS 
NOTES TO CHAPTER I 
1. Turvey (1968) and Turvey (197la). The point 1s discussed 
several times in the chapters to come. 
2. The source of. the data is "Statistics of the Electric Supply 
Industri', (E. S.A.A.) various issues. The unit of measurement 
is the Kilowatt-hour (KWh) the standard measure of electric 
energy, measured as power over a period of time. 
3. The source of the data is again "Statistics of the Electric 
Supply Industry" and the unit of measurement is the gigawatt (GH) 
equivalent to one million kilowatts, the standard unit of electric 
power provided at any one point of time. 
PART I 
A STUDY OF PRICES AND COSTS 
IN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 
lb 
• 
CHAPTER II 
PRICES AND COSTS IN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 
I would like to consider in detail an analysis of prices and 
costs in the electricity supply situation in Australia; the structure 
of the analysis will be 
(A) - to consider \vhat theoretical suggestions have been made 
for electricity pricing. 
(B) - to set up an empirical measure by Hhich the extent of 
the application of these suggestions can be gauged. 
(C) - to consider Hhat inferences may be made about costs of 
electricity supply. 
(D) - finally to attempt some empirical analysis if possible 
of the crucial peak loading problem and the Hay it 
has been tackled in Australia. 
(A) ELECTRICITY TARIFFS IN THEORY 
Economic theory has suggested several ways of pricing 
electricity, all of which are practised in Australia at the present 
moment. Essentially, different tariff suggestions correspond to the 
different objectives being met in pricing policy. 
A basic premise accepted by all of the schemes considered here 
is the absence of second best problems -Moreover electricity pricing has 
not been the province only of economists and the earliest attempts at it 
were developed by engineers. Very often the engineer's approach has 
been the subject of criticism but is is important to realise that the 
\~ 
planner's objective will determine the eventual choice of a pr1ce 
setting mechanism. The economis~s approach is traditionally a 
marginalist one based on some concept of social welfare. The engineer's 
objective is usually more precise and often is no more than recovering 
the full costs of the effort involved in satisfying the maximum demand 
on the system. 
To begin with the economist's marginalist approach, consider 
a simple objective: minimizing costs of providing for a fixed set of 
demand requirements in the present and succeeding periods. An only 
slightly more complex objective is maximizing the different between 
willingness to pay and social cost; in this case if the planner feels 
that his problems are so complex that he can only tackle them piecemeal, 
then minimizing costs will still determine much of his operational effort. 
In this context the public enterprise economist is crucially interested 
in the price signals which he wants to send to consumers to advise them 
of the costs they impose on the electricity authority by any change 1n 
their plans. The price structure should signal these "marginal costs". 
Price signals are then acting as "the handmaiden of investment policy" 
(Posner 1973), because they tell consumers of the capacity and runn1ng 
costs associated with adjusting a given set of plant to cater for the 
caprices of their demands. 
To develop this idea of price signals it is necessary to say 
something about costs and investment policy. At this stage I am only 
going to present some simple summary ideas of the way modern econom1cs 
looks at these; thes.e ·ideas are based on the more extended analysis of 
. ...... . ·' 
• i 
Part II of my thesis. 
Modern theoretical approaches have stressed the dynamic 
nature of the planning problem with the result that the static 
traditional textbook ideas of short and long run marginal costs are 
not helpful; it is more ~seful to borrow some French concepts among 
which is the idea of the marginal costs associated with an "adjusted" 
system i.e. a system of plant and equipment '"hich has evolved from 
following an optimal investment policy - ·(in this analysis optimal is 
synonomous with cost minimizing). All the structural changes to be 
considered are evaluated in terms of C* - the minimum value of the 
present worth of all system costs. The value of C* is the outcome of 
a policy of investment in plant in order to meet the forecast output 
requirements for each of the years of the planner's time horizon. The 
output requirements are"represented by (X0 , x1 , ••• , Xt, •.• ). 
Consider now the appearance of a new consumer who announces 
that he will require the following set of outputs beginning in year s of 
the plan: (~Xs' ~Xs+l' ... ~Xt, ... ). The electricity authority can 
regard this as a permanent output increment and requires to find the 
cheapest way of meeting it. When this has been done and the plant system 
adjusted to meet these output increments in the least expensive way then 
the extra costs are signalled to the consumer in the form of prices. First, 
look at the characteristics of the existing system. There '"ill exist at 
any time a set of plants of different ages and types for providing output 
and also a set of plans for plants for later years. 
generally differ in two ways: 
The plants will 
.. 
• 
- ----------- - -
• (a) ~n the ratio of capacity to runn~ng costs; e.g. nuclear 
plant usually has a very high capacity cost and a very low 
running cost while at the other extreme small gas turbines 
have a relatively low capacity cost but a relatively high 
running cost. In between there is a spectrum ranging in turn 
through hydro facilities, oil and coal fired plants. 
(b) The plants will also differ in the extent to which age has 
reduced their cost saving attributes. The most up-to-date 
plant of a g~ven type will have lower running and capacity 
costs than older plant of the same type; the two forces of 
technological advance in design and manufacture and wear and 
tear due to use ensure this. The desirability of using any 
given plant (whatever its type and age) will depend on its 
"cost savings" its ability to lm.;rer C'~' below ·what it .other-
wise v70uld be. On the system at any time there are certain 
plants ~n operation and certain plants on standby. Those on 
the margin of operation could be called marginal plants and 
it is their running costs that are the marginal generating costs 
of the system. Any other plant in operation will show a running 
cost saving over the marginal plant and such plants will have 
been scheduled into the investment policy because the present 
worth of their lifetime cost savings was at least as great at 
the time of installation as their capacity costs. 
In this context consider the permanent output increment the new 
customer brings along. He may have arrived at a planned or expected lull 
I 
in demand, a period in which there ~s a large reserve of standby plant. 
For at least one period his demand ~s met by bringing in one of these 
;2.1 
standby plants at a cost that reflects only the marginal generating cost 
of the system. However eventually - perhaps in the next period - there 
will be no planned spare capacity and to meet his continuing extra demand 
the electricity authority .has to build more capacity. It now incurs a 
stream of extra capacity and running costs. However the new capacity, 
if built, will not be kept in the reserve margin. Such will be its cost 
s·avings due to its "up-to-dateness" that it will push out some older plant 
into the reserve. The stream of runn1ng costs associated with the new 
demand will be reduced by having newer plant to deal with it, and the 
correct marginal cost term is the present -.;.;orth of capacity costs and the 
running costs on the "adjusted" system of plant. 
Of course if the consumer appears when there is no planned 
excess capacity at all then the new capacity must be·built immediately 
and the marginal costs will be all the greater. 
·summarized: 
These ideas are easily 
(a) the consumer appears at a time period, 8, at which there is 
spare capacity. The total extra costs he imposes are 
P.W. ( 8, ~) of marginal generating costs 
+ 
P.W. ( ~. oo) of capacity and marginal generating costs 
on the adjusted system. 
(the express1on P.W. (a, b) denotes the present worth now of 
an expenditure stream beginning at a and ending at b). 
At the date ~ there is no longer any spare capacity and new 
capacity is built. 
:o. 
(b) the consumer appears when ther-e is no spare capacity at all 
and incurs costs of 
P.W. ( e, ro) of capacity and marginal generating costs on the 
adjusted system. 
The present worth sum in case (a) must be lower than Ln case 
(b) and the economist will expect to see this signalled to the consumer. 
The electricity authority simply has to P-xtract from the new customer a 
different lump sum of present worth incremental costs according to the 
starting date of the customer's demand. It is the overwhelming importance 
of the effect of different starting dates on costs which has to be 
signalled. Any way of extracting this sum will do. For instance the 
consumer may be offered one of several options; e.g. 
(i) pay a lump sum for a contract of supply 
(ii) pay an annuity over the years of supply 
(iii) pay a varying annual sum declining from an initially 
high starting value 
The customer will choose according to his discount rate and views 
of the future. Option (iii) is interesting because although it does not 
accord with the usual idea of discounting the future it does reflect what 
is happening to the electricity authority's costs. Remember that 
equipment is installed on the basis of projected lifetime cost savings. 
These cost savLngs can be expected to decline over the capacity's life 
due to the forces of technological progress and wear and tear. The choice 
of an "amortization" stream to recover capacity costs will then fall to a 
method that writes off more of the value of capacity Ln earlier years than 
I 
in later years. 
None of the above schemes makes any allmv-ance for expected 
lulls in demand. In a period of large excess capacity the cost savings 
of some capacity rna:: drop to zero only to rise aga1.n as demand picks up. 
To reflect this the authority may try a two part tariff: 
(a) a capacity element that recovers installation costs 
according to the starting date of demand 
(b) a running charge that varies with the level of e~~cess 
capacity. 
The chief point that emerges 1.s that to the economist the 
starting date of the permanent output increment determines the cost of 
providing for it. This is the basis of what the French have called 
"dynamic marginal cost". 
However this sort of cost recovery is not what electricity 
authorities have usually practised. Most of the tariff schemes in 
operation throughout the world do not recognize the permanent nature of 
a new item of demand. Instead new permanent customers are treated as 
a succession of instantaneous customers and some idea of "instantaneous 
dynamic marginal cost" needs to be developed by the economist. The 
most celebrated attempt to do this in the English literature is Ralph 
Turvey's 1969 paper in the Economic Journal. 
Once more the starting date of demand is all important but to 
maintain the idea of costing only instantaneous demand changes, the 
definition of marginal cost amounts to calculating the difference made 
to costs by postponing (or advancing) the startiri'g date of a permanent 
output increment. The same cost elements are involved - capacity and 
running costs - but now we have to consider only the fraction of the total 
present worth of costs that is avoided (or incurred) by postponing a 
starting date (or advancing it). 
Looking at the expressions (a) and (b) we used above, try to 
work out the effect on C* of postponing e by one period. Beginning 
with expression (a) (for the case where a new consumer appears 1n a 
lull in demand requiring no new capacity to be installed), the only term 
depending on 6 is the present worth of the stream of marginal generating 
costs. Hence varying 6 saves or incurs only an instant's marginal 
generating cost i.e. 
(a) instantaneous dynamic marginal cost is marginal 
generating cost in period 6. 
However if - as in case (b) - the consumer's appearance reqtnres 
extra capacity to be built, the change in 6 will affect the present \<IOrth 
sum of capacity and running costs together: 
(b) instantaneous dynamic marginal cost is 
(i) marginal generating cost in period 6 on the 
adjusted system 
plus (ii) year a's fraction of capacity costs. 
Despite the fact that we now have a different conception of 
marginal cost, the crucial determinant of its value is still the time 
period 6 in which demand appears. Case (a) would require a lower pr1ce 
than case (b). However the consumer is now only. available for one instant 
for the recovery of costs•and cannot be offered a variety of tariff 
schemes;he can only be offered a different price for each time period 1n 
which he might appear. 
This then is the economist's ~arginalist approach to tariff 
setting and his policy prescription is to announce the tariff as a set 
of forward prices for the planning horizon so consumers are made aware 
of the fact that it is the particular time period of their extra demand 
that determines how costly it is for the electricity authority to provide 
them with supply for that period. 
This particular piece of analysis can be tidied up by examining 
a simple model of the measurement of instantaneous dynamic marginal cost. 
(a) the consumer appears at an off peak period 
marginal cost is: marginal g~nerating cost on the existing 
system without new capacity: at 
(b) consumer's appearance requires new capacity because he appears 
at a peak 
marginal cost is: marginal cost of building and running new 
capacity this period: st 
st has two elements: 
(i) a running cost element which is lower than at for case 
(a) because the adjusted system takes advantage of the 
"up-to-dateness" of the new plant. 
(ii) an amortization element which ~n future years will 
fall because the continuation of technological progress 
requires that the largest amount of recovery of capital 
costs he ~n the first year of operation of the new 
capacity. 
Now suppose we have already reached an optin~um of C* and are 
looking at infitesimally small changes in demand around the optimum. 
If our optimal investment policy has properly allowed for the appearance 
of infitesimally small changes in demand then it turns out that at = St• 
In other words, the cost of working old capacity a little harder for an 
instant is ve~·y nearly identical to the cost of installing new capacity 
and running it for that instant after first instant's amortization charge 
has been added on to the new capacity's relatively lmver running cost. 
(The precise mathematics of this is indicated in Part II of my thesis.) 
The models that have appeared in the electricity prLc~ng 
literature contain the germ of the above ideas though they are usually 
expressed in terms of the static diagrams of traditional microeconomic 
theory. The basic idea of a single price for electricity for a gLven 
period making up a tariff structure of hourly or periodic prices still 
emerges. To. set the result in the context of that literature I now 
present a brief summary of the more well kno'VlU contributions ·to peak load 
pricing theory by economists. 
PEAK LOAD PRICING HODELS IN THE ECONOHICS LITERATURE 
The peak load pricing problem has been the most famous of the 
electricity tariff problems tackled by professional economists and the 
"solution" has been suggested several times, one of the best treatments 
being the early work of Lewis (1941). The models examine electricity 
demand in several subperiods but the chief unit of time is a cycle of 
subperiods. Each subperiod has its OVlU demand curve 
p. = p. (x.) 
J J J 
J = 1 ••• n 
Capacity need only satisfy the largest of these demands, which means 
the "off peak" demands are not "responsible" for some part of the capacity 
of the system, and in "off peak" subperiods some of this total capacity 
is unused. The problem £s hmv to decide on optimal capacity and then 
allocate its costs. 
One solution might appear to be to allocate all capacity costs 
to one demand and only operating costs to other demands in off peak 
periods. The tariff implication of this is two variable cha~ges per KWh 
= + 
= 
p1 bears the operating costs of subperiod 1, c 1 , plus all capacity costs 
S whereas Pz bears only the operat~ng costs of subperiod 2, c2 • This is 
in fact not the general solution, but only a solution to a particular case. 
However Houthakker (1951) believing that a practical constraint was the 
necessity to have no more than two running charges, argued for this 
solution. Several subperiods might pay p1 and several Pz but no other 
prices would be charged. This means that several different loads may 
bear the same price. Let us call this the Houthakker solution. 
To obtain the so called "correct" solution which has the 
property that the same load may be charged several different prices we 
can use the model of Littlechild (1970). 
Once again the partial equilibrium welfare criterion ~s to 
maximize willingness to pay less social cost. For one subperiod w·e 
have: 
x. 
B = J J p. (x.) dx. 
J J J 
- c. x. 
J J 0 
where c. is operating cost per unit of output. 
J 
But how do w·e decide 
optimal capacity, which will be equal to at least one of the demands in 
the subperiods. Steiner's solution to this was to measure the "demand 
for capacity" in the manner of the demand for a public good; by vertical 
summation of the demand,curves (Steiner 1957 ). He therefore obtains 
a measure of total social benefit from a given amount of capacity, and 
this capacity is available to satisfy any subperiod demand: it exactly 
provides for peak periods' demand and more than provides for off peak 
periods' demands. This at least illustrates the nature of the final 
solution, although there may be problems in actually attaining it. Total 
benefit in other words is 
x. 
J = n J 
~ J 
0 
p. (x.) dx. 
J J J 
where J ~s an index of subperiods 
j = 1 
We still have to consider capacity cost. The easiest way ~s 
to think of this as an annual equivalent charge. Think of a piece of 
new equipment costing K dollars. K can be thought of as the present 
value of a constant time stream of payments: 
K = S (l+i)n - 1 
i (l+i)n 
where i is the rate of discount and n is the life of the equipment. 
Hence 
= annual (or per time unit) cost of capacity = K i(l+i)n 
(l+i)n-1 
as n + ro, S + iK and if we also allow for depreciation in physical terms, 
as n + ro, S + (i+d)K where d. is the physical rate of decay of the equipment. 
Let us call the amount of capacity purchased y and make 
explicit the constraint that output may never exceed capacity: 
x. ~ y 
J 
J = 1 ... n 
Hence our problem can be written as the non-linear program 
maximize L(x x y v v ) -1 · · · n' ' 1 · · • n -
j=n 
L 
j=l 
X· 
f Jp. (x.) dx. 
0 J J J 
j=n 
L 
j=l 
for x. 
J 
y ~ o, j=l ••• n 
C·X· 
J J 
By + 
j=n 
L 
j=l 
.. 
No't'r writing dmm the Kuhn-Tucker conditions for the local rnax1.rnum to this 
problem (for an explanation of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions see the Appendix 
to Part II) o 
aL 
ax. 
J 
X. aL 
J ax. J 
x. ~ 0 
J 
a1 
ay 
a1 
Yay 
y ?-- 0 
a1 
av. 
J 
a1 
v. "' J ov. 
J 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
P· J 
x. 
J 
-B 
(x.) 
J 
(p. 
J 
(x.) 
J 
j=n 
+ E 
j =1 
y(-8 
j=n 
+ E 
j=l 
y -X. ~ 0 
J 
C· v. 
J 
c. 
J 
v. ~ 0 
J 
v.) 
J 
J 
= 
V. (y :_X.) = 0 
J J 
~ 0 
for J 1 0 0 0 n 
v.) = 0 
J 
0 
for J = 1 o o o n 
we can simplify these by assum~ng ~n turn 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
x. > 0 
J 
then p. - c. + v. 
J J J 
y = x. 
J 
then v. > o 
J 
y > x. 
J 
then v. = o 
J 
(iv) y > o 
then 13 = 
j=n 
r 
j=l 
v. 
J 
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These then reduce to the following simple rules: from (i) and 
(ii) if output is equal to capacity, price exceeds operating cost by some 
element v. whichwill restrict output to capacity. 
J 
In other cases, 
prices equals operating cost only. From (iii) and (iv) the sum of all 
these market clearing excesses of price over operating cost should just 
cover the cost of new capacity. The welfare interpretation of the v. ~s 
J 
the additional social benefit of a unit of new cap'acity, as measured by 
.. 
the intensity of its total evaluation among consumers. 
This is the basic solution arrived at several times in the 
literature. The most convenient diagrammatic formulation is that of 
Heishleifer (1958) - see fig. II, 1, \vhich has now become quite famous. 
For simplicity operating costs are assumed to be the same and constant 
in both subperiods: Oc, and the two (these could be n) subperiod demand 
The demand for capacity curve is 
Dc = p1 (x1) + p2 (x2), the vertical summation of the demand curves. In 
terms of the classical exposition, capacity costs are joint to both 
periods and we can draw up a "joint" LMC curve which in this simplified 
case LS S + 2c - cycle LMC (note the horizontal axis measures output per 
subperiod). 
Suppose for the moment capacity LS OZ. The market clearing 
prices are ZG and ZE and demand is restricted to capacity in both 
subperiods. The distances EF and GF are the illustration of the Kuhn-
Tucker multipliers v1 and v 2• Since the distance (ZE + ZG) = ZR exceeds 
S + 2c = LMC, the Kuhn-Tucker criterion 
s = E 
J 
v. 
J 
is not satisfied and capacity may be increased; the extra social benefit 
LS i.llustrated by the triangle RST. Capacity is optimal when no 
additional consumers' surplus can be obtained, i.e. at OY. At OY capacity, 
output is again the same in both subperiods ox1 = ox2 = OY and prices 
charged are AP1 and AP 2 (see side of figure); both exceed operating 
costs, but by different amounts since the marginal evaluation of capacity 
in subperiod 2 exceeds that of subperiod 1. 
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Clearly then the solution does not necessarily involve the 
recovery of capacity costs only from the peak demand, charging off 
peak demand only for operating costs. This could lead to severe 
difficulties. Consider this ·Houthakker solution in fig.II~l. It would 
appear that p 1 (x1) is charged a price of Oc and p2 (x2 ) is charged S+ c. 
This leads then to outputs 0~' and OXz'; the "peak" has now shifted 
and lvhat l.ras previously off peak demand now exceeds capacity and previous 
'peak' demand now falls short of capacity. 
Lewis (1941) seems to have been the first to arrive at the 
'correct' solution. Houthakker developed his solution - which is correct 
when p1 (x1) falls short of capacity even when charged no capacity costs-
in 1951. In 1949 Boiteaux had obtained the general solution for a cost 
minimizing objective function and later Steiner, Hirshleifer and Williamson 
all reached the same point, Williamson's being perhaps the most general 
solution. 
The tariff implication ofthis recommendation 1s a vector of 
.,. 
variable cha~ges per Kwh 
where j is an index of the subperiods of a demand cycle; the larger is 
demand in a subperiod, the more are capacity costs charged to that 
subperiod's demand. A current illustration is the Victorian time of 
day tariff: 
7 a.m. - 11 p.m. 
( first 200 Kwh per month) 4.85 o/:. Kwh 
11 p.m. - 7 a.m. 
( all consumption) 1.00 r/. Kwh 
Especially in the European literature there has long been a 
preoccupation with another objective of tariff setting - recovering 
a deficit from marginal cost pricing arising from increasing returns to 
scale. 
Henderson (1947) seems to have been one of the first to tackle 
this problem which arises when LAC > LMC. 
His general solution was to have 
average price > marginal price; a typical example of this 
is the two part tariff. If you like, this is really the "bridge building 
solution". Charge only marginal cost for a service and provide the 
service in the first place if total consumers surplus exceeds total cost 
of building the service. Recover this surplus by charging a fixed sum 
to all potential users who may then use the facility by paying a variable 
charge equal to marginal cost. 
The tariff implication 1s 
fixed charge: A 
variable charge: p per Kwh 
as an example we have: (Tasmania) 
supply charge per room 41.00 ri 
per quarter 
charge per unit 2. 41 c/. per K~1h 
(first 300 units) 
The fixed charge finances the service. 
This is quite simple. However, the two part tariff in 
electricity supply is a great deal older than Henderson's paper. It 
th 
was introduced in the 19 century by Hopkinson as a "scientific" way 
of allocating costs and solving the peak load problem. 
Consider Houthakker's solution to the peak load problem. The 
two part tariff was an attempt to achieve this by charging one running 
rate (r/. per K\vh) and a fixed charge "proportionate to the greatest rate 
of supply the consumer will ever take". The essentially fallacious 
point is associating peak demand with certain consumers rather than 
recognizing that all consumers may be involved in both peak and off peak 
demand. There is no necessary correlation between the greatest supply 
a consumer will take and peak demand on the generating system • 
.. 
·., 
Despite its illogicallity this tariff has dominated electricity 
supply pricing all over the world since its first introduction at the 
close of the nineteenth century. All sorts of reasoned arguments are 
g1ven for two part or multipart charging, and it is generally favoured 
by engineers. A good example of the arguments advanced in its favour 
appears in a United Nations publication "Electricity Costs and Tariffs: 
a general study" (1972) designed to be used by generating authorities in 
developing countries. The authorities begin by noting that there are 
chiefly two types of "cost" in electricity supply: fixed and variable 
corresponding to the two "services" provided: readiness to supply and 
supply itself. It is reasonable therefore that two types of price be 
charged - a standing charge and an energy charge with only the latter 
varying with output taken. The arguments here are entirely different 
from Henderson's quoted above. Henderson 1s trying·to capture the 
consumers' surplus at maximum use to cover the monetary costs of a project 
for which it is already known that social benefit outweighs social cost. 
The present argument is based on a (mistaken) view of the costs of 
supplying electricity. The argument 1s 1n the language of cost 
accountancy- essential for managers' monitoring of current performance 
but no guide to decision making. The first fallacy consists in 
differentiating readiness to supply from supply itself. Decisions about 
policy are concerned with meeting a given energy demand; nothing more. 
Capacity is varied to meet demand in the cheapest way, hence the notion 
of fixed costs associated with readiness to supply is purely arbitrary 
and misleading; it fails to recognize that price policy is designed to 
signal to the consumer that the authority is carrying out planned changes 
in capacity according to forecast demand variations • The true electricity 
.. 
supply problem is not to cover costs of fixed capacity but, as we have 
seen, to accommodate fluctuations in de~and when output cannot be stored. 
However it may be possible under certa:ia conditions to tackle 
the peak load pricing problem with a two part tariff (Lewis ( 19l•l)). To 
do this the standing charge would have to be based on the amount the 
consumer will take at the time of maxlmum system demand. This could then 
give the same sort of solu.tion as the firm peak case described above in 
figure II, 1. 
This is the tariff advocated by Posner (1973) and used ln bulk 
supply tariffs for both electricity and gas in Britain. In its ideal 
form the standing charge or charges depend on "nominated" consumption at 
the next peak of system demand. This does signal peak capacity costs 
(which is what is required) and carries an incentive for the customer to 
shift his peak away from the time of system peak. But while it does 
signal some true cost information, it does not signal as much as the 
proper time of day tariff. Its proponents argue that it is less complex 
than a time of day tariff (this is Posner's defence ln particular). 
However the sort of time of day tariff they have in mind is the purist's 
I 
vast array of forward prices. A more limited set of time of day charges 
could be no more complex than the sort of multipart tariffs at present in 
use and could still signal much more information to users. 
In any case, the standing charge for Tasmania that we described 
above is hardly adequate as a system maximum demand signal. Charges 
related to such parameters as room size or quality of house bear only the 
most tenuous relationship to a customer's con.tribut~on to system maximum 
demands. Some fixed cha~ges are however related to maximum demand e.g. 
for consumer's maximum demand $ 2.70 
in KW per month, metered on 
special meter on consumer's 
premises 
running charge 
(first 1000 Kwh per month) 3.51 r/. per Kwh 
This applies to industrial consumers in South Australia. But 
again, this maximum demend measure is not necessarily related to maximum 
demand on the system, and its usefulness as a solution to the peak loading 
problem is probably very limited. 
Nevertheless, this concept has been so popular that it turns up 
1n a variety of guises. Other forms include block tariffs, or quantity 
discounts. A different running charge operates in each block. "Eariier" 
blocks e.g. first 50 Kwh per month may be charged at a relatively high rate 
with charges diminishing thereafter. The tar.iff implication is 
For demand = X* P (x1) • . . p (x.) • • • p (x ) J n 
n 
with I X· = X* 
j=l J 
and earlier ch&rges reflect more of capacity 
costs than later charges. 
" 
The Henderson argument of course was for two part tariffs as • 
a solution to the financing problem. However~ the t\vo part tariff or 
block tariff is not the only theoretical solution t6 the financing 
problem. Consider an individual consumer's demand curve for electricity 
(assume no peak/off peak loading problem for convenience) 
= k = 1 .•• m 
v7here the index k represents particular consumers. 
The supplier's objective is again assumed to be the maximization of 
benefits less cost. In this case benefits are the horizontal summation 
of the individual demand curves and an additional constraint is the 
provision of a surplus over costs: 
i.e. 
= 
'·· 
where C( ) is the general social cost function and S is the financial 
surplus required. 
Using the expression: 
= 
for the compensated pn.ce elasticity of "demand, the optimality 
conditions can be simplified as follows (Baumol and Bradford 1970) 
where k = l •.. m is an 
= a 
(1-a) ek index of individual 
consumers 
and where a = C3L, the marginal social utility of a $ 1. 00 of surplus, 
as 
and ck = ClC/d~. 
In other words each consumer is charged a price above marginal cost, 
the excess varying among different consumers according to each consumer's 
elasticity of demand. The tariff implication of this method of 
financing is a vector of running charges 
Where the index describes different consumers or consumer groups. 
This aga~n is widely used: e.g. in all states, the marginal 
running charges vary among consumer classes of the type: 
- residental consumers 
- commercial consumers 
- industrial consumers 
religious organizations 
- all consumers together 
He can sum up this summary of the theoretically suggested pricing 
schemes by looking at the tariff implications ~hey derived: 
(i) time of day tariffs, with peak demand prices showing a 
relatively greater reflection of capacity costs 
(ii) (a) t\vo part tariffs, \vith the standing charge reflecting 
q:tpacity costs 
Jtl 
(b) use of maximum demand charges, reflecting capacity costs 
(c) use of block tariffs, with "earlier" blocks reflecting 
capacity costs relatively more 
(iii) running charges that discriminate amongst different groups of 
consumers. 
We now want to obtain some empirical measure of the application 
of these schemes. 
• 
CHAPTER III 
ELECTRICITY TARIFFS IN PRACTICE 
There are several possible ways of obtaining a measure of 
the practice of theoretical principles. I have chosen one which 
depends on rather heroic assumptions but is nevertheless quite useful. 
Part III of this thesis outlines a basically recursive 
model of electricity demand and supply. The second equation block 
of the simple model represents a purely cost based set of tariffs. Now 
this pricing hypothesis has found widespread use in recent years in 
macroeconometric model building where prices are usually related to a 
measure of normal unit labour costs and normal unit capital costs (e.g. 
Norton and Others, 1970; Hellit~ell et. al. 1969). More generally I 
have assumed tariffs are related to planned unit costs in roughly the 
categories: 
fuel for generation 
- 'other' generating costs; chiefly labour costs 
- capacity costs 
Following the basic macro-modelling approach: 
= rJ. + E 
i s. x. + v 1 1t t 
where pt is price and xi is planned unit cost of the ith factor of 
production, and vt is a disturbance term. 
Using the data of the Electricity Supply Association of 
Australia the basic categories of unit cost corresponding to our 
theoretical analysis that can be singled out are: 
UFCP 
UOCP 
UICP 
UDCP 
planned 
planned 
planned 
planned 
unit 
unit 
unit 
unit 
fuel for generation costs 
other costs 
interest costs 
depreciation costs 
Clearly (UICP + UDCP) correspond to "capacity costs" of the 
theory (see remarks on S CH.II) and (UFCP + UOCP) correspond to 
operating costs. 
I would like to postpone for the moment the actual measurement 
of planned cost~ given a knowledge of actual costs; I will explain 
this_after considering the price cogt relationships. 
There are several reasons why the normal cost pricing hypothesis 
has been used in macro econometric modelling: the basic hypothesis is: 
II prices move with long run costs and do not change because 
of variations in demand or cost which are thought to be 
temporary ••• " 
(Godley and Nordhaus 1972) 
In fact there have been many arguments for using only 
infrequent variations in electricity tariffs becaus'e there are 
administrative and other economic costs.involved in changing tariffs 
and adapting to them. Consequently the 'normal' cost hypothesis 
appears quite attractive as an explanation of the relatively slow 
movements in administered electricity tariffs. An examination of 
the Australian data suggests that on average, some major alteration 
in tariff schedules occurs every three years. 
While adopting the hypothesis, I have tried to develop what 
I believe is a better measure of normal costs - I have called it 
planned costs, and I will set this out after considering the tariff 
relationships. The reason for this ordering is that the method of 
measurement does itself cast light on some problems raised in the 
application of theoretical tariffs. First I would like to consider 
the price data. 
TARIFF DATA 
The data consist of numbers of different tariff series 
charged to various categories of consumers in most parts of Australia 
over the last twenty years. Unfortunately every state could not be 
represented. No published tariff series covering Queensland was 
obtainable at the time of writing. In New South Wales there are so 
many distribution authorities (though some are more important than 
others) that it was not possible to relate published tariffs to the 
existing State wide cost data. This leaves four states in the sample: 
Victoria, South Australia, West Australia and Tasmania, and some very 
good 'hard' data on electricity prices was obtain~ble for these States 
covering the period of the 1950's and 1960's. Frqm this data, it 
proved possible to set up electricity pr~ce series of .much more use 
and complexity than conventional average revenue figures, and this 
~s one of the most interesting aspects of the study. All in all, 
nearly 300 different rates for a unit of electricity have been used 
in these 4 states over the post war period, an astonishing degree of 
pricediscrimination which bears little relationsh~p to the actual 
marginal costs of the units produced. In many cases reported tariffs 
overlapped for different classes of consumers and often a tariff was 
used for a few years, discontinued for a period and then perhaps used 
again ~n a slightly different category. Very often the amounts at 
which quantity discounts became available were altered. Nevertheless 
a ·substantial number of complete continuous, usable series have been 
obtained, pertaining to different consumer categories, seasons and 
times. These form the basis of the present study. The coverage 
of the tariffs will become plain in the reported results, where the 
following comprehensive coding system has been adopted. 
STATES: There are 4 states covered 
VICTORIA V 
SOUTH AUSTRALIA S 
WEST AUSTRALIA W 
TASMANIA T 
CATEGORIES: There are 5 distinct categories of consumers used 
RESIDENTIAL A 
INDUSTRIAL B 
COMMERCIAL C 
COMMUNITY SERVICE, RURlu .. , OR OTHER D 
ALL CONSUMERS E 
QUANTITIES: Quantities for bulk discounts are in ascending 
order, beginning '-1i th the most expensive: 
1, 2, 3 . • . 
PREFIX: One prefix, R, is used to denote a tariff only 
available,in restricted hours, during the day or 
night. 
RATIO: The ratio of an off peak, or night time restricted 
hour tariff to its peak or day time alternative is 
denoted: PI 
The coding is then Ln the following order: 
PREFIX (Restricted hour: CATEGORY: STATE: QUANTITY if used) 
so that for example: 
RAVl is the most expensive quantity block (1) of a Victorian (V) 
restricted hour tariff (R) applicable to residential consumers (A). 
CBT3 is the third (3) quantity block of a Tasmanian (T) tariff 
applicable to commercial (C) and industrial (B) consumers. 
47 
A full listing of the published name of each tariff used 
in this study, along with a copy of the data, which, it is felt, 
will be of interest to other workers in this field; is obtainable from 
the author. 
OVERALL REGRESSION PERFORMANCE 
Returning to estimation of tariff-cost relations in practice, 
it can be recalled that the basic model was 
= a. + I: s. 
1 1 
with x. being unit factor cost. 
1t 
x. + v 
1t t 
Despite some evidence of multicollinearity (it was decided 
not to drop "wrongly" signed variables to guard against specification 
e~ror) the overall performance was fair. Usually about 80-90% of the 
variance in tariffs was explained by unit cost measures. T~e regressions 
however were only part of the task. Regression coefficients are not 
enough to indicate the relative strengths of relationships with 
different variables; some systematic measure of individual contribution 
is required. Several statistics are available (Goldberger 1964 
pages 197-20G and the one chosen was the partial correlation coefficient: 
the square root of the proportion of variation in p (after all other 
regressors have been allowed for) which was accounted for by x .• 
J 
This 
statistic is preferred by both Goldberger (1964) and Theil (1971) to 
other forms of decomposition of the total explanation. It is 
equivalent to the ordinary correlation coefficient between xjt and the 
residuals: 
(p - E S. x.t -a). 
t i=/:j ~ 1. 
These experiments can be summed up as follows: 
(a) a detailed breakdown of tariff types was obtained. 
(b) each type was regressed against measures of planned unit fuel, 
11 other11 , interest and depreciation costs. 
(a) partial correlation coefficients for those cost variables 
entering each equation with a positive sign were calculated 
and these coefficients were used to examine the testable hypotheses 
of the theoretical·treatments o~ electricity prices. 
In the analysis which follows, especial attention is paid to 
those variables for which the partial correlation coefficient with a 
tariff category is at least as large as 0.300. This figure corresponds, 
for the sample size used here, to a t - test critical rejection level of 
the hypothesis thdt the regression coefficient does not differ from zero 
of about 25%. 
It is easy to argue that this approach is rather crude, but 
given the availability of data it can be expected to yield some helpful 
insights into tariff setting behaviour. The full results are analysed 
by cost and tariff categories for each state in tables III, 1, a, b, c and d 
(Victoria, South Australia, West Australia and Tasmania). 
Table III, 1 (a) 
PARTif~ CORRELATION OF R2 OF THE 
TARIFF NP.ME TARIFF AND PLANNED COST ESTIMATING 
UFCP UOCP UICP UDCP EQUATION 
1. AVl 0.584 0.008 0.9029 
2. AV2 0.466 0.015 0.9517 
3. AV4 0.539 . 0.9612 
4. BV3 0.270 0.182 0.9258 
5. BV6 0.386 0.150 0.445 0. 7245 
6. BV8 (MDCH) 0.139 0.001 0.2357 
7. RCVlO 0.339 0.005 0.194 0.302 0.8778 
8. CVl 0.413 0.224 0.287 0.8179 
9. CV2 0.284 0.169 0.9273 
10. CV6 0.247 : 0.182 0.9129 
11. CBVl 0.269 0.184 0.9259 
.. 
12. CBV2 0.297 0.147 0.9252 
13. CBV3 0.324 0.175 0.9354 
14. CBV4 0.060 0.157 0.053 0.220 0.9036 
15. REVl 0.597 0.168 0.474 0.5672 
So 
Table III, I (b) 
PARTIAL CORRELATION OF R2 OF THE I 
TARIFF NAME TARIFF AND PLANNED COST ESTUfATING I 
UFCP UOCP UICP UDCP EQUATION 
. 
1. AS2 0.019 0.509 0.347 0.6526 
2. AS3 0.096 0.366 0.438 0.7038 
.. 
3. AS4 0.428 0.443 0.069 0.343 0.7920 
4. ASS 0.204 0.589 0.397 0.6257 
5. RBSl 0.394 0.120 0. 45'•7 
6. RBS2 0.578 0.4214 
7. RBS3 0.411 0.321 0.077 o. 7405 
8. RBS4 0.398 0.426 0.002 0.7866 
9. ESl 0.194 0.500 0.459 0.6270 
. 
10. ES2 0.072 0.378 0.429 0.7175 
11. ES3 0.082 0.370 0.418 0.6909 
12. ES4 0.112 0.611 0.378 0.6489 
13. ES6 0.173 0.520 0.449 0.6381 
14. ES7 0.422 0.343 0.7423 
15. ES8 0.068 0.578 0.368 0. 6408 
16. RES9 0.434 0.341 0. 7703 
17. RESlO 0.416 0.354 0.7332 
18. RESll 0.063 0.539 0.196 0.4240 
" 
~-, 
Table III, 1 (c) 
PARTIAL CORRELATION OF R2 OF THE 
TARIFF NAME TARIFF AND PLANNED COST ESTIMATING 
lJFCP UOCP UICP UDCP EQUATION 
1. AWl 0.888 0.385 0.326 0.9307 
2. BWl 0.950 0.651 0.9567 
3. BW2 0.683 0.365 0.132 0.8072 
4. BW3 0.855 0.186 0.093 0.185 0.8944 
5. CBWl 0.870 0.600 0.8546 
6. EWl 0.785 0.331 . 0.088 0.073 0. 8650' 
7. EW3 0.910 0.041 0.432 0. 9088 
8. EW4 0.689 0.399· 0.097 0.8234 
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Table III, 1 (d) 
PARTIAL CORRELATION OF R2 OF THE 
TARIFF NAJ.v1E TARIFF AND PLANNED COST ESTIHATING 
UFCP UOCP UICP UDCP EQUATION 
1. AT2 . 0.382 0.052 0.8988 
2. BT3 0.034 0.362 0.8794 
3. BT4 0.432 0.8026 
4. CBTl 0.095 0.358 0.9031 
5. CBT2 0.109 0.321 0.8917 
6. CBT3 0.387 0.8422 
. 
7. DTl 0.397 0.8450 
8. DT2 0.001 0.376 0. 8729 
. 
9. RET2 0.035 0.366 0.8838 
10. RET4 0.298 0.106 0.8843 
Before examining the details ·df the different categories, 
there is one result that we can expect to show up straight away. It 
has been a frequently reported characteristic of the post war 
history of the .electricity authorities that it is inflation that most 
often prompts an authority to restructure its tariffs. For example, 
both South Australia and Victoria have recently (1973) announced tariff 
changes based on Jabour cost escalations. Recalling that labour costs 
are measured in the "other" costs category, it is to be expected on the 
basis of the authorities' public statements that the cost category UOCP 
(planned unit "other" costs) might have greatest influence on tariff 
movements. Table III, 2 shmv-s the overall picture but table III, 3 shmv-s that 
there may be considerable interstate differences in the impact of cost 
inflation on tariffs. 
However the important question to ask ~s whether - g~ven that 
tariffs have risen to recover cost rises due to inflation - these 
changes have overwhelmed the application of the theoretically suggested 
tariff schemes •. What has inflation recovery done to the principles 
(economic based or engineering based) of tariff determination? 
It can be shown that when there are theoretically determined 
cost-tariff ratios the recovery of inflation in costs need not distort 
the underlying relationships. The appendix to this part of the thesis 
investigates the effects of cost inflation on some aspects of tariff 
setting. The results are quite simple to summarize: 
... 
Table III, 2 
Partial Correlation with different 
tariff types: 
(a) No. of positive coefficients 
(b) As % of 128 
Table III,3 
POSITIVE CORRELATION WITH TARIFF 
VICTORIA (a) No. of Positive 
Correlation Coefficients 
(b) As % of 35 
SOUTH AUSTRALIA (a) No. of Positive 
Correlation 
Coefficients · 
(b) As % of 47 
WEST AUSTRALIA (a) No. of Positive 
Correlation 
Coefficients 
(b) As % of 28 
TASHANIA (a) No. of Positive 
Correlation Coefficients 
(b) As % of 17 
Cost Categories 
UFCP UOCP UICP HDCP 
27 41 27 33 
21· 32 21 26 
UFCP UOCP UICP UDCP 
5 13 5 12 
14 37 14 34 
" .. 
13 15 3 17 
28 32 6 36 
9 6 9 4 
32 21 32 14 
(n. a.) 7 10 0 
(n. a.) 41 59 0 
ss 
(i) inflation at equal rates in operating and capacity cost categories 
should leave tariffs relatively in same relationship with each 
other. 
(ii) faster rates of inflation in particular cost categories should be 
reflected most in the tariffs with highest relative weighting of 
those costs •. 
Thus inflation in costs can be recovered without distorting the 
basic principles of tariff setting. 
Nevertheless this theoretical result may not be practised 
by electricity authorities who may - 1n trying to cover inflation - pay 
scant attention to the principles of tariff setting. 
DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
Begin with the tariff principles derived from the peak loading 
problem; as we have seen there are several ways of treating .the 
complication of varying loads. 
Most authorities do consider the possibility of off peak 
tariffs. West Australia however is an exception. There are no off 
peak options wh~tsoever available to any West Australian consumers. 
The other states sampled use time of day tariffs to a varying degree 
for different consumers. None however use more than 2 separate time 
periods; usually these are 
7 a.m. - 11 p.m. 
11 p.m. - 7 a.m. 
Peak (day) 
Off Peak (Night) 
This suggests they adopt at most the "wrong" Houthakker 
solution to the problem and consequently charge the same price for 
different amounts of supply. 
The off peak rates sampled were the following: 
VICTORIA: 
RCVIO Commercial and industrial night rate 
REVI All customers night rate water heating 
From 1967 Victoria introduced a number of new off peak 
options (see below). 
SOUTH AUSTRALIA: 
RBS2 ) 
) 
RBS4 ) 
industrial night rate (block discount categories) 
Sb 
RES9 ) 
) 
RESlO) 
all customers night rate (block discount categories) 
RESll night rate water heating 
TASNANIA: 
RET2 two rate supply, all customers: night rate 
Table III,4 summarizes the results on these tariffs. Tasmania 
is the clearest example of a misuse of night rate tariffs. Capital 
costs (interest) have had much greater impact than operating (other) 
costs. Comparing table III,4 with the overall results of table III,l, the 
Tasmanian night rate has reacted as much to capital cost changes as 
TABLE III,4 
TARIFF 
RCVlO 
REVl 
RBS2 
RBS4 
RES9 
RESlO 
RESll 
RET2 
Off Peak Tariffs:·. partial correlation 
coefficients with different categories 
of unit factor cost. 
UFCP 
(fuel) 
0.339 
0.597 
0.398 
0.063 
UNIT FACTOR COST 
UOCP 
(other) 
0.005 
0.578 
0.434 
0.416 
0.539 
0.035 
UICP 
(interest) 
0.194 
0.168 
0.426 
0.366 
51 
UDCP 
(depreciation) 
0.302 
0.474 
0.002 
0.341 
0.354 
0.196 
any of the day rates and less to operating costs changes than several 
of the day rates, whereas we knm'l from the t~'lo period (Houthakker) 
theoretical solutio~ that off peak rates should have a relatively 
lower (or zero) weighting of capital costs and possibly a relatively 
higher weighting of operating costs. 
The other states do not err so badly. Both South Australia 
and Victoria show their off peak rates reflecting operating costs 
relatively highly but there is still a high reflection of capacity 
costs. In the second row of table III,4 
r (REVl, UDCP) = 0.474 
and from table III,l this is seen to be the highest of the UDCP correlations. 
In other words, the Victorian night rate for water heating has shown 
more influence from capacity (depreciation) costs than any of the other 
sampled Victorian tariffs. The RCVlO tariff is not much mo~e satisfactory 
in this respect. RCVlO, ~n its turn, shows the second highest sampled 
correlation with interest costs of all Victorian tariffs. 
For South Australia, there appears to be a stronger relationship 
between operating costs and off peak tariffs than between capacity costs 
and off peak tariffs; even so, the relationship with depreciation costs 
are still relatively high and RBS4 is one of only three South Australian 
tariffs sampled that shows a c.orrelation with interest costs. If we 
compare the results of table III,4 with the comments above on the effect of 
cost inflation, it is apparent that for all three states in question, 
all tariffs have been made to reflect capacity cost movements relatively 
less in. off peak than in peak tariffs, as should happen if the 
theoretical recommendation that capacity costs have a low or zero 
weighting in off peak tariffs is to be followed. 
escalations have been in: 
The chief cost 
VICTORIA: 
SOUTH AUSTRALIA: 
TASMANIA: 
"other" and depreciation costs 
"other" and depreciation costs 
interest costs 
(see table III,3) 
and these have been passed on just as much to off peak as to peak 
tariffs. 
Further on in this part of the thesis some other experiments 
are attempted to see if more light can be thrown on the peak load 
pricing problem. Meanwhile some of the other theoretical tariff 
implications can be examined. 
The popularity in utility prices of block tariffs or two 
part tariffs with or without a "maximum demand" aspect has already 
been noted. The theoretical implication is that the early blocks 
or the fixed charge or the maximum demand charge recovers capacity 
costs relatively more. Most of the tariffs sampled were block 
running charges, however two of the Victorian tariffs are attempts 
to recoup capacity costs directly. 
(i) AVl = the residential standing charge per month 
calculated on the householder's number of 
(ii) BV8 
rooms.· 
the industrial max~mum demand charge calculated 
by special metering of the customer~ max~mum 
demand. 
The partial correlation results extracted from table III,l are: 
AVl 
BV8 
UFCP UOCP UICP UDCP 
0.584 0.008 
0.139 0.001 
These tariffs seem, on this evidence, to be appallingly 
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misdirected. Both show highest positive relationship with the chief 
inflationary element in Victorian costs: "other costs" (most labour 
costs) and little or no relationship with interest or depreciation 
costs both of which (especially depreciation costs) were rising 
strongly over the period for Victoria and which have appeared as 
influences on other tariffs - including off peak tariffs. 
We can attempt the same sort of test wit~ different block 
discount categories - earlier blocks may show more relationship with 
interest and depreciation costs. Some of the results for the sampled 
runs of block discounts are shown in table III,5. Tasmania runs contrary 
TABLE III, 5 
Tariff 
VICTORIA 
CVl 
CV2 
CV6 
CBVl 
CBV2 
CBV3 
bl 
Correlations bet~.;reen cost categories and block 
discount categories for selected tariffs. 
UFCP 
(fuel) 
0.413 
Cost Categories 
UOCP 
(other) 
0.284 
0.247 
0.269 
0.297 
0.324 
UICP 
(interest) 
0.224 
UDCP 
(depreciation) 
0.287 
0.169 
0.182 
0.184 
0.147 
0.175 
SOUTH AUSTRALIA 
ES1 
ES2 
ES3 
WEST AUSTRALIA 
BW1 
BW2 
TASMANIA 
BT3 
BT4 
0.194 
0.072 
0.082 
0.950 
0.683 
0.500 
0.378 
0.370 
0.365 
0.034 
0.651 
0.132 
0.362 
0.432 
0.459 
0.429 
0.418 
to the theoretical result, the other states either are not conclusive 
or just barely exhibit a weighting of capacity costs.in the earlier 
blocks. Again inflation seems to have been recouped from all tariffs 
regardless of the theoretical weightings suggested 
DISCRIMINATION 
Finally we can attempt to discover whether these tariff 
correlations indicate any discrimination among consumer groups in the 
ways in which costs are passed on. 
Empirically we have to distinguish between: 
Residential 
Industrial 
and Commercial 
conf:lumers 
and in terms of the data we have we are able to provide the following · 
characterisation of any tariff: 
(i) its applicability to a certain group 
(ii) its correlation with a given cost type. 
The test proceeded as follows: for each cost category (fuel, 
other, interest and depreciation) we have a set of correlation 
coefficients each with a particular tariff which can be ranked in order 
of magnitude. But each tariff can also be ranked in the simple measure 
of its applicability to a standard group of consumers - e.g. residential 
consumers. Thus tariffs labelled A apply to residential consumers 
only, tariffs labelled E apply to residential and other consumers while 
tariffs labelled B and C do not apply to residential consumers at all. 
b3 
We can compare rankings to decide whether or not cost rises for a 
particular cost category (e.g. fuel) are associated with tariffs 
applying to a particular consumer group (e.g. residential consumers). 
To be quite clear a hypothetical exan~le could be illustrated as 
follows: 
Cost category: fuel costs: 
Ranking in order of size of 
correlation with different 
tariff types: 
1. tariffs with label A 
2. tariffs with label E 
3. tariffs with label C or B 
Ranking in order of 
applicability to 
residential consumers 
1. label A 
2. label E 
3. label B or C 
thus ~n the above example there is a perfect correlation suggesting fuel 
costs are mostly passed on to residential consumers. 
The rankings can be compared on the basis of Spearman's rank 
correlation coefficient and a simple transformation of this tested on 
the student's t distribution (see Kendall, 1948). 
The test applies to results from all states together and picking 
out those results for which the rank correlation coefficient differs from 
zero at the 5% level we have as the main result 
the category of costs which are passed on mostly to 
residential consumers is "other" costs; whereas 
interest and depreciation cost rises are mostly 
passed on to industrial .and commercial consumers. 
Table III,6 g~ves some of the main results. 
It appears from this fairly crude categorisation that 
inflation in 'other' costs (Labour and Working Costs) is generally 
passed on to the residential consumer while cost rises under the 
interest and depreciation categories are more likely to be passed . 
· on to industrial consumers. 
TABLE III,6 Coefficients of rank correlation for tariff 
categories and cost influences. 
Cost categories are ranked in order of their correlation 
with tariff types. 
Tariff categories are ranked according to how applicable 
they are to residential consumers. 
Cost categories 
Other 
Interest 
Depreciation 
Spearman's rank 
correlation coefficient 
0.448 
-0.657 
-0.182 
lo5 
CONCLUSIONS FROM THESE RESULTS 
We have therefore something fairly straightforward to say 
on the basis of these tariff results. The theoretical principles 
of tariff setting suggested the following hypotheses: 
(i) off peak tariffs ought to correlate more with 
running costs than capacity costs. 
(ii) standing charges ought to correlate with capacity 
costs. 
(iii) in block discount tariffs early blocks ought to 
correlate more with capacity costs than later 
blocks. 
The results from our samples indicate a large number of 
cases where t~ese theoretical principles are abused or ignored 1n 
bb 
practice. It would perhaps be a more realistic conclusion to say that 
1n practice cost inflation is simply recouped from all types of tariff 
on an unsystematic basis. It seems reasonable to conclude that these 
states are not setting their tariffs on the theoretically advocated 
bases. ·The questions that then arise are: 
(a) Does it matter in terms of cost sav1ngs whether or not 
theoretical principles are adhered to? In other words, 
are there significant cost sav1ngs to be obtained from 
load spreading? If there are then this abuse of 
theoretical tariff principles may be socially costly. 
(b) Even if there are cost savings to be obtained from load 
spreading, are tariff adjustments capable of achieving this 
load spreading - The following Chapters attempt to answer 
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CHAPTER IV 
ELECTRICITY COSTS AND PEAK SPREADING 
The sections above discussed the relationship between 
electricity tariffs and "planned" costs under different categories. It 
rema1.ns to discuss hm.; "planned" costs were calculated but the 
important question that the previous sections begged was whether peak 
spreading actually means anything in terms of real dollars. Is it 
simply an economists academic problem or would its solution provide 
real cost savings? Now it happens that in calculating "planned" costs 
for the previous analysis I believe that some light could be cast on 
this very question simply as a result of the methods used 1.n the 
calculation of planned costs. Thus, while the initiating theme of 
this section is to describe how "planned" costs could be and were 
calculated, a consequent (and very important) theme is the additional 
information we can gain on the "do-llar dimension" of the peak loading 
problem. The first comments are on planned costs and in developing 
them I will explain how the peak spreading aspect is brought in. 
Turning now to how I measured planned costs we can consider 
what the term appears to mean. 
The definition of the normal cost mechanism given by Nordhaus 
and Godley is still sufficiently vague to allow for a great many 
different interpretations of the measurement of normal costs and their 
influence on prices. It is soon apparent, on co~paring the studies in 
which the normal cost hypothesis is used, that there l.S little unanimity 
on its practical operation; very generally, however, we may determine 
some of the reasons why particular ways· -of measuring normal costs have 
been adopted in previous studies. All of these are deficient in some 
way, and we are compelled, before adopting one vers1on of normal cost 
measurement, to re-think exactly what is meant by the hypothesis. 
An initial impetus to the normal cost hypothesis in empirical 
work arose from a desire to capture 1n econometric models some of the 
observed stickiness of many industrial pr1ces. Basically this meant 
introducing a delayed response into cost adjustments. The pioneering 
study from an empirical point of vie>v was that of Schultze and Tryon 
(1965). They hypothesi~ed that changes in factor prices would be 
immediately incorporated into normal costs but changes in factor 
productivity would only be incorporated if they persisted over a long 
period. They measured normal unit costs as total factor payments 
divided by normal output, where normal output was a distributed lag or 
moving average of actual output. For instance, normal unit labour 
costs were measured as 
= Compensation per man hourt 
(E a. 
J j 
where xt is output at time t. This model was fairly successful, 
particularly in the category of regulated industries including electric 
utilities. This measure deflates total factor payments by a measure 
of normal output. Helliwell and others (1969) adopted the same device 
but used a more sophisticated measure of normal output. Normal output 
was achieved when the economy was on its production function; the 
" 
production function was synthesised from interrelated factor demand 
equations. The Cobb Douglas model was used and a log linear equation 
system was solved to give desired factor quantities 1n terms of relative 
pr1ces. These factor demand equations when estimated allowed the 
derivation of a synthetic production function which in turn provided 
normal output and hence normal costs. Again this approach was 
relatively successful, though more with respect to labour than capital 
costs. 
A further aspect of price stickiness led to a different method 
of estimating normal costs. Initially price stickiness merely reflected 
assumptions about non-competitive market structure. However in large 
model building a problem that ar1ses 1s that s1nce output responds to 
exogenous changes more quickly than employment, price equations that do 
not use normal costs will have prices falling because of falling unit 
costs whenever output rises; the "short term productivity" effect, 
which does not fit with the observed dmvmvard stickiness of prices. 
This phenomenon led to attempts to measure normal costs in terms of 
actual costs that have been purged of short term productivity changes. 
For example, the typical text book micro model of the form 1s 
max PI px - wL(x) 
where PI is pro{it, p is pr1ce, x is output and wL(x) is total labour 
costs. The equilibrium condition is: 
p 
, 
wL (x) = w L 
X 
7o 
so that 
dp 
Here price changes reflect both changes in average productivity 
and in factor pr1ces. However changes in normal costs (or normal supply 
price) should only, it is argued, reflect changes in factor prices: 
dp L wd(-) 
X 
= 
1 (dw) 
X 
which suggests that normal costs be measured as actual costs purged of 
· short term productivity effects. 
This has been the most popular conception of normal costs 1n 
the literature. It was advocated by Eckstein and Fromm (1968) and 1s 
the basis of the price equations in ·Norton, and others (1970) 
Australian study. It involves regressing actual costs against only 
those factors thought to determine long run normal cost changes (for 
example input prices) and taking the predictions from the regression as 
the series on normal cost. The immediate objection is that is is very 
arbitrary in its exclusion of possible cost influences. For instance 
it makes no allowance for changes in costs due to planned movements 
along a long run scale curve. Such factors will be quite important at 
the microeconomic level even i£ they can be regarded as negligible at the 
aggregate level. Nevertheless the basic assumption that normal costs 
do not include those short run random disturbances in actual cost 
regressions 1s quite attractive. The essential rat·ionale of this method 
however can be given a more definite if very simple support if it is 
thought of in terms of the stochastic regressor model of classical least 
squares. Essentially we are defining normal costs as what actual costs 
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would be without short run, unexpected changes. We have already 
derived an expression for actual costs as a linear relationship such 
as: 
c = a z 
where z may be a vector of• stochastic variables. This relationship 
is subject to a set of short run changes represented by a random 
disturbance term u for which we may make the assumptions: 
E (u / z) = Eu = o 
Then defining normal costs as what actual costs would be if 
only the expected influences on costs are considered, we have 
Ec = E(az + u/z) = az + E(u/z) = az 
• • • • • • • • ( 1) 
Hence this definition of normal costs - expectations about 
actual costs - suggests that the basic rationale of using the 
predictions from cost regressions is reasonable, but those regressions 
ought not to exclude arbitrarily any influences on costs that could be 
planned for. Such influences clearly include planned expansion along 
the scale curve. In other words, the only legitimate way to use 
normal costs is to regard them as what actual costs would be without 
the unplanned, unexplained residual. 
On the basis of this rationalization, the series we may adopt 
for normal costs are the predictions from the regressions of actual 
costs against all those factors which appear to be important, non 
random, influences on actual costs: i.e. the predictions from the 
cost regressions described above. These then are taken as our 
normal cost data and used to explain movements ~n reported tariffs. 
This therefore describes the method used to calculate 
planned unit factor cost from actual unit factor costs. 
I would now like to digress from considering tariffs to 
discuss these cost experiments in greater detail. 
We take uc(i)p as the predictions from a regression of uc(i) on those 
factors thought to influence uc(i). 
These regressions themselves may therefore throw some light 
on cost problems in electricity supply. I believe they can be quite 
useful in discussing the peak load problem. 
these cost investigations. 
COST INVESTIGATIONS 
Let us therefore consider 
The essential a~m of this section is to explain average 
factor costs in the main categories of factors of production reported 
in electricity authority accounts. This approach to estimating cost 
relationships owes more to macroeconometric model building than to the 
well established microeconomic approach to estimating marginal and 
average cost curves. Basically, we are splitting up the total cost 
function and ascribing components of total cost to the main factor 
categories e.g. in terms of capital, labour, and materials. 
This gives as a basic relationship for the ith factor of 
production: 
uc(i) = 
t 
a 
0 
+ + V(i) a2 t + (2) 
where the dependent variable is unit factor cost and the explanatory 
variables are: 
X* 
t 
(planned) output which acts as the scale parameter 
v<i) 
t 
the vector of determinants of the ith factor price 
random disturbance term 
This is one experimental way of explaining reported cost 
figures; on the assumption that electricity production reflects a 
basically fixed coefficient type of technology, it is probably 
theoretically well based. 
This is a standard form of relationship particularly used 
in macroeconometric studies. However for the case of electricity 
costs an additional influence needs to be taken into account. This 
is the ability to reduce costs by spreading peak loads into off peak 
periods. The relationship in (~holds for a given degree of capacity 
utilization but in the sample period of the data on electricity costs 
this degree of capacity utilization may vary significantly enough to 
change factor costs substantially. This is best illustrated with the 
use of a diagram like Fig. IV, 1, which represents a hypothetical 
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cumulative load duration curve. This curve is plott~d 1n capacity-
time space. Along the horizontal axis 1s measured tl1e houts in a 
production cycle; dealing \vith annual data we may consider a period 
of 8760 hours. On the vertical axis is measured the capacity used 
to satisfy the load on the system. Taking curve (a) to begin with: 
OK1 of capacity is in operation for OA hours, OK2 for OB hours and OK3 
for OC hours, the latter being the largest part of the year. Now, 
given the "merit order" running schedule of a generating system, base 
load e.g. OK3 for OC hours will be met by new base load plant 
exhibiting running cost savings over older plants. Peak load of OK1 
which lasts for OA hours will be met by both new and old base load and 
peaking plant (which may be either small high running cost plant e.g. 
gas turbines, or old conventional thermal plant). Suppose now the 
load characteristics alter so that curve (b) operates. It reflects, 
in comparison with (a), a shift from peak to off peak loading. OK, 
.L 
capacity is only in use for OA1 hours and OK3 capacity rises from OC 
1 hours usage to OC hours. 
This peak shift may have two effects on costs: 
(i) less peaking capacity is used; this means a reduction 1n capital 
costs by reduced use of old plant and small peaking plant. 
(ii) overall running costs may also fall as more load is met by the 
newest bas~ load plant, which embodies the greatest cost savings 
(quasi rents) of production. 
The actual effect on total costs is an emp.irical matter but a 
sensible hypothesis is that peak spreading does reduce costs with 
probably more effect on capital than on running costs. 
76' 
The question then arises of how to obtain a·statistical 
measure of capacity utilization. Several could be suggested but one 
obvious candidate is Load Factor. Load Factor is usually defined as: 
total demand (KW hrs) 
peak demand (K\v x 8760 hours) 
where the peak demand is measured over one half hour on the day of 
maximum system demand. This measure has 2 drawbacks - firstly it ~s 
not available for most states over a period of years and, secondly, it is 
liable to large random weather disturbances. A less usual but more 
helpful measure is ~vhat might be called Capacity Load Factor (CLF): 
uc(i) = 
total demand (KW hrs) 
Capacity (l\.'W x 8760 hours) 
Using this measure our basic cost relationship is: 
a 
0 
+ + V(i) a2 t + + • • • . • • • • . • (3) 
> 
The first term represents scale effects according as a1 ~ o, 
the second term represents exogenous factor pr~ce influences with a 2 > o 
as the a priori assumption and the third term represents peak shifting 
influences, a 3 < o. 
PEAK SPREADING 
In developing this notion of measuring planned costs as the 
predictions from the fitted form of equations, we have been compelled 
to take account of the effect of peak load variations on unit factor 
costs. In principle we hypothesise a3 < o but its actual value 
is of interest because the estimated coefficient for the ith factor 
a (i) 
3 
is the effect on unit costs associated with the varyLng load 
factors: 
i.e. :::: b.UIC 
b.CLF 
the dollar value of the cost savLng from a small degree of peak 
spreading. Hence in the fitted cost regressions the magnitudes of the 
~3 coefficients are of prime importance: they measure the opportunity 
costs of not attempting to spread the peak and may gLve us a clue to the 
importance of the peak loading problem. 
VARYING THE SPECIFICATION TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF 
SERIALLY CORRELATED RESIDUALS 
It was noticeable that with some of the equations, (especially 
those for interest and depreciation costs) problems of serial correlation 
in the residuals began to arise, as indicated by low values for the 
Durbin-Hatson statistic. There are two ma~n ways of.tackling this 
problem: firstly, by re-estimating the equation by some type of 
autoregressive least squares until serial correlation disappears 
or secondly, by re-specifying the equations. The latter approach 
tackles what may be the real underlying cause of the problem: the 
omission of relevant explanatory variables. 
After several experiments, it became clear that the simplest 
way of removing the autocorrelation was to include lagged values of the 
dependent variable (a procedure fraught with danger as explained below). 
It seems to be the case that the lagged dependent was the most suitable 
proxy for omitted variables and also for those variables only poorly 
represented by the data measuring them. (It is on this basis as a 
proxy variable rather than on any rationalization of "partial adjustment 
processes" that the lagged dependent was included.) 
This does raise severe statistical problems, so we have to be 
clear what we are doing. We wish to remove autocorrelation by us~ng 
the lagged dependent; however if autocorrelation remains after the 
lagged dependent variable is included then the ordinary least squares 
estimators may be seriously at fault. To be precise: the lagged 
dependent and any residual autocorrelation together may mean that the 
explanatory variables and the contemporaneou~ disturbance term ~n the 
euqation are correlated. In this case ordinary least squares does not 
even give consistent estimators. However if we can be sure that auto-
correlation disappears after the inclusion of the lagged dependent 
variable, then we can assume consistent estimators with ordinary least 
6 
squares. This is the point at w·hich the second serious problem 
arises. The usual tests for autocorrelation are not valid when the 
explanatory variables contain the lagged dependent. Hence our 
approach has to be as folfows: 
(1) introduce the lagged dependent and test for autocorrelation 
of the residuals not by the usual Durbin-Watson test but by 
Durbin's recent modification designed specifically for the 
case where the explanatory variables include the lagged 
dependent (Durbin, 1970). 
(2) If the hypothesis of residual autocorrelation is then rejected, 
then the ordinary least squares estimators are consistent. 
For a prec1se definition of consistency see Johnston, 1972 or 
Goldberger, 1964. Briefly, it implies that as the sample size 1ncreases 
biases in the regression estimates diminish (though not necessarily to 
zero) and the variances of the estimated parameters collapse to zero. 
When this procedure was adopted, all evidence of residual 
autocorrelation did disappear and we can therefore proceed with 
confidence on the basis of the revised estimates. 
statistic is h 
h = (l _ DH) 2 T 
Durbin's test 
where DH is the value of the ordinary Durbin-Watson ~tatistic, T ~s 
sample size and ~(b ) is 
~ 
the estimated variance of the regress~on 
coefficient on the lagged dependent variable. On the hypothesis of 
zero autocorrelation h is standard normally distributed. We 
therefore reject the hypothesis of residual autocorrelation at the 5% 
level if h ~ 1.6&5. 
Summing up therefore in some equations the lagged dependent 
variable appears but the theoretical results and statistical estimates 
remain valid. 
DATA 
The published data on costs is mainly that supplied by 
annual reports of the state electricity authorities and the Electricity 
Supply Association of Australia. Factor payments are reported in the 
four categories: 
fuel for generation (F) 
other working expenses (0) 
interest payments (I) 
depreciation charges (D) 
These correspond to the four categories we have already 
referred to: 
unit fuel costs (UFC) 
unit other costs (UOC) 
unit interest costs (UIC) 
unit depreciation copts (UDC) 
(the "planned" versions of the costs are of course UFCP, UOCP, UICP, 
UDCP the predictions from these regressions.) 
Let us now take each cost category in turn, examining the 
influence important in fitting an equation like (3) above. A good 
guide to the institutional bacl~ground is McColl (1972) and his vieW's 
·· have been quite helpful 1n formulating and testing the equations. 
FUEL COSTS 
Fuel costs are the most obvious output related costs, but 
the relation may go in two ways. Day to day operation of plant would 
clearly show (on the merit order basis) rising short run fuel cost 
curves. However on an annual basis, which is all that the published 
data allow us to consider, scale economies may appear for several 
reasons. For instance, expanding markets alloW' Australian authorities 
to take advantage of technological advances embodied in large overseas 
generating sets when these are imported. This, in our sample, might 
be expected chiefly in Victoria, the largest state in terms of 
consumption. However, Victoria uses a relatively rare technology -
brown coal is the generating fuel, since the enormous deposits of the 
La Trobe valley outweigh the disadvantages of its relatively low energy 
of combustion (typically about 10 million joules per kilogram compared 
# 
with 33 million .for black coal). Although we might expect little 
evidence of scale econom~es ~n smaller markets, Johnston's early study 
of British data suggests that scale economies ~n generation began at 
fairly low levels of output, (Johnston, 1961). 
~I 
There is, in addition, one directly observable measure of 
technical progress in generation, relative thermal efficiency rates, (TEt). 
The rates are simply the ratio of energy output to total energy input 
(using different conversion factors for each type of input). 
The chief fuel used in these three States (Tasmania was not 
examined in this fuel category because of its reliance on hydro-electric 
power) is coal and coal price is the input cost variable examined. A 
series on the marginal cost of brown coal was constructed for Victoria 
on the basis of rather crude figures for residual sales of brown coal 
by the SECV. South Australia used its o•vn sources of sub-bituminous 
coal at Leigh Creek and a very useful pr~ce ser~es was constructed from 
the reported delivered value of Leigh Creek Coal in the Electricity 
Trust of South Australia's annual reports. West Australia relied 
partly on imports of New South Wales black coal for which a published 
price series is obtainable. 
Several equations corresponding to 3 were tried and the 
preferred results are shmvn in Table IV, 1. The overall degree of 
explanation and the precision of the regression coefficients are both 
high and serial correlation does not seem to have been a serious 
problem. 
Fuel for Generation Costs Preferred Equations 
Regression Coefficients and Standard errors of explanatory variables 
State 
Victoria 
South 
Australia 
West 
Australia 
x* 
t 
-0.0032 
(0.0004) 
0.0015 
(0.0022) 
-0.0201 
(0.0039) 
Coal Price~'> TEt 
-o.0485 
(0. 0519) 
0.0621 
-0.2180 
(0.0238) (0.0595) 
0.0048 
-0.2840 
(0. 0019) (0 .1041) 
*Coal Price: Victoria: index of brown coal prices 
South Australia: index of Leigh Creek coal prices 
West Australia: index of imported black coal prices (NSW) 
CLFt 
-0.0009 
(0.002) 
0.0007 
(0.0015) 
Table IV, 1 
-2 R 
0.9633 
0. 9726 
0.9803 
D.W. 
2.38 
1.11 
2. 45 
~ 
• 
Unit fuel costs have fallen ~n each of these three states 
over the sample period, as output has grown and as thermal efficiency 
has shown a positive if erratic degree of improvement. Movements in 
.coal price have moderated the falling costs, and capacity utilization 
I 
has had no effect in this element of variable costs. 
The evidence of scale economies is interesting. In South 
Australia, output appears not to have significantly affected fuel 
costs, but ~n both Victoria and West Australia output enters with a 
negative sign and is highly significant. In Victoria this slightly 
drives out the influence of relative improvements in thermal efficiency 
'but this variable has a significantly negative effect as might be 
expected in both South Australia and.West Australia. The input price 
series for Victoria has not worked at all Hell and we. may have serious 
doubts about this data. However, the series on coal price for the 
other States do appear to have sho•vn that rising coal prices have 
significantly moderated the falling fuel costs. 
OTHER WORKING COSTS 
There is less reason to believe that other working costs which 
include administrative overheads and distribution costs will be output 
related; this will only be the case to the extent that mann~ng costs 
are important in this category. Hmvever, many authorities have blamed 
rises in other working costs as reflecting the inflationary trends of 
the rest of the economy and being the source of tariff revisions. 
Besides planned output, a measure of general price trends, (The Consumer 
Price Index in that state,~ CPit) and Capacity Load Factor were incorporated 
into the equations. 
Neither Victoria nor Tasmania, 1n the preferred equations 
shown in Table IV,2, indicate any relationship between output and other 
costs. South Australia shows some diseconomies of scale. However 
the South Australian equations were all extremely suspect and even the 
preferred equation did not pass a total equation test. The hypothesis 
that the whole vector of regression coefficients was not significantly 
different from zero was not rejected at the 95% level on an F test. 
This leaves only West Australia, from which we may conclude that there 
were some scale economies to be obtained, presumably from the distribution 
network. 
Leaving aside the suspect South Australian regressions, it is 
clear that other working costs do significantly reflect inflationary 
trends in the rest of the economy as represented by CPit. Clearly then 
we should expect movements in these administrative and labour costs to 
account for some of the changes in tariffs that have appeared over the 
sample period. However, an offsetting factor is clearly shown by the 
ability of more even load spreading to reduce costs in this category. 
Capacity Load Factor has produced negative coefficients in all cases. 
There is therefore some initial evidence that use of peak off-peak 
differences in tariffs may have a definite effect 1n reducing unit 
costs and therefore reducing tariffs. 
Other Working Costs Preferred Equations 
Table IV, 2 
Regression coefficients and standard errors of explanatory variables 
State 
Victoria 
.. 
South 
Australia 
West 
Australia 
Tasmania 
x* 
t 
0.013 
(0.006) 
-0.024 
(0.005) 
CPit 
0.499 
(0.093) 
-0.921 
(0.520) 
1.122 
(0.218) 
0.075 
(0.060) 
CLFt 
-0.0068 
(0. 0040) 
-0.0094 
(0.0040) 
-0.0026 
(0.0012) 
-0.0019 
(0. 0009) 
-2 R 
0.6852 
0.2733 
0.7479 
0.7438 
D.W. 
1.49 
1.01 
2.98 
1. 43 
.. 
<>6 
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INTEREST COSTS 
Both interest and depreciation costs make up the rental price 
of capital. Hmvever to accord ·with published data we have separated 
the two influences. If the simple rental price of capital is: 
Pk = PCE (IR + RHO) 
where PCE LS the price of new capital equipment, IR is the interest 
rate used Ln the authority's investment decisions and RHO is the rate 
of depreciation of the capital stock, then we separate the costs as: 
Pk = PCE·IR + PCE·RHO 
and the first term LS interest costs and the second LS depreciation 
costs. 
These are fixed costs, and as we saw above, likely to be much 
more closely related to the degree of capacity utilization rather than 
the level of output, although McColl has suggested that capital costs 
per KW have been falling as larger generating costs have come into use. 
Several versions of an equation like 3. were tried and no relationship 
was found between unit interest costs and output. 
equations are shown Ln Table IV,3. 
The preferred 
Again South Australia has shown a very poor performance and 
serious doubts appear to be raised about the cost data reporting in 
this case. However, the other states all show interesting results \·lith 
Interest Costs 
State 
Victoria 
South 
Australia 
(not used) 
West 
Australia 
Tasmania 
Preferred Equations 
Regression coefficients and standard errors of explanatory variables 
PCEt IRt 
0.1197 0.1019 
(0. 0778) (0.1039) 
0.2000 0.2094 
(0. 0699) (0.1591) 
0.0465 0.0009 
(0. 0735) (0.1167)' 
0.1029 0.0816 
(0. 0635) (0.1084) 
CLFt 
-0.0036 
(0.0019) 
-0.0011 
(0.0029) 
-0.0027 
(0. 0015) 
-0.0023 
(0.0011) 
Lagged 
Dependent 
0.5865 
(0.1598) 
0.6087 
(0.1110) 
0.4741 
(0.1655) 
Table IV, 3 
-2 R 
0.9547 
0.2834 
0.8412 
0.9032 
Durbin's 
h 
-0.1821 
-1.1702 
-1.4765 
.. 
~ 
....:t 
some quite prec1se estimates. Changes in the rate of interest 
series do not appear to have been important (the series used was the 
short term Connnonwealth bond yield). This suggests that changes in 
the discount rate applied in project analysis may have little influence 
on final tariffs (though a considerable influence on project timing 
may remain). McColl suggests that different suppliers of funds to 
State electricity authorities charge different interest rates. He 
points particularly to the contrast between borrowing from State 
Treasuries and borrowing on the open market. A variable reflecting 
HcColl's suggested measure of the degree of reliance on external 
borrowing was constructed: 
REBM = 
t 
( % increase in External Capital Liabilities 
% 1ncrease in Original Capital costs of works )t 
but its performance was negligible and hence there is no evidence that 
different borrowing sources have intportant relative effects in unit 
interest costs. 
The capacity utilization variable has had a significant 
influence on this element of fixed costs: CLFt has the expected 
negative s1gn on its regression coefficient and the standard error is 
very low in most of the cases. Here is clear evidence that movements 
in load factor have had significant effects on costs and hence we may 
strongly argue for peak off-peak tariff differences on this basis. 
• DEPRECIATION COSTS 
As shown cbove we expect depreciation charges to vary with 
the pr~ce of capital equipment, PCEt, and with the rate of decay assumed 
for the capital stock, RHOt. This latter parameter is usually derived 
on a rule of thumb hasis according to taxation provisions, lifetime of 
assets assumptions and other factors; ~n the strict operation of. 
benefit-less-cost minimization we saw how it would vary with the degree 
of capacity utilization. It is not however directly observable and an 
instrumental variable has to be used instead. Since we know that State 
Electricity Authorities have used rule of thumb depreciation methods, an 
instrumental variable based on the rate of growth of stocks may easily 
be derived, because of the strict relationship between the rate of decay 
of stocks and the rate of growth of stocks, when asset life is assumed 
constant. 
Suppose the rule of thumb adopted is one of declining balance 
so that the depreciation amount is simply the depreciation rate (RHO) 
times the capital stock; re-writing RHO as r for convenience, declining 
balance depreciation writes off 
rK(t) (4) 
units of capacity each period. Now the gross investment identity is: 
.. 
I(t) = K (t) + rK(t) (5) 
~.e. gross investment is net capital accumulation plus depreciation 
investment. Nm,r suppose capacity is grmving at an average rate of ~ 
per period 
K(t) = K(o)eit (6) 
Consider the initial investment J.n capacity: I(o); if a unit of 
capacity lasts for n years then depreciation in period n will replace 
this initial investment 
rK(n) I(o) 
or J.n general 
rK (t+n) I (t) 
Now combining (5), (6) and (7) we have 
rK(o)ei(t+n) 
= 
. ( ) it J.K o e . 
Hence we may write: 
r = 
. it it J.K(o)e + rK(o)e 
K(o)ei(t+n) 
giving: 
i 
r = 
el.n_ 1 
and from (9) we may easily show: 
dr 
di < 0 
+ 
it 
rK(o)e 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
<to 
under general conditions. This simply says that ·the faster the rate 
of growth of stocks, of a .. given life, the slower the rate at which the 
volume of stocks decays. Similar resul~s may be obtained using other 
rules of thumb. Thus we have the general relationship 
r = f(i,n) 
with f. < 0, where n H the lifetime of capital equipment. 
l. 
On this basis the instrumental variable for RHO is taken as 
b(Generating Capacity)t 
(Generating Capacity)t-l 
and the expected s1.gn on the regression coefficient is negative. 
and CLFt are the other main explanatory variables concerned. 
However, we must be careful to note that different rules of 
thumb, assumed asset life and coverage of assets to be depreciated may 
have been adopted over the sample period. 
the follmving timetable was drawn up: 
Victoria 
South Australia 
West Australia 
Tasmania 
1. Change in assumed 
asset life 
1965/66 
? 
Based on McColl's discussion, 
2. Change in depreciation 
rule applied 
1957/58; 1960/61 
1962/63 
? 
Dummy variables were constructed to represent the changes in 
this timetable and included in the depreciation cost~ regress1.ons reported 
# 
in TableiV,4. DUM lt represents changes in asset life and DUM 2t 
represents changes 1n the depreciation rule applied. 
the equations have fitted reasonably well. 
On the whole, 
The instrumental variable representing the depreciation rate, 
RHOt, performs well 1n all cases. 
An interesting feature of the results here is that changes 1n 
the depreciation rule have been important enough to obscure the 
relationship betv1een this element of fixed costs and capacity utilization. 
Where DU}1 lt or DUM 2t appear in an equation CLFt becomes unimportant; 
only in the cases of Tasmania and West Australia \vhere the same 
depreciation conventions have been applied over the whole sample period, 
is there clear evidence of the effect of spreading load in reducing fixed 
costs. CLFt is significantly negative in these cases. The important 
dummy variable is DUM 2t in the other cases; it is particularly 
significant 1n the case of Victoria where there have been changes not 
only in the depreciation convention (the adoption of straight ·line 
rather than sinking fund conventions) but also in the extent to which 
the distribution network has been depreciated in these reported changes. 
Although no depreciation convention changes were reported for 
West Australia and Tasmania, two factors were examined to determine whether 
or not there may in fact have been changes adopted significant enough to 
affect costs. One factor, the performance of CLFt has already indicated 
that no obscuring changes have been apparent; secondly, the residuals 
in the regression, showed no outstandingly large positive or negative 
values 1n any year of the sample period. 
.. 
Depreciation Costs 
State 
Victoria 
South 
Australia 
1.Jes t 
Australia 
' 
Tasmania 
PCEt 
0. 2571 
(0.0397) 
0.1834 
(0.0305) 
0.0335 
(0. 0364) 
0.0058 
(0.0069) 
RHOt 
-0.0368 
(0.0319) 
-0.0763 
(0.0510) 
-0.1204 
(0. 0355) 
-0.0322 
(o.Ol65) 
Preferred Equations 
DUM lt Dill1 2t CLFt Lagged dependent 
0.0991 0.6156 
(0. 0913) (0.0632) 
0.1657 
(0.1176) 
-0.0028 0.6132 
(0.0010) (0. 0762) 
-0.0013 0.1547 
(0.0003) (0.1478) 
Table IV, 4 
test for auto-
·-2 correlation (DW R 
or Durbin's h) 
---
0.9914 2.15 (DW) 
0.9046 2.03 (DW) 
0.9245 -0.3004 (h) 
0.6075 +0.8543 (h) 
• 
~ 
(.).> 
It seems apparent therefore th?t, in the absence of changes 
in accounting conventions, a clearly significant relationship exists 
between fixed costs on the one hand, capacity uti~.ization on the other. 
This latter fact, the importance of spreading load in 
reducing overall costs and hence tariffs must be regarded as a 
significant argument for the use of peak versus off-peak pricing 
differentials, advertising of off-peak facilities: (like night-storage 
heaters) and other marketing strategies to spread load more evenly. 
DOLLAR ORDERS OF MAGNITUDE ON THE PEAK LOADING PROBLE}1 
One outstanding result of the regressions LS the strongly 
significant effect of capacity load factor variations in affecting unit 
costs. The regression estimates permit us to put orders of m~gnitude 
on these cost savings. Tabel IV, 5, presents the main results and the 
total effect summed over different factor categories. 
It seems that the cost savings are not trivial. To get some 
idea of the impact of these magnitudes we can pick, for example, 
Victoria or Tasmania. Capacity cost savings alone total $ 442,000 
and$ 177,000 respectively from a change in load factor of one 
percentage point (by this I mean a change from, for example, 48% to 
49%- this is what I call a one percent change). The Tasmanian case 
has some interesting applications. 
At the time of writing the "Lake Pedder" controversy has had 
some impact on electricit~ policy discussion. The Tasmanian Hydro 
Table IV, 5 The Cost Savings from Spreading Load 
(a) Regression Coefficients t::.UIC/ t::.CLF 
fuel other interest 
Victoria -0.0009 -0~0068 -0.0036 
South Australia -0.0094 -0.0011 
West Australia -0.0026 -0.0027 
Tasmania -0.0019 -0.0023 
(b) Dollar values of the cost savings from raising CLF by 
one percentage point: ($ 'OOO) 
fuel 
Victoria 110 
South Australia 
West Australia 
Tasmania 
other 
834 
383 
56 
93 
interest 
442 
45 
58 
113 
depreciation 
-0.0028 
-0.0013 
depreciation 
60 
64 
Electric COilli~ission - arguing on the basis of a steadily rising maximum 
demand - proposed (and are carrying out) a programme of hydro-electric 
scheme construction Ln and around Lake Pedder a nature reserve with 
conservation value. Withput making value judgements the economist 
can point out: 
(a) the growth of maxLmum demand may not be immutable; 
it may be variable within the control of H.E.C. pricing 
policy. 
(b) the capacity cost savings above suggest that raLsLng CLF 
for Tasmania by 5.2% could save an annual capacity cost 
sum of one million dollars. The annual equivalent charge 
of the Lake Pedder scheme has been variously estimated by 
the newspapers, critics and public bodies as between 0.9 and 
' 
3.6 million dollars (acc.ording to assumed life and total cost 
at an eight per cent discount rate). 
Hence the annual costs of the Lake Pedder scheme (on the lower 
estimate) can be entirely saved by a 5% shift in load factor (a 5% degree 
of peak shifting). 
It looks on this basis as if the potential savLngs due to CLF 
variations are within the range at which they can have significant impact 
in Social Welfare terms. 
However, although we have provided some sort of measure of the 
dollar value of solving the peak load problem, this still leaves 
unanswered the question of whether tariff policy itsetf can affect the 
peak- in particular can raise CLF. 
It is this final question that the remaining sections of this 
part of the thesis are addressed • 
• 
CHAPTER V 
TARIFFS AND LOAD FACTOR 
The point has been made that charging capacity costs 
relatively more to peak demand not only is a more efficient method of 
allocating costs (in the economic sense of the word efficiency) but 
may also be effective enough to persuade consumers to ra1se the overall 
load factor of the generating system. Although electricity authorities 
have been reluctant to adopt peak load pricing policies, it may 
nevertheless be true that within the limits of traditional tariff 
structures some manipulation.has occurred. This is difficult to test 
because of the complexity of Australian tariff structures. Hmvever, 
the traditional tariffs do have certain uniform categories within which 
tariff rates have been varied. ~\lith a large enough sample these tariffs 
provide a useful set of qualitative variables which may be effective in 
spreading out the peak of electricity demand. In simple terms, the 
hypothesis is that the attributes or characteristics of a given tariff 
structure may affect the "degree of peak" 1n the demand that results. 
To formalize a model we can conce1ve of a measure of degree of 
peak - in the form 'of a certain load factor - being the result of 
consumer reactions to various characteristics of the tariff involved: 
L* t = 
J 
z: a. ctJ. j=l J 
where L* 1s the desired overall load factor depending on the different t 
9q 
. characteristics of the tariff structure~· ctl ••• ctJ' at time t. 
There ought to be an allowance for a time lag in the 
adjustment of actual load factor to this desired overall level, 
described by the difference equation 
where, by assumption: 0 ~ W ~1. 
Consequently actual load factor - the measure of the peak 
character of any demand schedule - is given by 
J 
Lt = W E a.Ct. + (1-W) Lu.-1 j=l J J 
The initial experiments to relate load factor to tariffs in this 
study consists of fitting an equation of this type to a pooled sample of 
time series and cross section data for our four states. 
The characteristics of the prevailing tariff structures are 
qualitative variables conveniently represented by the following type of 
dunnny variables: 
(i) c tj = 1 if the tariff structure has option J at time t 
(ii) ctj = 2 if option J is "emphasised" (e. g. by application to 
an extended number of consumer categories) at time t 
I 
(iii) c . = t] 0 if option j is absent from the tariff structure at time t 
100 
A three way classification seemed preferable because Hhile 
some tariff structures offer, for instance, off-peak prices as one of 
a number of categories available to a limited number of consumers, 
others offer off-peak prices as. an option to almost every tariff, 
applicable to almost every consumer. 
Of course, it then becomes a matter of judgement deciding 
exactly what values to g~ve to different tariff characteristics at 
any one time; hoHever as general as possible a classification Has 
used consistent with keeping the model in a \vorkable shape. 
Two statistical comments are in order before describing the 
experimental results. The dummy variable trap was avoided by 
constraining the regression plane to pass through the origin, and, 
• 
secondly, the experimental procedure does not allow tariff 
characteristics which remained unchanged over the sample period to be 
included. This is because the result of including a variab~e that 
was always 1 or 0 in value would have meant a linearly dependent set 
of columns in the data matrix causing ordinary least squares regression 
to break down. 
As a consequence of the last point, the lagged dependent term 
picks up the underlying effects of the non-changing parts of the tariff 
structure while the variables C . isolate the influences on the movement 
tJ 
of Lt associated with variations ~n the tariff structure. 
lol 
In the final analysis four tariff characteristics were 
isolated as having appeared disappeared or changed in nature over the 
sample. Three of these were: 
the provision of a time of day tariff option ctl 
the provision of a maximum demand option ctz 
the provision of a night storage heating option ct3 
The fourth qualitative variable consisted of a measure of 
tariff alterations. Each time that part of the tariff structure of 
the state in question was altered (a rate was raised or amalgamated 
with another rate etc.) this fourth dummy variable increased in vabie 
by 1. It therefore measures the effect on load factor of any tariff 
alterations whatever the motivation for them • 
• 
As mentioned above the sample LS a pooled time series cross 
section mixture so that tariff restructing variable is in fact split 
into 4 variables one each for Victoria, South Australia, West Australia 
and Tasmania; e.g. when the Victorian section of the Lt data ends a new 
dummy variable for the next state starts to increase as tariffs are 
changed. 
Thus the final estimating equation is: 
where C . is a dununy variable representing a tariff option 
t] 
and .dTSti is a dununy variable representing some change in a State 1 s 
tariff structure. 
V~rious versions of the equation are fitted to the pooled 
sample of states over the period 1953-1971, and the results appear 1n 
Table V, 1 below. The lagged dependent - indicating the overall 
10.2.. 
influence of the "permanent" parts of the tariff structure - dominates 
the explanation but the signs on the qualitative variables are of great 
interest. 
On the basis of best overall fit equation (3) is to be preferred. 
The results provide the following conclusions: 
(i) CLF adjusts slowly to the measure of eariff structure 
(ii) the effect of the provision of an off-peak tariff option is to 
raise the over~ll load factor. The off-peak option ct3 is the 
cheap night rate for storage heating. 
(iii) all the dummies representing tariff structure alterations show a 
positive relationship with load factor except for the variable 
representing Tasmania. It would appear that the impact of tariff 
alterations in Tasmania - whatever their real purpose - has been 
to lower load factor. 
From 16oking at the other equations (e.g. equations (1) and 
(7) ) the variable Ctl - provision of a general time of day option -
also raises load factor but by a smaller degree than the particular 
option of a night storage peating rate; (the size of the regression 
coefficients in equation (7) can be directly compared since all the 
CLF Regressions 
Pooled sample 1953-1971, States of Victoria, Tasmania, South Australia and West Australia. 
Partial regression coefficients dependent variable 
CLFt 
Equation 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7~ 
CLF t-1 . ct1 
0.96* 1.30 
0.98* 
0.95* 
0.96* 1.28 
0.95* 0.20 
0.95* 
0.95* 0.25 
ct2 ct3 l:ITSVIC 
0.16 
0.66 0.08 
2.05* 0.07 
0.02 0.16 
1.84 0.08 
-0.37 2. 38i: 0.08 
-0.39 2.13 0.09 
- -- ---
* regression coefficient exceeds its standard error. 
!:ITS SA l:ITSWA 
o. 39)~ o. 37 
0.20 0.26 
0.43* 0.18 
0.39* 0.37 
0. 44)'( 0.20 
0. 45)~ 0.22 
0. 46:': 0.25 
- -- -- --- - -- --- --
l:ITSTAS 
-0.19 
-0.10 
-0.02 
-0.19 
-0.05 
0.05 
0.02 
-- -----
-2 R 
0.66 
0.66 
0.66 
0.66 
0.66 
0.66 
0.65 
I 
I 
I 
• 
0 
t.l 
l Oit-
variables are dummies measured in integer units). Attempts to influence 
load factor by the use of max1mum demand charge tariff options seem to 
have been unsuccessful - equations (6) and (7) even show a negative s1gn 
So far the experiments of this and the previous sections seem 
to give us two conclusions: 
- load factor variations do have a cost sav1ng impact. 
- load factor itself appears to react positively to the prov1s1on of 
off peak charges. 
It would be helpful therefore to have some measure of the 
magaitude of load factor variations obtainable from the provision of 
off-peak rates. For this task, a second set of experiments is 
necessary. 
LOAD FACTOR VARIATIONS AND OFF-PEAK TARIFFS 
The aim of this section is to measure the magnitude of load 
factor variations obtainable when various off-peak tariff rates are 
varied. In precise terms we wish to calculate an elasticity of load 
factor with respect to variations in the ratio of off-peak to peak 
tariff rates. 
E = l'.CLF £\PI 
PI 
CLF 
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where PI is a variable measured by the ratio of a g1ven off peak 
tariff to its on peak (daytime) alternative. If peak spreading does 
occur \ve expect this elasticity to be negative: 
Ti' 
""CLF, PI < 0 by hypothesis 
Thus a rise in the night rate relatively to the day rate is 
expected to reduce load factor, while a fall in the night r?te relatively 
to the day rate is expected to raise load factor. Naturally the 
hypothesis is that the chain of causation runs from PI to CLF. 
However there.is a possibility that there may be a feedback 
1n the direction of CLF to PI. It has already been ·established that 
variations in CLF can affect costs. A rise in CLF may have enough 
effect on the ratio of capital to running costs to persuade an 
electricity authority to change a previously established relationship 
between off-peak and peak tariffs. The model is really one of 
simultaneous determination of CLF and PI allowing for interdependency 
between these variables. The essence of such a model can be formulated 
very simply:-
Equation (1) 
= + + 0 1[ predetermined variabl,-l_t 
loe:, 
Equation (2) 
+ + 0 2 / predetermined variablefc 
Our hypotheses about the coefficients would now be as 
follows: 
measuring the effect of the tariff variations on load factor - the 
effect whose magnitude is of prime interest. 
> 
< o according as cost changes due to vary1ng load factor 
are incorporated 1n tariff stru~tures. 
Unless this simultaneity and interdependence is taken account 
of, consistent estimates of the magnitudes we are interested in cannot 
be obtained. 
There are several ways of estimating the equations of a simple 
model like this and for the three or four versions used in the experiment, 
two stage least squares (2SLS) was chosen. For a description see 
Johnston (1979. chapter 13 ) • 
• 
In different versions the "predetermined variables" (which 
may include past values of the "jointly dependent" variables) used 
were: 
equation (1) 
equation (2) 
'CLF t-1 TIME 
the ratio of running to capacity 
costs per unit of output at time t 
The model can only be ·said to have been successful in terms 
of the expected behaviour of the signs on the coefficients for.one state: 
. Victoria. The results here are of some interest however. It. is not 
surprising that Victoria should be a.relative success in this respect 
since it ~s (or would claim to be) the state with longest allegiance to 
the idea of time of day tariffs. 
Of the various candidates for use as Pit two were chosen: 
PI(l)t the ratio of industrial and commerical night rate 
to the first block of the equivalent daytime runn~ng 
charge. 
PI(2)t the ratio of the night rate for water heating for 
residential consumers to the equivalent residential 
daytime running charge. 
From the 2SLS estimates of equation (1) the following 
elasticities were calculated (at the data means): 
I 
.. 
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ECLF, PI(l) = -4.8 
ECLF, PI(2) -6.1 
To obtain an appreciation of what these really mean consider 
the following hypothetical examples: 
(a) In 1971 capacity load factor for Victoria was 49.7% and the relation 
between night and day rates for PI(l) (industrial consumers) was: 
night day 
1. 00 ¢ per KVfu 8.00 r£ per KWh 
Then if the night rate was reduced to 0. 90 r£ per ·K~fu and the day 
rate stayed the same the model predicts that 1971 load factor would 
have risen to 50.0%. 
(b) Again taking 1971 as an example the night and day rates making up 
PI(2) were: (residential consumers) 
night day 
1.05 ¢ per K~ 2.21 rf. per KVfu 
Reducing the night rate to 0.95 rf. per KWh and leaving the day rate 
unchanged at 2.21 rf. per KVfu would have raised load factor (according 
to the model) to 50.1%. 
lo~ 
In conjunction with the earlier measures of cost savings due 
to load factor variations, such rises 1.n load factor are by no means 
negligible. 
SUHHING UP THE W'ORK. ON COSTS AND TARIFFS 
Very briefly, the overall impressions resulting from the 
analysis and experiments just described can be set out. 
To begin with we discussed the extensive literature on 
theoretical principles of setting electricity tariffs. The key to the 
economist's view is that "timing of demand" is the basic determinant of. 
costs and should be reflected in "time of day" prices if marginal cost' 
pricing is adopted. The essence of what might be called the engineering 
approach is to distinguish between capacity and running costs and to 
charge separate prices accordingly. 
.However there is an inteYvening 
area in which one scheme becomes very closely related to the other. 
In addition there are several suggested forms of discrimination among 
consumer groups. 
The first experiments showed that all types of pricing 
principles make an appearance in Australian electricity tariffs but 
in experiments to correlate particular tariff categories with particular 
cost categories, it was found that what the theoretical principles 
recommended in relating tariffs to runn1.ng and capacity costs were not 
practiced in general. Indeed sometimes the relationships were exactly 
opposed to the theoretically correct ones. 
llo 
Moving on; we examined whether· the "timing of demand problem" 
had a significant cost dimension. It was found that spreading peak 
demand into off peak periods - as measured by rises in capacity load 
factor did have a measurable and arguably important impact on unit costs. 
This lead to posing the final question: g~ven that load factor 
variations have a cost impact, can such variations in timing of demand be 
achieved by tariff alterations? A first set of experiments indicated 
that capacity load factor was positively related to certain "time of day" 
characteristics of the tariff structure and further experiments suggested -
for the State of Victoria - some orders of magnitude for these effects. 
It is on the basis of this analysis and observation that it 
can be argued that pricing policy is of fundamental practical importance 
in resource allocation in electricity supply in Australia. 
Ill 
APPENDIX TO PART I 
·coST INFLATION AND PEAK LOAD PRICING 
The effects of cost inflation on peak and off peak prices 
r 
can be examined in the simplest two period model which has appeared 
several times in the literature- for example Littlechild (1970). The 
essential result is that for a social optimum, price will exceed 
marginal running cost in periods when demand is high by an amount 
which just restricts demand to capacity; summing all these differences 
between price and marginal running cost we obtain a term equal to 
marginal capacity cost. We need only examine the case in which the 
demand cycle is broken into t"tvo periods. In symbols our solution is: 
Pl = c + vl .......... (1) 
P2 = c + vz .......... (2) 
vl + v2 = b ........... (3) 
vl;::, 0 v2 :e. 0 
Where p1 and p2 are prices charged in periods 1 and 2 
respectively, c is marginal running cost in those periods and b is 
marginal capacity costs; v 1 and v 2 are the differences between pr1ce 
and marginal running cost in each period and mathematically represent 
the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers on the existing capacity constraints. 
We may begin the analysis with the simplest possible case and 
assume that the only inflation we observe is a steady rise in marginal 
running costs. (To keep the notation simple we shall measure all cost 
changes as being net of technical progress.) This case reflects what 
' 
I 
! 
I I. 
! 
! 
I I 
I 
I 
! 
I l 
II:).. 
might happen if there were a newly negotiated wage structure ~n the 
industry. 
Taking partial derivatives of equations (1) and (2) 
1 
L e. peak and off peak prices rise by the same absolute amount. 
In percentage tenns: 
= 
= 
1 
1 
c + v 2 
Suppose period 1 is the off peak period, so that 
o < v1 < v2 
then 
1 dpl 1 ap2 
pl dC > Pz ac-
and clearly off peak pr~ce ought to rise by a greater percentage than 
peak price. The reason is simply that we are only allowing inflation 
to affect running costs and these have a greater weighting in off peak 
than in peak price. 
113 
Obviously then there is some justification for the proposed 
new tariff structure having a relatively lower peak to off peak ratio. 
Hmvever, this is only the most oversimplified case. Inflation 
may be apparent in capacity costs as '"ell as running costs and this may 
alter the results considerably. To investigate this we can specify our 
e~press1on for capacity cost more formally. Capacity cost will depend 
on several factors - the pr1ce of new equipment, the rate of interest, 
the economic life of equipment. A simple case is that in which the 
capacity is capable of producing the same output year after year until 
it stops operating completely. We can then consider associating a 
constant amount of capacity cost with each year of operation and 
therefore obtain an exp~ession for capacity cost as the price of new 
equipment (K) multiplied by an appropriate annuity rate 
b = i (l+i)n 
(l+i)h -1 K • • • • • • • • • • ( 4) 
Where i is the rate of interest (the cost of capital and the 
discount rate used by the electricity authorities) and n is the life 
of the equipment. The period we are interested in is very short 
relatively to the life of the equipment so that we can simplify the 
expression in equation (4) by considering 
b = Lim 
n-+oo 
i (1 +i)n 
(l+i)n -1 
K = iK . • . . • • • • . . ( 5) 
Using equation (5) our simple peak and off peak pricing model 
becomes: 
ll't 
pl c + al (iK) .......... (6) 
p2 = c + a2 (iK) .......... (7) 
al + a2 = 1 
al > o, a2 > 0 
and we have replaced v 1 and v 2 by terms expressing the proportion of 
marginal capacity cost charged to each period; i.e. a 1 (iK) in period 
1 and a2 (iK) in period 2. 
We may now examine the case of cost inflation in both running 
costs and 1n the price of new equipment. Take total differentials of 
equations (6) and (7) and express in percentage terms: 
dp. c (de/c) + K·a. i (dK/K) 
_J 
= 
J (8) 
p. 
c + a. (iK) J J 
for j = 1,2. 
The effect on pr1ce for each period will reflect the weighted 
average of inflation rates 1n running and capacity costs. The most 
straightforward case is 
dc/c = dK/K = g 
.. 
i.e. the rate of inflation is the same· for running costs and capacity 
costs; substituting in equation (8) 
= g 
peak and off-peak prices n.se by the same percentage - the connnon rate 
of cost inflation - and there ~s no basis for altering the peak off-
peak price differential. 
Summing up so far, we can see that our first case of inflation 
only in running costs is a special category of the general rule embodied 
in equation (8): 
(i) the effect on price is to raise it by a percentage 
which is a weighted average of the percentage rates 
of inflation in running .and capital costs. 
(ii) if the rate of inflation is the same for both 
categories of cost the peak off-peak price ratio 
does not change. 
(iii) off-peak pr~ce rises by a greater percentage than 
peak price only if inflation in running costs 
outpaces inflation ~n capacity costs. 
Hence to provide a justification for tariff changes we have 
to assume that case (iii) applies and that its effect is sufficiently 
·severe for it to outweigh the social costs imposed ··by a reduction in 
the ratio of peak to off-peak pr~ce. 
A numerical illustration of the results implied by equation 
( ~ is shown in table 1. 
Table 1. 
Illustration of the results of equation ( 9) 
assumptions: dc/c 0.10 c = 2 i = 0.10 
dK/K = 0.05 K 100 
al a2 dpl/pl dp2/p2 
0.0 1.0 0.10 0.058 
0.3 0.7 0.07 0.061 
0.5 0.5 0.065 0.065 
Table 1 illustrates a case where the rate of cost inflation 
in running costs is double the rate for capacity costs. As we move 
IHo 
from a case of very high demand in period 2 and very low demand in period 
1 (first row of table) to a case where demand is the same in both periods, 
the amount by which the percentage rise in off peak price exceeds the 
percentage rise in peak price diminishes rapidly. 
However, it can be argued that another case remains. We have 
not allowed inflation to appear in the rate of interest term. In normal 
discounting analysis an approximate method of taking account of the 
decrease in value of future sums due to inflation rather than due to time 
is simply to add the expected rate of inflation to the discount rate 
I 
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i = ·r + q 
where r is the real rate of interest and q is the percentage rate of 
inflation expected over the time period in consideration. If it is 
the case that private industry is consistently adding an inflation 
premium q to its own discount rates, then sooner or later the public 
utilities/government may wish to change their discount rates to remove 
the bias in public sector resource allocation. 1-le ought therefore to 
discover the effect on peak prices and off-peak prices of simultaneous 
inflation in capital and running costs and an alteration in the discount 
rate applied. 
If we allow the discount rate to rise by a small factor from i 
to (1 +D.)i we obtain from equation (8) the expression: 
dp. 
_J 
c(dc/c) + a. (iK) (dK/K) + b. ~ a. K 
J J 
= 
Pj 
If we assume 
dc/c = dK/K g 
we obtain: 
dp. 
_J 
P· J 
= g + 
c + a. (iK) 
J 
a. K b. i 
J 
c + a. (iK) 
J 
• • • • • • • • • ( 9) 
To investigate the effects of this expression consider the 
numerical example shown 1n table 2. 
Table 2. 
Illustration of effects of cost inflation and 
an altered discount rate. 
assumptions: g = 0.15 
i = 0.05 
a. dp./p. 
_1_ J J 
0.0 
0.2 
0.4 
0.5 
0.8 
1.0 
l. 
K 
= 
0.10 
100 
c = 2 
m + (a. K /::, i/c 
J 
0.150 
0.400 
0.483 
0.525 
0.550 
0.567 
ll~ 
+ a. i K) 
J 
The table illustrates that the effect of raJ.sJ.ng the discount 
rate from ten percent to fifteen percent is a very large rise in the 
capacity cost element J.n prices: 
peak demand) the higher is dp./p .• 
J J 
the higher is a. (indicating a high 
J 
The nature of the effects can be seen in figure 1; quadrants 
I and III plot the expression for dp./p. against a.; quadrant II 
J J J 
indicates the variation in aj - e.g. for a 1 = 1 and a 2 = 0, all demand 
is concentrated in period 1; for a1 = 0.5 = a 2 demand is spread equally 
over both periods. Quadrant IV plots the relative. effects on dp 1/p 1 and 
The clear result is that when 
FIGURE 1 
The effects of cost inflation and an altered test discount 
rate on peak and off-peak prices: 
dpl/pl = percentage change in period 1 price. 
dp2 /p 2 percentage change in period 2 pr1ce. 
al = proportion of capacity costs allocated 
to period 1. 
az = proportion of capacity costs allocated 
to period 2. 
~ . 
.. 
llqfQ...) 
a rise in the discount rate is allowed for, the effect of inflation 
is to raise peaR pr1ces relatively to off-peak prices. For example, 
if period 1 is off-peak demand and twenty percent of capital costs are 
allocated to this period then from table 2, (rmv 2) we observe 
= 0.40 
and s1nce the other eighty percent of capital costs are allocated to 
period 2 we note from row 5 of the table: 
= 0.55 
Off-peak pr1ce rises by forty percent while peak price rises 
by fifty-five percent. 
We ought to be clear why this has happened. Raising the 
discount rate raises the capital charges (capacity costs) associated 
with each period because these capital charges reflect the reduction 
for each period in the net present value of the future earnings of the 
equipment in question. Any rise in the opportunity cost of new 
investment (i) makes this reduction greater and hence adds to each 
period's capital charge. Since capital charges have an additional 
increase, peak prices which bear the brunt of capital charges will rise 
proportionately more than off-peak prices. The nature of this view_of 
capital charges is well discussed by Salter (1966) (page 19). 
.. I 
I· 
It can be seen therefore that we have a variety of results 
depending on the assumptions used: 
(a) if runn~ng costs show greater inflation than capacity 
. 
costs we would normally expect off-peak prices to 
rise by a greater percentage than peak prices. 
(b) where running cost3 and capacity costs r~se at the 
same rate the ratio of peak to off-peak price should 
not alter. 
(c) eventually cost inflation may lead the electricity 
authorities to evaluate capacity expansion programmes 
at a new higher test discount rate; this could mean 
that peak price will rise by a greater .percentage than 
off-peak price. 
PART II 
INVEST}ffiNT PLANNING MODELS 
IN ELECTRICITY SUPPLY 
l.l...l 
CHAPTER VI 
A MODEL OF THE INVESTMENT PLANNING PROBLEM 
IN~RODUCTION Our purpose here is to examine some of the fundamental 
issues which economists have raised in tackling the investment planning 
problem in electricity supply. Because theoretical issues are being 
considered the discussion is at an abstract level;· nevertheless all of 
the models reviewed have, ~n one way or another, attempted to reflect 
real-world constraints and all of them have a great deal to say about 
planning electricity supply in realistic circumstances. 
Rather than adopt a chronological investigation, it is 
preferable to examine different models of electricity supply in the 
context of one particular approach to the problem. One of the best 
developed and most explicit models is that given in a series of 
contributions by Ralph Turvey (Turvey 1968, 1969, 197la, 197lb). Hany 
of Turvey's results and propositions have received comment (not all 
favourable) but there seems little disagreement that this series of models 
has cast a great deal of light on the problems of electricity supply. 
However, the usefulness of a model's results depend to some extent on 
the sort of questions that it attempts to answer. Turvey himself has 
stated that a fundamental result of investment planning models is the 
indication they ·give of the optimal price to be charged for electricity. 
• I Bas~cally the model provides a clue to the calculation of marginal cost 
and, in some way or other, marginal cost is expected to enter into the 
pricing decision. However, a crucial result of the recent analyses is 
that the old textbook idea of a single easily defined marginal cost is 
seriously deficient. Putting together the views ot Meek (1968) and 
Turvey (1969) we can begin by noting the follmving proposition 
\'. 
I' 
i' 
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investment planning provides a determined optimal path of 
capacity installation and utilization once the planner's objective 
function is explicitly stated; as a by--product of the planning 
exerc1se information is obtained on the additional cost of small 
changes in the values of the exogenous variables in the constraints 
on the objective function; since there are many types cf such 
constraints there will be many types of these additional costs and 
one or more \vill be appropriate bases for charging the individuals 
who are responsible for the exogenous changes -
The two key arguments here are 
(a) an argument by Meek that margirtal cost pricing is a means and not an 
end (Meek 1968, p.58); it LS a means towards satisfying the planners 
overall objective; 
and (b) an argument by Turvey that there are several·marginal costs, 
not just one (Turvey 1969, p.285) 
In brief, therefore, we can expect the models to be examined 
to be concerned with optimising a given objective function subject to 
constraints and to provide in the solution many different kinds of 
marginal cost. 
SETTING UP THE PROBLEM He are going to examLne the investment planning 
problem in the context at first of a specific series of models so we must 
initially consider what these models do and what they do not attempt to do. 
In the introductory chapters of his book on Economic Analysis and Public 
Enterprises (1971) Turvey sets out very specifically the issues which he -
and, as it happens, most of the other writers in this field - has ignored. 
He is not concerned with income distribution or questions of equity or 
·subsidising certain groups in the community. The problems of externalities 
are not especially considered and he repeats his belief that Ln dealing 
with problems of information "What is not known should be ignored". 
Although there is a stock of literature on the problem of second best(l) 
he does not bring this into his discussion of optimal investment planning 
models, and neither shall .we. He believes the plannerst objective is and 
ought to be the maximisation of the difference bet~·men social benefits 
and social costs and social benefits are to be measured by willingness 
to pay. With this cutting of the Gordian knot of many controversial 
issues in public enterprise economics he arrives at his statement of the 
problem of optimising the capacity expansion programme of a theoretical 
public enterprise which could well be exemplified by any of the Australian 
electricity authorities. 
The planning situation facing the enterprise is modelled in 
figure VI,l.Demand for the product responds to exogenous factors like the 
grouth of income and to endogenous factors like prices. Having partially 
determined demand by its pricing po~icy the enterprise seeks to minimise 
the costs of meeting that demand, and this optimisation programme not only 
solves for the optimal path of capacity accumulation but provides the 
measures of system costs which form the basis of pricing policy along with 
the exongenous constraints imposed by the planner's political superiors. 
Turvey makes the empirical judgement that planners know less about the 
interaction between parts (A) and (E) (i.e. demand and prices) than they 
do about parts (B) (C) and (D) (system costs and expansion). Rather than 
tackle the whole planning problem at once he isolates the system cost 
aspects and optimises on these alone allowing the feedback from prices 
and demand to have an effect on the second iteration of the cost planning 
exerc1.se. In terms of computational effort alone this approach is 
essential, and is explicit or implicit in almost all the writings on the 
subject with the exception of the peak load pricing literature where 
Figure VI, 1 The Planning Situation 
Exogenous factor prices 
r - t - - -· 
Exogenous factors 
(A) 
~ Demand for the product 
(B) 
Cost of meeting demand 
1 
(C) 
System size and growth 
(E) 
Price of the product 
J 
r ------
(D) 
' 
System costs at the margin ~<-----------..1 
L J 
s constraints on pr~ces 
The aspects of the problem considered by Turvey are 
isolated within the box superimposed on (B) (C) and (D). 
sufficiently simplifying assumptions allow the whole problem to be 
tackled at once. 
Before we go on to the details of Turvey's models \·le may 
note two comments he makes' on this approach. Length of lead times and 
gestation periods in electricity supply are so large that there may be 
many changes in the exogenous factors between the steps of obtaining an 
optimal programme and carrying it out. This reduces the likelihood of 
a convergence towards an optimum in practice; this non-convergence of 
optimal plans to subsequent optimal practice clearly imposes costs on 
society. Turvey dismisses any attempt to lower this cost by using a 
simplified interdependent model: his comment( 2) is "life is like that 
and one might as well try to adjust to it". 
Summing up his statement of the problem therefore we can 
say: 
. 
the planner accepts a set of demand forecasts and tries to 
minimise the cost of meeting them. 
The forecasts could be in probability terms or as certain 
point forecasts. All of the main models have used the latter formulation 
and we shall continue to do so. 
TURVEY'S SERIES OF MODELS 
Turvey specifically tackled the optimal investment problem 
m electricity supply in his book Optimal Pricing and Investment 1.n 
Electricity Supply in 1968 but he concentrated there on some of the 
marginal conditions for local optima. Having determined an overall 
investment plan he discussed the problems of making marginal adjustments 
to it. It is only in his later writings (especially 197la and 197lb) 
; i 
I 
1.1-<o i 
that he sets out his global optimising model. 
There are several noteworthy characteristics of an 
electricity capacity planning model and these can be examined ~n the 
context of the Turvey series. The most obvious is that electricity 1s 
(except in some unimportant senses) not storable and at the same time 
subject to severe periodic demand fluctuations. The importance of this 
is in the way in which marginal system costs are translated into a set of 
optimal prices, but in the situation of planning minimum cost investment 
the problem of peaks in supply can be avoided by the very simple device 
of redefining the time periods involved. Thus instead of considering a 
set of annual demand forecasts we could specify a set of demand forecasts 
for the different groups of hours within a year which make up the demand 
cycle. If we compare Turvey's generalised model (197la) with his specific 
programming model for electricity supply (197lb) it is apparent that the 
structures of the two models are id~ntical, only the time subscripts 
differ. Hence bearing in mind that the time variables (t) may refer to 
hours rather than years we need only examine the generalised investment 
planning model(3). Similarly Turvey's model 197la allows for only one 
type of plant \-.Thile his model 197lb allows for an optimal plant mix to 
be determined. Nevertheless the underlying structure of the model does 
not alter and the only difference between the two is the use of an 
additional superscript to denote plant type. The basic results that we 
want to consider are unaffected by redefining the time variable or adding 
superscripts, hence the long run investment planning model is unaffected 
in abstract terms by ignoring the two considerations of peaked demand and 
multiple plant types. In a short run model of fi~ed generating capacity 
where the problem is optimal despatching these considerations cannot be 
avoided. The appendix presents a model of this situation(4) in the 
spirit of Turvey's long run model. 
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We now turn to consider some other characteristics of 
optimal investment models. We have already stated that the objective 
function is to minimise the costs - subject to some constraints - of 
meeting a specified set of demand forecasts. The solution paths are 
~n terms. of two variables: 
{Qv} Installed capacity at each moment ~n time 
v . v {Ot} rate of output in period t of capacity (Q ) installed 
~n period v. (The notation used here means that {Qv} ~s 
a sequence (Q1 Q2 ••• Qn ••• )of installations and {O~} represents 
a sequence of outputs. 
In each period total output ~s the sum of the outputs f.rom each 
type of capacity already installed. 
v = t total output = 
v = 0 
in period t. 
The superscript v refers to capacity installed ~n year v (it could 
equally refer to capacity of type v). 
Associated with capacity and the rate of output of capacity are 
two costs called capacity and running costs: 
cv the cost of installing one unit of capacity Qv built 
in year v. 
rv the cost of producing one unit of output Ov ~n year t 
t t 
from capacity built in year v. 
The expression for total systems costs (C) is therefore: 
v C = (total systems costs) = t 00 
...... (1) 
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Turvey chooses an infinite· horizon in order to simplify 
the exposition. There are arguments for and against this. An infinite 
horizon solves the problem of calculating scrap values at the end of a 
finite horizon; since these scrap values are to be passed on to the next 
generation anyway having a finite horizon poses as many problems as it 
solves. However an infinite horizon is not computable in practical terms 
and analytically raises problems of what the value of the solution should 
.. be as .we. ap.proach infinity. 
... :·- . . :.>··· .. ,·.: ' ·. .• 
(This "transversality" problem is mentioned 
again in the appendix.) Nevertheless to obtain the essential results of 
the model an infinite horizon is just as useful. 
The most crucial aspect of the problem is its essentially 
dynamic nature. Investment programmes are planned over time· and a static 
analysis becomes irrelevant. This has prompted Turvey to argue that it 
is ·a historical dynamic concept of marginal cost which emerges from the 
investment programme making the old textbook static concepts redundant. 
This is completely true and very important but is not an issue which 
has yet been resolved as we shall see below. Given that the analysis 
brings in time in a positive manner the question arises of discounting 
the future. Turvey's models (and the practice of Australian electricity 
authorities) accept without demur the necessity of discounting the future 
and that really resolves the question for us. Nevertheless we should 
c ? '?. • • • 
reor-gan1se at least 1n pass1ng that some commentators argue that in 
infinite horizon planning models the use of a discount rate other than 
zero is a defect from a welfare point of view(S). 
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Having obt.ained our concept of system cqsts (C) what can 
be said about it? One of the most important things is that it allows 
for what Turvey calls "system interdependence" (Turvey 1969, page 292) 
so that when an item of new capacity is required its appearance affects 
the functioning of the rest of capacity. Any cost conclusions relating 
to one piece of capacity depend crucially on the cost implications of 
having or not having other pieces of capacity. Turvey's first version 
of his explicit system planning model (1969) ignored system inter-
dependence. This allowed him to consider in isolation the problem of 
advancing or postponing the replacement of one item of capacity 
irrespective of the existence of other capacity. However the rules he 
derived do have counterparts in the more general model of system 
interdependence. 
In solving his dynamic model Turvey is able to use a 
static non-linear programming technique by sufficiently splitting up 
his time variable. Each dated solution value of (Qv) and (Ov) will 
. .t 
depend on every other solution value and it is easy to see that this 
interdependence translated into dynamic terms means that every "current" 
planning decision depends on a whole series of hypothetical "future" 
decisions. 
The exogenous variables affecting the choice of Qv and 
v v v Ot are c and rt (which we ought to think of as being calculated 1n 
present value terms), and in addition the specified set of demand 
forecasts: 
= X n 
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Turvey makes explicit assumptions about how technological 
v v progress affects rt and c • For given t, r~ and cv fall with v; i.e. 
technological progress ensures that the running and capacity costs of 
later vintage capacity are lower than those of earlier capacity. This 
corresponds to the assumption that technological progress is embodied in 
the latest vintage of the capacity acquired. Best practice plants and 
techniques are those most recently adopted. This idea associated mainly 
with the names of Salter, Solow and Johansen(6) has received some critical 
comment on empirical grounds, (Jorgenson 1966, and Gregory and James, 
1973) but as the discussion in Chapter VII indicates, it is probably an 
empirically justifiable assumption for the case of electricity supply. 
In addition to r~ declining with v, Turvey assumes tpat 
v 
rt rises with t for given v. Older plant becomes progressively more 
costly to run in terms of maintenance and repairs. These two assumptions 
(embodied technological progress an~ positive ageing costs) together 
introduce a non-stationary element into the model, as Turvey recognises 
(197lb, page 375). The assumption of non-stationarity simply means 
that, apart from the dependence of (Qv) and (0~) on time, the variable (t) -
time - enters explicitly into the objective function since r~ and cv can 
both be replaced by expressions in t. If this was not the case then at 
v v least one of the optimal paths would mean that Ot and Q would settle 
down to stationary values unchanging for the rest of time, and the problem 
would be said to be "autonomous". It is therefore the crucial assumptions 
of technological progress and positive ageing costs in a critical sense 
that give Turvey's model its true dynamic flavour -merely discounting the 
future is not enough to do this. This is exemplified by the number of so 
called dynamic neo-classical investment models such as those of Jorgenson( 7) 
which turn out to be only a series of static decision problems. (A proof 
I 
131 
of these rather important observations "is given ~n the Appendix, section 
(iv).) 
Before we examine the rest of the model in detail we can 
ask what Turvey expects to get out of the model. In a real-world 
v v 
situation the solutions (Q ) and (Ot) would be of over-riding importance, 
in an analytical exercise this is not the case and far more attention is 
directed to other products of the solution. Outstanding among these is 
a measure of marginal cost. It has long been known that in a cost 
minimisation problem marginal cost can be calculated as the effect on the 
objective function of a small change in the constraints; this is what 
Turvey is particularly interested in, and he is interested in it as a 
basis for developing pricing policy from a welfare economics point of 
v~ew. Marginal cost therefore is exclusively a result of optimising 
behaviour for Turvey. In discussing this point he recognises (1969, 
page 282) that marginal cost may be calculated for other reasons but the 
optimising one is the main one for him. An important contribution which 
we will discuss below (Albouy and Nachtigal 1970) also recognises this: 
in static optimisation ••. marginal cost remains an 
indispensable concept in interpreting the results. 
In addition to calculating marginal cost Turvey is also 
interested in establishing socially optimal pricing and investment rules. 
He makes some headway with this especially in using his model to solve the 
peak load pricing problem (197la Chapter 7; see also Littlechild 1970). 
One translation of these rules is to say that capacity is optimally 
adjusted to demand when short run marginal cost equals long run marginal 
cost. Turvey uses his model to develop this rule, however the outcome 
is not clearly resolved. One result of this was a severe criticism of 
Turvey's 1969 paper by Kay (Kay 1971) ... In fact all of the discussion 
on this point appeared to be hopelessly mixed up and we can attempt to 
resolve it below(S). In the process we shall h~ve something to say about 
the usefulness of short and long run concepts in dynamic optimisation. 
Finally Turvey develops from his model some interesting results on 
depreciation and amortisation - and, interestingly enough, some of these 
. . . . . 1. . 1. (9) have appeared 1n d1fferent d1sgu1ses 1n the ear 1er econom1c 1terature • 
THE SOLUTION OF THE MODEL 
We now have enough to start exam1n1ng and solving the model 
1n detail. Recalling the above discussion the objective is 
Minimise C = PH (total system costs from t = o to t = ro ) 
by solving for the optimal capacity expansion programme 
Q v •••••••• ) 
and the optimal utilisation programme 
0~ .. ~. ) 
Hhere PH = the present worth at some specified discount rate of 
the stream of costs. 
(X) 
c = E 
v = 0 
[ 0~ ] • • • • • • • • • • • ( 1) (X) + 
t <;:. v 
We note that one of the solution values is 0° the rate of 
0 
output in year 0 from capacity existing in year o; this 1s capacity 
inherited from the past, Q0 , since the first capacity solution value 1s 
1 
. b b . . h . Q , capac1ty to e u1lt 1n t e f1rst year of the plan. 
The most important constraint ~s that output rates are to 
meet the specified set of demand forecasts: total output from all plants 
in year t is to be at least as great as demand in year t : 
t 
E 
v ~0 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • (2) 
the remaining constraints relate to the operating technology of the 
system 
constraint 
constraint 
constraint 
Output may never exceed capacity for any machine 
0~ ~ Qv for all t and v 
capacity available at the beginning of the plan 
cannot exceed the amount inherited from the past 
output and capacity may never be negative 
o· 
' 
for all t and v 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
There are no other constraints in Turvey's models as 
explicitly stated though he does indicate the possibility of making some; 
in particular, transmission constraints and possibilities v1hich could mal~e 
the system even more interdependent are ignored here. 
We now have to solve the problem of minimising the objective 
function (1) subject to the constraints (2), (3), (4) and (5). The 
basis for the solution is known as the Kuhn Tucker theorem (see appendix); 
, we can confine our attention to the important necessary conditions. 
The first step is to create from (l).to (5) a single 
objective function without constraints. To do this we use a set of 
auxiliary variables called Kuhn Tucker multipliers the amended objective 
function is therefore dependent not only on Ov and Qv but also on these 
t 
I j 
I 
I 
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auxiliary variables. 
mt corresponding to the t constraints 1n equation (z) 
kv 
t ·corresponding to the (vt) constraints in equation (3) 
0 
corresponding to the single constraint in equation (4) u 
0 ' 
and these (like cv and r~) can be regarded as being 1n present value 
terms. The point of this is that each constraint reflects a condition 
that must hold at each point of time in the planning horizon and the 
strength of these constraints will diminish through time in our evaluation 
just as the costs of our planned operations cv and r~ diminish through 
l. 
time. We can conceive of a current value Kuhn Tucker multiplier - say 
-t Mt - and its present worth mt = Mt (1 + i) and we work 1n terms of mt. 
Our objective function is then: 
00 r~ 0~ J + E 
t ~v 
00 [xt 00 ] + E mt E ov t t = 0 v = 0 
00 00 [o~ J + E E kv Qv t v = 0 t ~v 
+ u 
0 [ Qo QOJ • • • • • • • • • • ( 6) 0 
The Kuhn Tucker theorem now-allows us to solve the original 
problem as follows: under certain general conditions a set of values 
of 0~ v v 0 that provide a minimum of L for ov and Qv and Q mt kt and u 0 t t 
and a maximum of L for v 0 also provide a minimum of v mt kt and u0 c for ot 
and Qv subject to the constraints specified above. We therefore only 
have to examine the necessary conditions for L to be a minimum for Ov t 
and a maximum for mt k~ and 0 u . 
0 
Taking these Ln turn, we proceed as follows. 
Optimal choice of the use of inherited capacity Q0 : if Q0 is to be 
optimal a small rise in it must either raise or leave constrained costs 
unchanged therefore we requLre 
0 and Q0 3L = 
aqo 
0 
where 3L/3Q0 is the effect on constrained system costs of using some 
additional inherited capacity and where the second term expresses the 
Qv 
fact that if a small rise in Q0 raises costs then we would prefer not to 
0 . 
use any Q at all; 
and 3L 
aqo 
00 
r k 0 t 
t = 0 
• • • • • • • • • • • ( 7) 
Optimal installation of new capacity Qv : our reasoning LS similar - we 
install Qv up to the point at which any further installation raises total 
v . 
system costs - if this arises for any level of Q then we install no 
capacity of that vintage. 
aL 
w 
v 
= c 
00 
t v 
~ 0 and aL = o for all v 
w 
• • • • . • • • • • . . ( 8) 
I 
I 
I 
where 3L/3Qv is the effect on system costs of installing additional Qv 
capacity. 
Optimal choice of output rates 0~ : Proceeding similarly we have 
positive output from a given Qv in year t if to do so does not raise 
costs; otherwise we have zero output from that plant in year t. 
different. 
vaL ~ 0 and otaov 
t 
= o for all v and t. 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • "(9) 
Our arguments with effect to the constraints are slightly 
For each constraint we must judge whether - at the optimum 
that constraint is an effective limitation on our freedom of action. If 
it is then the effect of relaxing it. a little must be to reduce costs. 
Reasoning this way we obtain as necessary conditions 
for constraints on total output: 
3L 
'dmt 
t 
= (X - I: t 
v=o 
()L = o for all t • . • • • • • (10) 
Clmt 
Where aL/amt is the effect on system costs of a small rise 1n 
the "shadow cost" arising out of the existence of this constraint, and 
()L 
ar t 
and 
3L 
au0 
0 
~ o and u0 
0 
3L = o for all v and t •••• (11) 
ar t 
= 0 ••••••••••. (12) 
These necessary conditions ensure that where a constraint LS 
effective the optimal values are indeed feasible values. Finally the 
Kuhn Tucker theorem ensures that 0~ Qv mt k~ and u~ chosen in this way 
will never be negative (o~r constraint equation (5) is satisfied 
automatically). 
Having solved his model in this way, Turvey proceeds to use it 
to obtain a variety of important results. The model is very flexible 
and rich and as well as examining some of Turvey's chief propositions 
we can proceed ourselves to discover some of the nuances of the model 
that Turvey himself does not mention. 
Of course in any practical use of this model (or ones lib~. it) 
attention is focussed ou the optimal· 'paths' of capacity installation 
and utilization (Qv) and 0~); however in an abstract study we concentrate 
on analytical conclusions. A good starting point is equation (9). 
Essentially whenever a machine produces a positive rate of output in a 
. v gLyen year : Ot >o, we know that, at the optimum a small rise in the rate 
produces no rise in costs: 
mt only varies with t so that there is, in any one year, a set 
of implied equalities over different vintages of plant: 
. . . . . . . . ( 14) 
We now need to interpret k~ and mt to understand this 
proposition. k~ and mt are Kuhn Tucker multipliers or "dual variables" 
and are crucial to analysis of the underlying structure of the problem. 
Their strategic importance ~s expressed by showing that - under special 
conditions: 
the value of a Kuhn Tucker multiplier 
(or dual variable) at the optimum = the effect of the optimal 
value of the objective function 
of a small relaxation in th~ 
constraint associated with that 
multiplier. 
For example if the special. conditions were satisfied we could 
write, 
= AC* 
AX 
t 
at the optimum value of mt 
Where C* is the value of system costs at the minimum point and C* is a 
function of the optimally chosen variables 0~ Qv which are ~n turn functions 
of the exogenously given constants. Turvey does not investigate these 
special conditions and they are very rarely treated in the literature so 
it is worthwhile spending a few moments exam~n~ng them. Hence the next 
section is a digression on this topic. The main flow of the argument is 
taken up once more beyond this section. 
1 
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THE SHADOW PRICE INTERPRETATION OF KUHN~UCKER MULTIPLIERS 
In this section we have digressed to consider the conditions 
under which it can be said that 
This is developed from the process of relaxing the appropriate 
constraint ~n the problem. The exogenous variables of the problem are 
Xt' r~ and cv and the cost minimising solution C* depends on the solution 
values 0~, Qv and these ~n turn depend on Xt, r~ and v c • If we were now 
v v to change Xt' say, by a small amount, some values of Ot and Q would 
change and hence C* would also change. If we could evaluate these changes 
over a small range we can measure - in this example 
= 
f).C* 
aov 
t 
etc. 
However we must ask the question whether this is always possible. 
Is it the case that a finite 
exists for every change in Xt? 
there is then the further question of whether 
= 
Once we have tackled this, 
Tackling the first problem, we want to consider whether a finite 
!:.C*/f).Xt exists. Precisely this problem was tackled by Balinski and 
Baumol (1968), and the essential points can be conveyed diagranrrnatically. 
Suppose all our variables are reduced to two, labelled Y1 and Y2 • 
We are dealing with a minimum cost problem so the structure 
is simply 
minimize C 
subject to 
etc. 
If this was a linear problem (linear objective function and 
linear constraints) - and of course Turvey's problem is entirely linear -
we could picture it as 1n figure VI,2 where the shaded area is th~ feasible 
region initially. (This figure is based on the analysis of Balinski and 
Baumol, particularly their figure la but adapted to deal with a cost 
minimizing formulation.) The constraints are "greater than" inequalities 
Two isocost contours of the objective 
function are shown for completeness. Initially a solution will occur at 
point B where an isocost contour reaches the lowest ~easible.level. 
Suppose now that the constraint equation represented by BB1 is relaxed, 
AAl 
so that the appropriate constraint is BB with the boundary of the feasible 
region being ADEC. The new solution will be given by isocost contour 
passing through D but the effect on cost is simply to lower it 1n 
proportion to the relaxation of the constraint: cost falls in proportion 
to the distance BD. But this fall in cost may not always· occur so 
smoothly. For example suppose there was a further relaxation in this 
--1 
constraint that took it down to the level BB • The feasible region 
however becomes AQC and the relaxed constraint 1s no longer binding: 
abruptly ~C*/~X has become zero. Such discontinuities might also occur 
if the constraint remained binding but the optimal solution shifted to a 
new vector. If we graph C* as a function of x1 , the exogenous variable, 
l: 
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we therefore get a result like figure VI,3. 
the derivative 
1 For values of X less than ox-, 
is well defined. But for ox1 (and also ox11 ) ~C*/~X is not 
defined. 
At points like ox1 and ox11 , small changes Ln X so radically 
alter the structure of the optimal plan that C* does not change in a smooth 
manner at all. This appears to raise the theoretical problem that 
marginal cost for some levels of output may simply not be measurable. 
However Balinski and Baumol did establish a savLng result, sLnce 
they were able to show that 
~C*/~X 
for ox1 and similar points would lie between the finite limits 
given by the values of ~C*/~X to the left and right of ox1. This means 
that ~C*/~X at 0~1 would be given by the slope of a line tangential to the 
C*(X) curve passLng through W and lying bet>veen OW and WV. Marginal cost 
could therefore be measured within limits. (The essential condition is 
that the constraint qualification necessary for the Kuhn Tucker solution 
should hold; see appendix.) 
Hence the answer to our first problem LS as follows. Given 
the conditions for a solution to the non-linear programming problem to 
exist (the Kuhn Tucker constraint qualification), then relaxing a 
constraint produces a measure 
which at worst will be defined within positive limits. 
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As we have already remarked, Turvey places weight on this 
measure of marginal cost in pricing policy, so it has to be accepted 
that for some output ranges the nearest we may get to setting a price 
based on marginal cost is to pick a price from a finite range of values. 
The second problem we pointed out was this: 
g1ven that we know b.C*/b.Xt exists within finite limits, is it 
true that it can be measured by mt, the Kuhn Tucker multiplier associated 
with the constraint containing Xt? 
This 1s simply a matter now of careful analysis of the optimum 
solution. 
Recalling the,optimal solution we know that the optimum value 
of L depends on Qv, v v 0 ot, mt, kt, u 0 
L* = L* (Qv ov kv 0 ) at the optimum mt u t t ·O 
But then allowing for these variables 1n turn to be affected 
v v by Xt rt c we ought to write 
L* L* [ Qv (Xt v cv) ov (Xt v v v v v (Xt v cv) rt t rt c ) ' mt (Xt rt c ) kt rt 
0 (Xt v v J u rt c ) 0 
We are particularly interested here in Xt holding cv and ri constant. 
Let us therefore focus our attention on 
L* = L* 0 u 
0 
Where the optimal values of the variables all in turn depend on the given 
demand forecasts xt. We are now able to examine a small change in Xt 
by investigating what happens to these optimal values as xt changes 
6L* ~ ",. ·'· 6Qv ~ ~ ;}L* ti.Ov I: 3L* 6mt OL" 
6Xt 
= aqv + aov _t + am v 6Xt v t 6X t 6Xt t t t 
. 
~ ~ 3L* 6kv 3L* 
0 
0 6u0 + akV 
_t + u 3u0 + mt 
·v t t.Xt 0 t.x t 0 t 
We can see that AL*/b.Xt contains a series of complex terms and the single 
This single expression mt arises because the constraint 
containing Xt enters the expression for L* by being multiplied by mt. 
Hence any effect of 6Xt on L* will include at least this term reflecting 
the shadow price of this constraint; the question remains whether any 
of the other terms also enter. In a linear or non-linear programming 
framework we can never be quite sure whether terms like dL*/30~ will be 
negative or zero or whether terms like 3L*/3k~ will be positive or zero 
since either may be the case at or near the boundaries of the problem. 
To keep matters simple suppose almost every term except mt 
is zero so that we are only left with the case of 
3L* 
= + w t 
Which simply says that the cost of changing Xt by 6Xt amounts to the 
shadow price, mt on the Xt constraint and an item representing the cost 
of using a little more output 0~, from capacity of vintage v in period 
t. What can we say about this term bearing in mind that we only know 
that 3L*/30~ is not negative? 
We reason as follows. First~y, suppose 8L*/80~ is positive -
any rise in 0~ raises costs; 1n this case we would not want to meet 
Xt at the optimum by using 0~ since our costs 'vill rise away from 
the optimum. But if this is the case ~0~/~Xt is zero and ~L*/~Xt = mt. 
Suppose now that ~0~/~Xt is not zero - so that near the optimum a 
variation in Xt will cause us to vary 0~. This might be the case if 0~ 
is already part of our optimal solution. But in that case 8L*/80~ = o 
and again ~L*/~Xt = mt. Finally suppose an infinitesimally small r1se 
in Xt caused 
that case Ov 
t 
us to raise 0~ from zero to a small positive amount. In 
though not a part of the optimal solution must have been on 
the verge of being a candidate for the optimal solution. v Then 8L*/aOt 
must have been almost zero. Hence we can show that in the neighbourhood 
of the optimum 
either ~0~/~Xt is very close to zero 
or 8L*/80v is very close to zero t 
and therefore write 
= 
Our final step is then to note that at the optimum ~L'~~/~Xt' the 
effect on the optimal value of our constrained costs, is exactly equal to 
~C*/~Xt the effect on the optimal value of unconstrained costs. (See 
appendix on Kuhn Tucker theorem). 
Hence 
= 
We have established two things 1n this section for the case of 
non-linear programming problems: 
(a) At the optimum !:J.C*/t:J.Xt exists and is finite but 
may be discontinuous, if the constraint 
associated with mt is binding. 
(b) At the optimum t:J.c~·, I !:J.Xt must be very close to rot. 
APPLICATIONS TO TURVEY'S MODEL We can now continue our interpretation 
of equation (14) ~.e. 
•••• (14) 
We can therefore interpret m~ 
L. 
= !:J.C*/!:J.X ~n two ways. t One is 
as a marginal cost concept of the forecast demand levels, Xt; the other 
is in terms of the optimal utilisation of an item of capacity. mt is 
the sum of running cost, r~ and a dual variable or shadow price k~ for 
each machine. The two together make up a given mt for any year. 
therefore at the optimum the planner in meeting any forecast !:J.Xt is 
indifferent among a \17hole complex of plants rang1.ng from the newest 
installed to the oldest in operation. 
Clearly 
With our dynamic hypothesis about r~ we therefore obtain an idea 
v 
of how kt might look. Turvey has modified a celebrated diagram of 
Salter's to illustrate this result. Figure VI,4a and VI,4b show for a given 
. * . demand level at the opt~mum, x3' the relat~on between 
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In figure VI,4a all plants are used to capacity 
0~ = ·qv for all vintages 0 1 ••• 3 
While in figure VI,4b there is some capacity space on earliest 
vintage plant, (here Q0 ) in period 3. In this later case it is a 
0 0 
necessary part of our optimum condition that k3 = o so that m3 = r 3 
and only running cost enters marginal cost for this marginally used plant. 
Just as mt is interpreted by Turvey so kv t provides a useful 
interpretation point. Turvey argues that 
kv 
= t.C* t w 
the effect on system costs of having some additional capacity. 
v Intuitively it is easily seen that it is the kt term that brings running 
costs up to marginal cost for any machine in any period; k~ therefore is 
a capital charge associated with a particular machine built at t = v and 
operating in year t. This ~s a sensible interpretation though it is not 
quite the same as 
t.C* 
w 
We already know at the optimum that 
= ~ 0 
but Turvey, in calling k~ a cost saving associated with additional 
capacity (or quasi rent) is implying that k~ ~s negative. 
It is more correct to say 
(a) kv is a form of capital charge t 
(b) it is also the effect on L* of slightly relaxing 
the constraint. 
Thus suppose the constraint 1s binding so that 
If the constraint was then written as 
14-7 
Where e is a small positive number we would effectively have raised the 
available amount of Qv and could then interpret as 
e 
It 1s necessary therefore to distinguish between the 
positive: 
k~ a capital charge, and the idea of us1ng k~ as a quasi-
f v . d rent rom Q 1n year t as Turvey oes. In a cost minimising exerc1se 
quasi-rents have negative signs. Turvey in fact is stretching the 
economic ideas of this model over into a different type of model. As we 
shall show below(lO), this second model was first developed by Hotelling 
(1925) and is an interesting antecedent of the present analysis. 
Bearing this in mind, we can see that for each plant there 
is a running cost and capital charge item. For any plant in operation 
these add to marginal cost, mt. What happens when a plant is marginal 
to the operating programme? As a plant reaches the end of its economic 
life its quasi-rents or cost savings tail off; at the optimum there will 
be zero capacity charges recoverable fr~m the last period of its use 
i.e. = 0 
This can be seen in figure VI,4b. Part of x3 is made up by 
operating some old inherited plant but at a level below capacity. AB 
in figure VI,4b measures unused capacity of Q0 in year 3. The plant is ~n 
operation but its running costs are equal to the whole of marginal costs 
and it is on the verge of not being used at all. 
= 
We have here a condition for use or non-use of capacity but 
not enough to give us an indication of whether that capacity ought to be 
scrapped. 0 To know this we must not only look at k 3 which is equal to 
zero but also at k~ k~ and so on. The factors making up our 
scrapping criterion are simply whether 
+ 
v kt for all t from now to infinity. The following 
chapter makes some additional comments on this proposition. 
In developing the optimal planned expansion kv not only plays 
t 
a part in determining usage or scrapping of plant but also in acquisition. 
()L* 
w 
Examine equation (8) 
= 
L 
t + 
v 
c ~ 0 
= 0 
From this, if Qv>0 then 3L*/3Qv = o; i.e. a necessary condition 
for building capacity Qv ~s that 
or, that the capacity cost cv is just covered, for each item 
of capacity, by the lifetime allocation of capital charges associated 
with that capacity. Some of the k~ will be zero : this is immaterial -
as long as cv can be covered by allocating a part of it every time capacity 
is to be used then that capacity ought to be built. These two results: 
v 
+ kv mt = rt t 
v E ·kv c = 
t t 
make up the essence of Turvey's model. 
Marginal cost in any one year is given by a running charge and.a capital 
charge for whatever plant is utilised; this can be called a short term 
pricing rule if mt is to be used as a basis for pricing. Capacity cost 
is covered by a time stream of capital charge allocations for whatever 
capacity is built; this can be called an investment rule. Together the 
pricing rule and the investment rule determine optimal capacity expansion 
and utilisation. 
There is much else in Turvey's model but one of the most 
interesting aspects still to be covered is what the model tells us about 
v 
measuring mt and kt. 
We can approach this by an indirect route. Let us look at 
equation (12) 
<3L* ~ and ~ 0 u 
0 
where <3L* 
au<> = 
0 
0 Let us suppose u 
0 
0 
0 
<3L* 
auo 
0 
E 
t 
= E 
t 
= 0 
ko 0 + u t 0 
We must distinguish carefully between 
................... (9) 
and 
I So 
E 
t ~ v 
v ~ 0 
The second expression ~s the present worth of the stream of 
capital charges from capacity which will be acqu~red as part of the optimal 
programme and, as such, it not only covers cv but amounts to all the 
possible capital charges attributable to this capacity. But capacity Q0 
is inherited from the past. It is not optimally chosen by our programme, 
it is simply given to us. As such ·He have no way of knowing if its 
capacity cost has been or will be covered. We can derive a shadow price 
0 for this capacity, u 
0 
0 
u 
0 
= D.C* 
r:,.qo 
but this shadow price is simply a reflection of the remaining 
capital charges for Q0 - not the entire lifetime amount of its capital 
charges, some of which may have been allocated before our programme began. 
Since we know k 0 t 
write 0 u 
0 
= from equation (14) 
= 
and u0 is the stream of cost savings remaining to some 
0 
capacity inherited from the past. It could be called the "unamortised" 
value of inherited capacity. 
Now we could imagine time marching on and our optimal plan 
becoming an actual programme passed on to future generations. Associated 
with each succeeding plan there would be a series of terms 
= E • • • • • • • • • • ( 15) 
t ~ v 
being the present worth of the remaining cost savings of 
capacity actually built. Of course for capacity about to be built 
t 
c = E 
n ~ 
151 
= 
the unamortised value of capacity Qt is its total capacity 
cost- this is a special case of our general equation (15). Equation 
(15) can always be written: 
= 
so that 
m 
v 
E 
t >,:. v 
+ E 
m 
v 
t >,:. v 
E 
t >,:. v 
• • • • • • • • • • (16) 
The second term in ( 16) v is of course kt but more usefully is the fall 
in the unamortised value of Qv over the next year's use -what many 
economists have called true depreciation. Let us relate this to equation 
(14) 
n >,:. 
(m - r~)l 
t n J 
t t 
and ut = c 
= E (m - r!~~ 
n >,:. t n J 
Marginal cost in a given year 1s the sum of runn1ng cost and 
true depreciation on each plant, and in particular _the sum of running 
cost and first year amortisation on newest (current vintage) plant. 
System interdependence is clearly emphasised by this 
result: 
mt depends on every subsequent mn, n >,:. t (though not on 
previous ms' s $ t). The only way marginal cost can be calculated is 
by looking forward to expectations - it cannot be calculated by looking 
i 
! 
I 
I. 
I 
i' 
I 
i 
I 
I, 
backwards. Turvey sums this up as follows: 
II it is clear .that first year amortisation epitomises 
the complex of expectations and calculations about the 
future which are central to the notion of marginal cost 
in principle an intelligent guess at first year amortisation 
could furnish an intelligent guess at marginal cost •••• " 
(Turvey 1969 p.296) 
This completes our exposition of the global programming 
model of Turvey in terms of its properties. Before turning to a 
consideration of its implications and its place in the other investment 
planning models of the literature we can summarise those aspects of it 
on which we have focussed attention. 
(a) The model chooses an optimal path or sequence of capacity 
construction (Qv) and utilisation (0~) to minimise the present 
worth of the system costs of meeting some specified demand 
forecasts. 
(b) The model emphasises two important characteristics of the 
investment planning problem: (1) system interdependence and (2) 
non stationarity; the first characteristic shows up in the 
importance that expected costs of future operations with items 
of capacity have on the costs of present operations with other 
it~ms of capacity; the second characteristic - inherent in the 
. f . v d v . assumpt1ons about exogenous actor pr1ces rt an c - appears 1n 
v the way the model determines the course of mt and kt. The 
optimum solutions remain inherently dynamic and dependent on the 
future.· 
(c) An interesting marginal cost concept ~C*/~Xt 1s thrown up in the 
programming formulation. We know·something about its 
discontinuities and that it is equal to one of the dual 
variables mt. It remains to be seen what sort of marginal 
cost concept this is and what use Turvey makes of it. 
(d) The model produces a pricing (or costing) rule and an 
investment rule which in turn tell us a great deal about how 
we might determine the time profile of amortisation on 
capacity. 
l 
I 
I 
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI 
1. The classic ~ork is Lipsey and Lancaster (1956). One aspect 
of the topic has appeared in part I's treatment of the way 
prices are related to marginal costs when a surplus is to be 
made. A general guide is Rees (1968). 
2. Turvey 197la page 54. 
3. While this is true of the models examined in this chapter, never-
theless Chapter VIII does present an optimal investment planning 
model that explicitly incorporates a "load curve" into the 
analysis. In practical applications this latter approach may 
be computationally more useful. 
4. The appendix referred to 1s the mathematical appendix to part II 
of the thesis. 
5. The idea has been discussed in the optimal growth literature, most 
of which stems from the work of Ramsey (1928). 
6. The references are Salter (1966), Solow (1959), Johansen (1959). 
7. Jorgenson (1965) was the first of these neoclassical investment models. 
8. The resolution appears in Chapter IX. 
9. These are discussed at length 1n Chapter VII following. 
10. See Chapter VII following. 
1~ ) 
I 
I 
I 
Introduction 
CHAPTER VII 
The Background to Turvey's Model of the 
Investment Planning Problem 
We now have a detailed knowledge of 'l:urvey's progrannning model 
in its 197la version, and it would be helpful at this point to examine 
some of the background to his propositions. Turvey has used and analysed 
his model on several occasions and these, especially the discussion in his 
1969 paper on Marginal Cost (Turvey 1969) give some. idea of the influences 
he has attempted to take. into account. To begin with we. can recall the 
nature of the basic problem. The planner wishes to find two optimal 
paths: 
- the path of capacity accumulation or expansion 
- the path of output - ~.e. capacity utilization. 
In doing this he faces a given objective function - in our 
case minimising total systems costs and he also must take into account 
constraints on his actions. The nature of the constraints in Turvey's 
model can be summed up as 
- output should never exceed capacity 
- output should never fall below the specified demand 
requirements. 
The two crucial characteristics of the Turvey model of this 
situation are then 
- system interdependence 
the non stationary character of input prices. 
Not all of the literature has specified the problem ~n this 
way, and different models have focussed on different aspects of the 
I. 
optimal solution. 
other models. 
With this in mind let us examine some of these 
OTHER MODELS OF THE INVESTMENT PLANNING PROBLEM 
1. HOTELLING (1925) Of the previous attempts to tackle investment 
planning problems in the Turvey spirit one of the earliest and most 
penetrating was a model developed as early as 1925 by Harold Retelling. 
Retelling's work grew out of his dissatisfaction with the established 
methods of depreciating assets. He began by asking the fundamental 
question: What must be the "theoretical selling price" of the product 
of a machine before we can decide whether the machine should be acquired. 
Clearly it is meaningless to answer this question by adding running costs 
and "depreciation" when depreciation is defined as the rate of change of 
the value of the machine. The established models of the accounting 
literature did just this and were therefore irrelevant. A second 
important consideration for Retelling was - once a machine was acquired -
when ought the machine to be scrapped? 
Retelling sets up his model as follows. 
variable is the annual rental value from the machine 
K(t) = pO (t) R(t) 
The fundamental 
p is the theoretical selling pr~ce described above, O'(t) is the rate of 
output of the machine and R(t) is its running costs. O(t) is specified 
in the blueprint for the machine as its maximum output capacity. Of 
course a planner could decide to run the machine below capacity, but 
Retelling leaves aside this possibility in the initial part of his analysis. 
0 (t) and R(t) are therefore known time paths. Once. a machine has been 
acquired at time t = o, its value from then until the end of its life 
! ' 
157 
depends simply on p and n where n is the year 1n which it is scrapped 
given that it is always run at the fixed maximum rate of output O(t). 
Thus suppose we have acquired a machine previously and now (time t = T) 
are looking at its future rentals, the value remaining in the machine is 
present worth ( annual rentals ) 
from t = T to t=n ( from T to n ) 
+ present worth( scrap value when ) 
in year T ( machine is ) i' 
( scrapped in year n) · 
Scrap value is the known value of a machine aged n years on the 
second hand market. Hotelling assumes this market is perfect and scrap 
value of machinery is identical to the "inside value" of the machine to 
the owner - the value remaining 1n the machine 1n its place in the owner's 
plant. If we use continuous discounting with 8 as our discount rate we 
can write down the above ideas as 
( ) t; - ) ( ) ] -o ( t - , ) dt + s (n) e -o (n - , ) V t = ~ P O(t - R t e • • • • • • • • ( 1) 
So much for the value remaining in a previously acquired 
machine. But when should a machine be acquired? Clearly when: 
Cost of acquiring machine = total value of machine over its entire life 
(C) t = o to t = n 1n present worth terms. 
i.e. 
f n -ot -on C = V(O) = (pO(t) - R(t) ) e dt + S(n) e 
0 
• • • • • • • • (2) 
The planners problem the~ is (a) whether to acquire a machine; 
(b) once acquired to scrap it in a way to maximize V(t). 
/~8 
Take the second problem first. The machine has been acquired 
because (p) the crucial price variable was known to be sufficient to 
warrant acquisition. When should the machine be scrapped? We have to 
picture what happens to K(t) = pO(t) - R(t) over the machine's life. Two 
. 
examples are given in figures VII,la and VII,lb. Figure VII,la shows a 
straightforward case of the machine giving declining output with rising 
running costs - the sort of picture we have in general of most capital 
equipment. Figure VII,lb shows the same fundamental idea but a much more 
complex pattern. On three occasions quasi rent K(t) ~s zero. To begin 
with the machine takes some initial period to reach a high output and it 
experiences a new lease of life towards the end of its existence when its 
quasi rent almost becomes positive once more. 
Hotelling labels these crucial time periods when output ceases 
to be worth operating expenses as m: m is given by 
pO(m) - R(m) = o 
In. figure VII,la there is only one value form but ~n figure VII,lb there 
are 3 values for m and we would wish to choose the value of m which makes 
V(t) a maximum in accordance with our overall objective. In figure VII,lb 
this will almost certaintly be m = m2. Now fixing on the appropriate value 
of m the sum of all the positive rentals from the machine will be 
present worth from t = ' to t = m of K(t) 
= -o (t m K(t) f e 
L 
But before the period m is reached this sum of positive 
rentals remaining as we look at different years • falls until it will 
coincide - in year n - with the scrap value of the machine. 
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In year n 
present worth of remaining 
i.e. 
positive rentals from n 
to m 
r m 
n 
K(t) e -o(t-n) dt. 
value of the machine in year n 
on the second hand market 1n 
present worth terms 
= S(n) • • • • . • • • (3) 
The owner is indifferent in year n between keeping and us1ng 
his equipment and selling it for scrap, and in this way the year of 
scrapping or replacement is chosen. One aspect of Turvey's model which 
we did not investigate was whether or not it produced a general scrapping 
or replacement criterion like Retelling's. In fact it is possible to 
derive from Turvey's model a replacement criterion analogous and rather 
similar to (3) but it is possible only with difficulty. This is because 
Turvey's mode1 - although inherently dynamic because of the non stationary· 
assumptions about factor prices - is nevertheless not solved sequentially 
but rather is solved simultaneously treating each value at each time 
period as a separate variable. To see this we can proceed as follows. 
In a solution to the Turvey model an item of capacity has been scrapped 
or replaced when it is apparent that it produces no more output; i.e. 
beyond a certain value of t, 0~ equals zero for every point 1n time for 
certain vintages of capacity. The scrapping criterion in other words 
relates to the optimal values 
and a machine is scrapped in year n if . 
Ov = o for all t ~ n 
t 
I 
I 
lbo 
The drmv-back of this form is that while the methods of 
optimization we have used do indicate which variables necessarily will 
have non zero values, they do not indicate which variables necessarily 
have zero values. Thus, capacity is utilized if doing so reduces costs 
ClL 
aov t 
> 0 and 
= 0 
but there is no way of deriving from these expressLons, 
necessary conditions for 0~ = o. 
We can see that if ClL/ClO~ > o then this implies that 0~ = o and so is 
sufficient; however if 0~ = o this does not imply that aL/aO~ > o so 
the condition is not necessary. Concentrating therefore on sufficient 
conditions: 
ClL/()0~ > 0 means that r~ - m + kv > 0 t' t 
that is 
kv v 
t > mt - rt 
and this condition must hold for all time periods, t, beyond the period n 
if the capacity Qv is to be scrapped in period n. What does this 
condition mean? We know that for a feasible solution, with constraints 
binding, each of the terms above, k~, mt, r~ is positive. Now k~ is the 
potential additional cost from relaxing the constraint 0~ = Qv by a small 
amount, say E; (mt - r~) is the maximum additional cost that can be 
permitted to 0~ for 0~ still to play a part in the optimum; mt of course 
is set by running and amortization costs on the other capacity within the 
system- hence the replacement rule in Turvey's model· is: 
\bt 
replace capacity Qv in year n if - for every time peri~d beyond n - the 
additional cost associated with an extra portion of Qv capacity is higher 
than the maximum additional cost: (mt - r~) which would permit output 
v . v . . from Q - 1.e. 0 - st1ll to be part of the opt1mum output path. 
t 
This 1n turn is sufficient to ensure that if Qv 1S scrapped 
in year n, then 
00 00 
kv (mt v z > z - r ) t t t ;,:. n t ~ n 
but this condition is not necessary for scrapping. This is about as far 
as we can go 1n Turvey's model towards obtaining a general scrapping rule; 
so on this account we have to conclude that the Hotelling model is 
partially superior to Turvey's formulation. 
The more fundamental part of Hotelling's model, however, relates 
to the decision to acquire capacity and the determination of optimal 
pricing through time for the product of that capacity. Hotelling's ma1n 
analysis continues to use the assumption that the machine will be needed 
to full capacity throughout its life. The problem then is to solve for 
p(t) which can be represented either as a contant or as a known function 
of time and an unknown parameter: e.g. p(t) = rt where r is some known 
figure. The two equations describing Hotelling's model above are then 
all that is needed. Equation (1) gives a scrapping condition by 
choosing n to maximise V(t); the condition dV(t) 
dn = 0 
determines n and 
when this is inserted into equation (2), p(t) can also be determined. 
Hotelling, however, is conscious that this sort of approach masks the real 
nature of the problem and in the last part of his article concludes that 
the assumption that capacity is always fully used is not an essential 
part of investment planning analysis. But the dropping of this 
assumption completely changes the approach to the problem. Recall 
equation (1) 
V(T) = ~n lp (t)O (t)-R(t) l -O(t - T) -o(n - T) e dt+S(n)e · (1) 
Nmv V(T) can no longer be regarded merely as a function of p and n; V(T) 
has become a functional: that is to say it will be satisfied only by 
choice of some optimal function, O(t), describing for each instant in time 
the rate of output or capacity utilisation. The techniques for solving 
this type of problem are much more involved than the simple solution of 
simultaneous equations which represent optimality conditions that only 
depend on a few parameters. One method is to treat time as discrete and 
employ the Kuhn Tucker programming methods of Turvey; an alternative. is 
to employ theorems on dynamic optimization treating time as a continuous 
variable. Hotelling recognised that this was at once a more difficult 
but more general approach than the usual rule of thumb depreciation 
methods. 
2. WRIGHT (1964, 1968) The optimal investment planning model had been 
posed by Hotelling as part of his search for the ideal depreciation method. 
Hotelling, once he had shown how the problem of choosing a maximum of V(T) 
should be solved, ob~ained optimal depreciation - the amortization of 
Turvey's model - as the rate of change of V(T) : dV(t)/dt. The question 
of optimal depreciation of long lived assets has continued to be the 
motivating source for treatments of optimal investment in the accounting 
literature. Wright's models - (particularly Wright 1968) - developing 
Hotelling's ideas end up with a formulation very close to the model of 
Turvey that we have examined 1n detail. Wright's ai~ 1s to develop a measure 
of what he calls opportunity value of an asset the loss of value to an 
lb '3 
. enterprise associated with the disappearance of the services of a given 
asset at a particular period of time. The course of opportunity value 
over time is then taken as the theoretically souno way of depreciating or 
amortising an asset. (Wright 1964, page 277). Wright's results can be 
examined in terms of his most general model (Wright 1968, page 299). The 
objective is to maximize the present worth of profits which are simply 
the discounted stream of sales at a fixed price less operating costs and 
expenditure on new capacity. Two constraints operate on this objective. 
(a) both inherited and newly purchased equipment has a fixed 
capacity which cannot be exceeded by output in any period. 
(b) at the fixed set of prices a specified maximum level of 
output can be sold and production cannot exceed this 1n any 
period. 
Wright is particularly interested in the dual variables of this 
problem. Bearing in mind the analysis of the previous chapter we know 
that the dual variables associated with constraint (a) (Wright~ Wjk) 
represents the value to the firm of producing a little extra from some 
given amount of capacity (of type j in period k) while those associated 
with constraint (b) (his v1k) represented the value of being able to sell 
an extra unit of output (of product I in period k). His solution to 
the depreciation problem then focusses on the Wjk since one of the 
optimality conditions shows that for any machine that is purchased, the 
capital cost is exactly accounted for by the lifetime present worth of the 
values (Wjk) of producing a little more from that capacity, i.e. the 
present worth of the values of just relaxing the constraint relating 
output to capacity. This is identically the concept .. which Turvey tries 
to capture in his k~, except that here the dual variable 
. is in terms of cost s~vings since his objective function is to minimise 
costs whereas for Wright Wjk is in terms of profits since his objective 
function is to maximise profits over the firm's life. Both models, 
therefore, adopt very much,the same approach to the problem as can be 
seen by the comparison: 
TURVEY 
objective: minimise present worth 
of system costs 
constraints (a) output does not exceed 
capacity 
results 
(b) output does not fall 
short of demand 
estimates of marginal cost 
6C*/6Xt and estimates of 
optimal amortization in 
terms of cost savings 
assumptions:. system interdependence and 
variation through time of 
factor prices 
WRIGHT 
maximise present worth of 
system profits 
(a) output does not exceed 
capacity 
(b) output does not fall 
short of demand 
estimates of marginal revenue 
and estimates of optimal 
amortization in terms of 
marginal opportunity values 
at fixed prices 
system interdependence and 
variation through time of 
factor prices 
Wright uses .the assumptions of the model and the consequent 
results to negate two well established alternative amortisation methods: 
(i) revenue matching: system interdependence, which we saw 
illustrated in terms of Turvey's model, makes it impossible 
to associate with one machine in one period a specific fraction 
of total profits and hence attempts to depreciate assets by 
writing off in each year a proportion of revenues for which they 
are responsible are meaningless 
(ii) rules of thumb - like straight line or diminishing balance 
depreciation - are at best only usable as approximations to 
ideal amortisation though diminishing balance may be just 
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preferable if it reflectsmore accurately the effect on 
amortisation of technical progress embodied in the latest 
vintages of capacity. 
Hhat \-7e have shown here is that a line of models, beginning 
with Hotelling's early contribution, that have approached the problem of 
optimal depreciation produce virtually identical results - under the 
appropriate assumptions - to Turvey's approach to the cost minimising 
investment programming problem. Indeed, Wright himself sees that his 
model is essentially a cost minimising model (Wright 1968 p.233) since 
he specifies both the price of the product and the max1mum level of 
sales at those prices, so that the interdependence between price and 
output is effectively denied - just as it is deliberately denied for ease 
of computation in the Turvey model. 
3. NEOCLASSICAL INVESTMENT THEORY A line of models which, it might be 
imagined, would cast very clear light on the investment planning problem 
has been associated with the neoclassical investment theorists, especially 
Jorgenson (see Jorgenson 1965 and 1966 and also Arrow 1964). However, 
these models - which are briefly outlined below produce very little of 
any consequence at least in the directions in which we have been following 
so far. Both Jorgenson and Arrow end up with what might be called "myopic" 
rules of behaviour - rules apply again and again for each instant of time 
but are otherwise independent of each other. Taking the Jorgenson model, 
the objective funcJtion is 
maximise the present worth of a firm's profits at 
each instant 
and the constraints are: 
(a) output depends at each instant on the amounts of labour 
and capital services provided at each instant 
(b) the stock of capital services physically depreciates 
by the process of a constant proportion "evaporating" 
each instant. 
The objective variable is the firm's instantaneous rate of 
profit, which Jorgenson defines. as 
n (t) = p(t) O(t) - w(t) L(t) - q(t) I(t) 
the first term, p(t) O(t), is the value of sales (price times output, 
with price a given constant); the second term, w(t) L(t), is 
instantaneous labour cost (wage times man-hours) and the third, q(t) I(t) 
is.·instantaneous new capital cost (price ,of new equipment times gross 
investment in ·capital services). 
the present worth of 'IT(t) = f 
0 
The overall objective is to maximise 
T -vt 
'IT(t)e dt at a given discount rate v. 
It clearly makes no difference however if we split up this integral into 
a sum of discrete instantaneous profits, because, although there are 
constraints on profits, none of these constraints overlap from one instant 
to another. Jorgenson was clearly wrong in characterising this as a 
dynamic model, s{nce it is only a series of static models recurring every 
instant. As Turvey comments in his 1969 paper, one of the first to see 
this was Lucas ·(Lucas 1967) but the point has been forcibly made by 
Gould (1968) and Nerlove (1972). 
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It can be explained mathematically at first. The crucial 
variable in the analysis is the stock of capital services: K(t). 
Jorgenson claimed he ~vas setting up a dynamic optimization model in 
terms of K(t), and its rate of change (K = dK/dt) ~vhich is net invest-
ment. If this was the case the model would be dynamic because the 
optimality conditions would depend on K and K and be differential 
equations. But in fact K does not need to appear in Jorgenson's 
model because everything that could be of importance in it ~s summed 
up by the constant evaporation assumption and nothing else ~s effectively 
said about K. The optimality conditions can always be reduced to 
ordinary static equations. The point of the critiques was that something 
else, besides evaporation of K, had to be assumed about K, to make the 
model dynamic. The general solution proposed by Gould and later Nerlove 
was that there were positive "adjustment costs" associated with variations 
in the rate of investment K, although neither writer is very specific 
on what these.might be. However this is enough to bring both K(t) and 
K into the objective function in a concrete way. The resulting 
optimality condition (Euler equation) is a differential equation of 
second order and provides a specifically dynamic model, (see mathematical 
appendix). 
Economically the important step is to make the assumption that 
the rate of capacity accumulation in one period affects ~n a real manner 
~he optimal rate in another period. This is exactly what Turvey's model 
(and the Wright model as well) does when it makes the assumptions of non-
stationarity of factor costs with the resulting relationship between 
optimality conditions in different periods. 
However before the neoclassical investment model is entirely 
dismissed, it is worth looking at one version of it that actually does 
tackle the very depreciation problem that Hotelling grappled with. 
This is R.E. Hall's paper "Technical Change and Capital from the Point 
of View of the Dual" (Hall (1968)). 
Hall begins from the optimal investment decision analysis of 
Jorgenson and Arrow that we described above - the objective being to 
maximize the present worth of profits. The exercise has as an 
optimality condition a price equal to marginal cost condition. The 
Jorgenson paper developed this version of marginal capital cost as 
vq + dq q 
where v is the discount rate, d is the exponential rate of decay of 
capital equipment, q ~s the capacity cost of equipment and q is its rate 
of change. There is nothing 'dynamic' about this equation, ·nothing has 
to be forecast and only current variables are needed, so the cost term 
is not forward looking. This is to be expected from our comments above 
on the Jorgenson model. Hall extends this model by (a) allowing for 
some other form of equipment deterioration than the exponential one and 
(b) by 
" relaxing the assumption of stationarity to the 
extent of allowing changes (in capital equipment) 
over time and vintage which are independent of 
deterioration." 
Hall (1968) page 37. 
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From our previous discussion, it can readily be understood 
that this substantially changes the marginal cost formula. Taking 
case (a) first, Hall replaces the assumption of exponential physical 
deterioration by using a mortality function relating the rate of decay 
to age of the equipment artd a replacement density function which makes 
the probability of collapse depend on the accumulated wearing out of 
the equipment. The effect of this is to replace dq in the marginal 
cost by a term reflecting the costs associated with the probability 
over the remaining life of the asset of its collapse. (Hall's equation 
(20)). With this modification, marginal cost is made forward looking 
because a guess about the future mortality of the machine must be made. 
A somewhat similar result obtains in case (b). Allowing jor 
technical change (embodied or disembodied) produces a marginal cost 
formula in which dq is replaced by a term reflecting.all the future 
obsolescence rates that will apply to the machine over the rest of its 
life. (Hall's equation (23)). Once again a guess has to be taken 
about the future. 
The overwhelming conclusion remains: dynamic formulations of 
the investment decision and the marginal cost calculation have to 
incorporate expectations. All calculations in a dynamic model must 
be forward looking. This has been the important theme of all the 
models surveyed in this background to Turvey's programming model. 
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LITTLECHILD'S MODEL 
Although S.C. Littlechild's model of 1970 in some senses is 
the most complete treatment of our problem, He need not examine it 1.n 
great detail. Littlechild set out to provide a prcgramming formulation 
of Turvey's 1969 model and although we shall have much to say on the 
success of this in the next chapter, Turvey virtually adopted the whole 
of Littlechild 1 s formulation in setting out his 197la and 197lb models 
which we discussed at length above. Strictly therefore the model we 
have been discussing could really be called the Turvey-Littlechild 
model. The outstanding difference is that Littlechild seeks to avoid 
some of the problems of indeterminateness of output which are liable to 
result from the iterative technique used by Turvey. Recall that 
Turvey - reluctant to believe planners know enough or have sufficient 
resources to attempt a completely interdependent model for investment 
planning - optimizes on the cost side, sets prices, determines demand 
and finally re-optimizes. We noted that this process might not 
converge. Littlechild's model avoids this by attempting an inter-
dependent solution. His objective function is in terms of consumers' 
willingness to pay: 
maximize present worth of consumers' 
monetary evaluation of output less running and capacity costs 
subject to the constraints: 
(a) total demand satisfied cannot be less than the sum of output on all 
vintages of capacity 
(b) output cannot exceed capacity for any vintage of plant. 
(Littlechild 1970 pages 328-329, equations 13 to 15). 
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The comparison with the Turvey and Wright models is immediate. 
The results are very similar. An optimal short run pricing rule is 
derived with price covering running costs and amortisation charges; 
capacity is acquired if lifetime amortisation covers its purchase cost, 
and amortisation is valued in terms of a machine's quasirents which are, 
as expected, the dual variables associated with the constraints relating· 
output to capacity. Littlechild brings out, as clearly as Turvey and 
Wright, the importance of system interdependence and non stationarity 
of factor prices. He incidentally provides a proof - for a myopic model 
of the Jorgenson-Arrow type - of the paradox pointed out by Turvey 
(1969, p.256) that a rise in the future rate of technical progress may 
raise marginal costs in the interim. This result comes out of our own 
analysis very easily. Recall equations (13) and (15) of chapter VL. 
• .• • • • • • • • • (13) 
marginal cost is the sum of running cost and capital charge 
.-
/ 
v kv (mt v (15) ut = E = E - rt) .......... 
t~v t t~v 
the remaining stream of cost savings (capital charges) is the unamortized 
value of capacity. · Calculate (15) for year t and year t+l and substitute 
in equation (13) to get the straightforward result 
where the term in brackets is the year's amortization- ~.e. the fall 
during the year in the remaining unamortized value of capacity. Now 
j,' 
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suppose there is a rise in the rate of .t.echnical progress expected 
in the future; in terms of equipment which will later displace 
vintage v capacity, uvt+l the value of capacity ~t the end of the year, 
v falls relatively tout so that more of this capacity's cost has to be 
charged immediately to this year; the result is a rise in mt. 
THE WORK OF W.A. LEWIS 
W.A. Lewis. is a writer whose work is being rediscovered. The 
discussion of optimal tariff schedules 1n part I of the thesis has 
already mentioned that not only did Lewis first discover the general 
solution to the peak load pricing problem (Lewis (1941)) but he was 
also among the first (and most lucid) to explain the theorem on pricing 
above marginal cost 1n proportion to demand elasticity when seeking to 
achieve a financial surplus (Lewis (1949)). It is therefore 
interesting to discover that Lewis was writing about optimal amortization 
streams and their effects on marginal cost long before the Turvey-
Littlechild and Wright models appeared. His classic article on over-. 
head costs (Lewis (1949)) first stated his point that marginal cost 
calculations using long lived capital equipment were based on the view. 
that regarding output in each separate time period as a separate product 
implied that the appropriate model was that of joint production. This 
is exactly the Turvey-Littlechild point about jointness in time being 
equivalent to jointness in product. The definitive statement of 
Lewis' views on optimal amortization are contained in a neglected but 
important paper on depreciation and obsolescence as factors 1n costing 
(Lewis (1960)). 
In this paper Lewis broadens the discussion.to include both 
the accountant's and the economist's approach to amortization. The 
controversy over the appropriate depreciation policy arises from a 
failure to realise that depreciation is calculated for more than one 
purpose. He illustrates four possibilities: 
(A) in order to compute tax liability, 
(B) in order to evaluate prices in the second hand market, 
(C) l.n order to determine how much of gross profit will be 
distributed, 
(D) in order to determine the selling price of the product. 
Points (A) and (C) have chiefly been the accountant's 
preoccupation •. The crucial factor in evaluating (C) is, Lewis argues, 
not so much the price of the asset as the general price level and its 
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rate of inflation. The decision maker is encouraged to maintain capital 
intact, and in a period of inflation will have to.devote much effort to 
forecast general pr1.ce levels and estimating depreciation on the basis of 
replacement cost. 
It is points (B) and (D) which, being more concerned with 
optimal resource allocation than provident business practice (something 
Turvey dismisses as "good housekeeping" in his 1969 paper), are the focus 
of the economist's attention. It is here that Lewis returns to his 
classic notion of escapable cost as the basis of optimal pricing related 
to marginal costs. His general description is in terms of depreciation 
as "user costs", but his categorisation of the probl~m is easily 
recognised: 
II At some times during its life the asset 
will have a high yield, while at other times 
it ";ill have a low yield. The firm must get 
what it can at different times, subject only 
to the condition that the asset should not be 
in~talled unless the firm expects to earn its 
total cost over the lifetime of the asset II 
Lewis (1960), page 42. 
There could hardly be a clearer statement of the nature of 
the programming model and its solution proposed a decade later by 
Turvey and Littlechild. 
Lewis clearly realises the forward looking nature of the 
amortization decision. The firm must 
..·•. 
II make its best guess as to the projected 
time pattern of use of the asset". 
Lewis (1960), page 43. 
The yield profile is uncertain - " it may be expected to 
decline progressively or to fluctuate" depending both on the evolution 
of costs and demand variations, as he points out. 
It is not hard to argue that of all the literature which 
tackled the investment planning decision, Lewis' work comes closest 
to the modern programming approach of Turvey. Lewis is convinced of 
1?5' 
the difficulty of estimating optimal amortization 1n this way - his 
eminently quotable conclusion is 
II the es~imates are highly speculative and 
subjective, and 'are of the sort that change 
easily between breakfast and lunch". 
Lewis (1960), page 45. 
' . ~-
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It is clear from this discussion of the historical background 
that there has been a long history of modelling the investment decision 
1n a way similar to that outlined by Turvey. The points which e~erge 
again and again from the literature are 
(a) the necessity of having a dynamic model - usually by making costs 
vary through time and with the investment decision being taken. 
(b) pricing, investment and optimal-depreciation are all different 
aspects of the same decisions: when to install and how to operate 
capital equipment. 
INTER-RELATIONSHIPS AMONG THESE MODELS 
These treatments of the global investment programming problem 
have certain common characteristics: 
(a) they all make the attempt to construct a dynamic analysis of 
constrained optimization. 
(b) the constraints are usually of two types: 
(i) relating output to demand or maximum output or sales 
(ii) relating output and capacity of equipment. 
As far as the first characteristic is concerned, the 
possibility of the model being dynamic turns on the assumptions made 
about costs. If exogenously given factor prices do not vary over time 
or if they only vary in a way that means that the rate of change of 
capacity expansion does not systematically affect the value of the 
objective function, then the model remains a static one. Models which 
have succeeded in being dynamic have either used the embodied technological 
progress and rising running costs assumptions or, more generally, assume 
positive adjustment costs to changing investment programmes. 
The interesting implications of the second characteristic 
relate to the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers or dual variables associated with 
the constraints; those corresponding to (i) yield a set of prices or -
in Turvey's case- marginal costs and those corresponding to (ii) yield 
information on the optimum evaluation of assets and hence the ideal 
depreciation profile - the evaluation being in terms of profit (Wright) 
marginal social utility (Littlechild) or cost savings (Turvey). The 
following chapter considers the implications of the price/marginal cost 
calculations, but we can consider at this stage what the models seem to 
say about the shadow price evaluations of capacity. 
We saw earlier that any of an infinite number of profiles might 
correspond to the time path of capacity shadow prices. Turvey, mainly 
for institutional reasons which are probably very applicable to the case 
of electricity supply, makes some explicit and implicit assumptions about 
these evaluations, (k~), particularly in his 1969 paper. On new 
capacity, Turvey expects to see both falling .capacity and running costs. 
On older capacity, Turvey expects runn~ng costs to rise with age and use 
of the capacity. Either of these assumptions leads us to expect that 
capacity is most useful in' the early years of its lif~, and that the 
time path of the k~ for different years, t, of a machine's life will 
show a steadily declining profile. There are several possible 
conclusions from this. For example, it might be possible to use rule 
of thumb approximations to the k~ if -.:ve can be sure in advance of the 
profile that will emerge. This obviously would make decision taking 
a great deal eas~er. In his 1969 paper on 'Marginal Cost', Turvey 
writes that such approximations are possible; he cites a convenient 
approximation due to Desrousseaux: we know from our previous analysis 
that the crucial factor in marginal cost that reflects capacity.charges 
is first year optimal amortization (k~); Desrousseaux suggests 
approximating this by twice the sum corresponding to a constant annuity 
equivalent of total capacity cost. The implication is that capacity 
charges decline approximately linearly. 
In preparing this thesis, I was able to discuss several of 
the ideas with other economists at the University of Melbourne. These 
aspects of approximati~ns to k~ profiles were particularly interesting, 
and I will take the opportunity here to report some of the results that 
emerged from the discussions. Soper (1973) discussed the Desrousseaux 
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approximation in particular, but found that it was not a particularly 
good guide, because the ratio of first year amortization to the constant 
annuity factor was particularly sensitive to the rate of discount and 
the assumed economic life of the project. (For rule of thumb 
approximations a guess about the most important economic variable 
replacement date- has to be made.) Long lived projects and discount 
rates above four or five per cent destroyed the applicability of the 
Desrousseaux rule. Nevertheless on a very broad view, we would expect 
that a rule of thumb like declining balance would approximate optimal 
amortization better than a rule like constant sum depreciation. 
accounting conventions have to be used to approximate optimal 
amortization this is worth bearing in mind. 
Where 
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To provide some further guidance to optimal amortization, one 
could try to simulate versions of the Turvey model. My Melbourne 
colleagues, Professor L.R. Webb and Mr. B.R. Parmenter and I experimented 
with several simulations. The striking result - to be expected of course -
is how easily the steadily declining k~ profile is disrupted when 
variations in demand are allowed for. The bulk of Turvey's writings on 
the subject are concerned with the case of steadily expanding demand 
which is characteristic of a mature electricity authority in a developed 
market; he has to rely on the variations in technical progress in capacity 
and running costs to provide fluctuating amortization schemes. However, 
in simulation terms, only a relatively small degree of demand variation 
can, in conjunction with technical progress in costs, produce highly 
variable dynamic paths for optimal amortization. 
see Parmenter and Webb (1974)). 
THE EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND 
(For further comments 
Turvey's model was made dynamic by explicitly incorporating 
the vintage capital equipment model of technological progress, with 
running and capacity costs falling as later vintages are installed and 
running costs rising as equipment ages. We know from his 1969 paper, 
that Turvey was a great admirer of the Salter version of the firm's 
decisions. While it is not strictly relevant to the theoretical 
development of the model, it is nevertheless worth examining for a 
moment the impact that the vintage model approach has had on the 
empirical literature. 
Empirically the vintage model postulates"that technological 
progress is "embodied" in successive vintages of equipment and plant 
used by the producer. Analytically this idea is very appealling but 
the difficulties arise when an attempt is made to measure the rate of 
embodied technological change in isolation from factors like disembodied 
technological change or equipment deterioration. Straightforward 
econometric models using time trends are inadequate for making the 
distinction. 
Consequently the empirical 11sefulness of the vintage model 
has been doubted ever s~nce the model first appeared; for the most 
recent survey of the criticisms and "failures" of the vintage model see 
Gregory and James (1973). This latter reference does acknowledge that 
in one industry - that of electricity generation - the vintage model 
may have empirical (as well as its undoubted theoretical) value. The 
reasons for this lie in the facts that the product is homogeneous, the 
technology easily identified and identification of vintage of the capital 
equipment is relatively straightforward. 
There have indeed been several attempts. to measure technical 
change in electricity generation; all have been carried out with u.s. I 
I. 
data and have been related mainly to coal using plant. These are the [ 
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studies of Komiya (1962), Dhrymes and Kurz (1964) and Galatin (1968). 
Both the Komiya and Dhrymes and Kurz studies are open to the criticism, 
pointed out by Galatin, that their analysis is essentially static. 
This arises from the relation of capital input to output in a given 
year. No allmvance is made for an investment decision to install 
capital equipment to meet output requirements over a planning horizon 
lasting many years. 
As a very brief summary of the applicability of the vintage 
model, we can look at the relation between the vintage of capital 
equipment and fuel requirements. Komiya fitted an equation of the form: 
y = 
where Y is fuel input required, X is size of the generating unit and A 
is a fuel requirement parameter. .t\..nalysis of covariance techniques 
indicated that A differed significantly between vintages (though S a 
scale parameter did not). This was taken to indicate that newer 
vintages of a given scale of capacity needed significantly less fuel 
input. 
Dhrymes and Kurz do present evidence on the impact of 
technological change by identifying differing technological periods. 
However, there is no explicit treatment of vintage models and no analysis 
of the degree to which technological change is embodied in latest vintages 
of capital equipment. 
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Galatin specifically tries to.isolate embodied technical 
change using a long period investment planning model not too far 
divorced from the theoretical models we have considered. Embodied 
technical change is identified by observing shifts of the production 
function for machines of the same size and fuel type but of different 
vintage. He sums up his results as: 
II the effects of technological change have been 
somewhat uneven when two adjacent vintages are 
compared but over the range of the sample the 
effect of technological change has been to save on 
fuel input". 
Galatin (1968), page 121. 
This last section has been added simply to show that - at 
least in the electricity industry - the vintage model of embodied 
technological change has had an empirical as well.as a theoretical 
impact. 
CHAPTER VIII 
AN INVESTMENT PROGRAHHING HODEL: THE CASE OF A GENERATING SYSTEM 
WITH HYDROELECTRIC AND NATURAL GAS OPTIONS, FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS 
AND A TWO PARP.JffiTER REPRESENTATION OF Tlill LOADCURVE 
INTRODUCTION 
The last two chapters were directed to s:tting out the Turvey 
model in one of its incarnations and then to investigating its 
relationship to the previous attempts in the literature to solve similar 
problems. One chief area remained to be discussed - the use of the 
marginal cost concepts in pricing policy. This is the subject matter 
of chapter IX below but in the present chapter we embark on a slightly 
different tack; 1.e. extending the model's structure in a way that is 
particularly relevant to the Australian situation. At the same.time an 
opportunity is taken to depart from Turvey's convention of allowing the 
time subscript to apply if necessary to hourly periods. It will be 
recalled that this was done to exclude the necessity of pay1ng specific 
attention to the peak load problem. The model outlined bel~w 1s one that 
would be more readily computable since the time period is assumed to be 
the full production year and a specific allowance is made for the peak 
load problem by formulating output targets in the form of a loadcurve, 
represented by two separate parameters. 
We now attempt to build a programming model that has some 
especial relevance to the Australian generating situation. The 
development of the other electricity generating system models of course 
lays the groundwork and the model is entirely in the spirit and form of 
those already discussed. However some additional constraints are adopted 
to try to capture more realistically how the particular problems of 
Australian authorities might arise. The work of Masse and his 
colleagues at Electricte de France developed from models that were 
simple but sufficiently realistically formulated that they gave very 
. 
penetrating insights. 
One. of the key aspects of the problem is the joint product 
nature of electricity output and demand. It is a load pyramid or load 
curve that is being produced not simply a flow of kilowatthours each 
identical in its economic characteristics. Masse et al. captured this 
by identifying three "bottlenecks" of output and optimizing with respect 
to those; these were winter potential, peak potential and annual output. 
(Masse 1962, p.l67-168). 
We can begin our simple model by specifying two important 
aspects of load generation: 
A: the provision of an annual required output, measured 
in kilowatt-hours 
B: the provision of adequate peak capacity to meet system 
maximum demand, measured in kilowatts. 
(In the Turvey model these are specified by simply forecasting 
each hour's output requirements; however the two parameter representation 
of the load curve we adopt provides its own special results.) 
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In addition to the general output and capacity constraints of 
other models, two additional forms of constraint appear to be important 
in the Australian ccntext. The first arises from the possibility of 
large scale use of hydroelectric schemes like the Snowy Mountain scheme 
for New South Wales and Victoria and the Tasmanian generating schemes. 
In addition South A•tstralia and Victoria have the possibility of 
generating electricity using indigenous and local natural gas as pr1mary 
fuel. Both these types of energy input raise the possibility of natural 
resource exhaustion constraints, either in the form of using up of river 
and reservo1r sites or 1n the form of depletion of gasfields. Hence we 
must allow for finite limits on certain capacity options in the investment 
programme. 
A further constraint, which is hinted at in other models, but 
is worthv1hile incorporating explicitly is a financial one; there is a 
specific limit to yearly planned investm'ent expenditure operating for 
most electricity authorities in Australia. We shall see that 
incorporation of this constraint amends some of the results on depreciation 
which other models have produced. 
Finally, the model can be extended to incorporate the maintenace 
costs on the generating system; allowing for this, permits us to say 
something about the possibility of temporary or permanent retirement of 
plants - an aspect which only emerges as a by-product of the solution for 
other models. 
Putting these ideas together we can set out the model 
schematically in the following table: 
-- ----------------------------;;-,_-
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minimize thepresent worth of the costs of providing 
A: specified annual electricity output 
B: specified peak generating capacity 
within the following constraints 
(i) usual capacity and output constraints 
(ii) finite units on the availability of us~ng 
hydro and natural gas facilities 
(iii) specified budget constraints. 
The unknowns ~n the problem are of three types: 
a sequence of installations of capacity of 
type s and vintage k 
a sequence of outputs ~n year t from 
installations Qsk. 
a sequence of retirements ~n year t of some 
part of the installations {Qsk} 
The unit costs associated with these are: 
sk 
. capacity costs of Qsk unit c . per 
sk 
costs of 0sk unit rt runn~ng t per 
sk 
maintenance costs of sk unit pt ot per 
The constraints can be set up ~n the following manner: 
(i) Out~ut cannot be less than capacity ~n any year. 
However capacity installed is diminished throughout 
its life by gradual retirement. Here we.are 
allowing for divisibility which would certainly 
have to be amended in a practicai example: 
Output is less than capacity remaining after a 
series of retirements: 
n=t 
here L: 
n=k 
n=t 
L: Rsk 
n=k n 
for all s, k, and t. 
is the accumulated retirement which 
has already occurred by year t of capacity of type s 
installed in year k. 
(ii) there must be two sets of constraints corresponding to 
the two parameter representation of the load curve. 
Firstly,~the annual output requirement must be met: 
Output over all types and vintages of plants must be 
at least At kilowatt-hours in year t: 
i.e. L: L: 
s k for all t. 
Secondly, 1.n each year, a specified amount of capacity 
must be available to meet the system maximum demand 
in the peak hour: 
J<g 7 
Capacity of all types and vintages 1n year t must be 
at least Bt kilowatts - allowing for accumulated 
retirements. 
i.e. 
}"; 
s 
}"; 
k 
n=t 
r sk R 
n=k n for all s and all k ~ t. 
(iii) A third set of constraints refers.to the maximal rate of 
retirement of capacity. Accumulated retirements of 
parts of a given plant will always be less than or 
equal to capacity first installed. (In some examples 
this would be modified to allow for "improvements" to 
capacity throughout its life, but we ignore this 
consideration here): 
n=t 
i.e. r Rsk ~ Qsk 
n 
n=k . 
for all s and all k, and t. 
(iv) The first of our completely new constraints relates to 
exhaustion of facilities. Retirements can be ignored 
here because they cannot regenerate depleted gas 
reserves or recreate natural river or reservoir 
facilities. Hence we have only a simple relationship 
between hydro and natural gas capacity and the finite 
limits to it. 
· Installed hydro capacity (or natural gas us1ng capacity) 
has a given upper limit: 
i.e. E Qhk ~ In .. superscript h refers to k 
hydro facilities. 
E Qgk ~ L superscript g refers· to natural 
k g 
gas facilities. 
An alternative way of representing these limits - more 
applicable to Qgh than Qhk - would be to allow the 
authority to buy flows of natural gas or to rent 
\vater facilities at steadily rising charges, as finite 
limits are approached. 
(v) The other completely new set of constraints limits 
yearly investments expenditure to a fixed annual 
appropriation. (Of course several other ways of 
formulating financial constraints could equally apply): 
i.e. total expenditure on latest vintage plant of all 
types is less than or equal to a financial limit 
in each year: 
for all t. 
Where Dt is year t's budget for capital expenditure. 
t It is interesting that in a sense D sets the most 
rigid boundary on any solution. Masse (1962) reports 
that for low values of Dt in postwar France optimal 
investment programmes were limited to use of conventional 
thermal plant: t however as soon as higher values of D 
r.,... 
I , 
I 
·allowed for some hydroelectric options, the cost 
savings were so large that the optimal solution quickly 
converged on a heavy bias towards hydroelectric plant. 
(vi) · Finally of course negative values of our unknowns are not 
permitted. 
The solution of the model proceeds straightforHardly nmv, 
and we can concentrate on examining the effect of the 
new constraint formulations on the results already 
established in the literature. To begin with, the 
Lagrangian function of objective and constraints is set 
out below. In doing so we have introduced a series of 
Kuhn Tucker multipliers: 
sk sk 
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In analysing the solution using the theorems of non linear 
progrannning, we will take as read the usual "complementary slackness" 
results whereby either the necessary conditions hold with equality or the 
corresponding variable takes a value of zero. In passing it can be 
pointed out that we have not included in the problem the specification 
of any inherited capacity since that is not an aspect on which we are 
going to focus attention. 
We can begin by examining the partial derivatives of the optimal 
value of C with respect to capacity and output. Taking capacity first, 
we write, for all vintages and types actually installed (temporarily 
leaving aside hydro and natural gas facilities). J ! 
! 
I ,, 
0 = 
= 0 = 
sk 
c 
+ 
• • • • • • • (1) 
• • • • • • • (2) 
These two equations correspond to the pr~c~ng or costing and 
investment rules already discussed in the literature. Taking equation 
(2) first of all we have: 
= + 
and applying our usual analysis, at can be interpreted as: 
which is the effect on the optimal value of costs of a small increment ~n 
annual power requirements: i.e. it has a cost per KWhour dimension and of 
course reflects, as we know, a running charge and an amortization charge 
calculated over a mix of old and new equipment of differing types; 
reflects the amortization charge or cost savings due to the presence of 
a small extra amount of capacity of the appropriate type. 
Turning now to equation (1) we see how these amortization charges 
recover the costs due to equipment installations. However the expression 
here is much more complex than the usual case. 
+ + 13 k = 
sk 
c + 0 k 
The term on the right ~s the sum of the pr~ce of an item of 
new equipment and the premium which must be added to it reflecting the 
budget constraint Dk operating in that year. The market price of an 
item of new capacity does not reflect its true cost to the authority 
because the authority has a resource shortage (in capital funds) which 
the equipment market does not recognise. It is this resource cost 
(csk + ok) which must be recovered by amortizing capacity. Only if 
capacity is worth enough to recover this augmented resource cost will 
.the authority invest in it. The presence of the constraint on capital 
expenditure adds another dimension to the problem of "time" depreciat.ion. 
It is no longer the case that amortization in the sense used by Hotelling, 
Turvey and Wright(l) -of a fall in the value of cost. savings of equipment 
is a sufficient measure of ideal depreciation. The authority now has a 
capital expenditure constraint which compels it to consider problems of 
how to maintain its capital intact in the traditional ways discussed by 
economists - notably by recognising the difference between the historical 
and replacement cost targets for a depreciation charge. Lewis (1960) 
provides a good discussion of how different objectives in depreciation 
policy lead to different concepts of the theoretically ideal depreciation 
method. On the left hand side we have a measure of the benefits or cost 
savings attributable over its lifetime to a unit of capacity of the type 
and vintage in question. We can recognise the first term immediately: 
it is the cost savings that capacity provides in producing for annual power 
requirements (At): ~.e. the life-time sum: 
(1) see the discussion ~n Chapter VII above. 
I~ 
but this capacity has other benefits as well. Th ~ I sk e Lerm t:cr t is aga~n 
a present worth of lifetime cost savings this time associated with early 
retirement of capacity; as we show below retiring capacity early may 
produce cost savings which will help to amortize the resource cost of 
that capacity. The third term on the left hand side of the equation ~s: 
and from looking at the constraints we know: 
s 
k = 
the cost variation associated with a change ~n demand at system peak -
i.e. in the hour of system max~mum demand. Hence the cost savings 
associated with capacity are of three types: 
( i) l: sk t y t 
(ii) l: ask 
t t 
cost savings for annual power requirements 
cost savings from vary~ng retirements rates 
cost sav~ngs from providing extra peak 
capacity. 
These will vary with the nature of equipment types and the 
importance of this model is the allowance it makes for hydroelectric 
schemes in the plant mix. The reason for this is that hydroelectric 
schemes provide one of the few options for "s.toring" povJer output either 
in seasonal or in daily reservoirs. Wherever capacity can be built up -
by winter rainfall or by night-time pumping up of water levels - for a 
specific period, then that capacity comes into its own in meeting peak 
demands over and above base·load operation. Hydroelectric schemes have 
a great deal more of this sort of peak flexibility than - say - conventional 
thermal plants which usually run for base load at almost full capacity. 
We have therefore the important result that in eva~uating marginal 
increments to capacity in the form of a mix of for example 
conventional thermal capacity 
nuclear capacity 
or reservoirs, 
it is not enough to look at costs only on a kWhour basis because the 
third option (reservoirs) - where they are feasible as in Australian 
electricity supply - are likely to have a large cost saving item on a kW 
basis at times of system maximum demand or large seasonal demand. It LS 
this form of cost savLng that is measured by 8k. 
We can now take up the corrnnents we made about cost savings due 
to retirements. Looking at the objective function we can see that the 
retirements enter total system costs with a negative sign because they 
save on maintenance expenses 
= cost saving Ln form of reduced maintenance on a 
fraction of retired capacity. 
For capacity retirements that do occur the appropriate partial 
derivative is: 
= 0 = + + 
and we can exam~ne the cost sav~ng from early retirement - the term 
reflecting a relaxation in the retirement constraint - as follows: 
Quite simply it does pay to temporarily or permanently retire 
a unit of capacity if the saving on maintenance expenses (p~k) exceeds 
h · · d k · · · ( sk d ) t e cost sav~ngs ~n power output an pea capac~ty prov~s~on yt an st 
which that capacity provides. This condition really only determines 
temporary retirements; nevertheless reasonable assumptions about the time 
f . 1 f sk sk . h . pro ~ e o pt , St and yt m~g t suggest that - unless demand ~s extreme 
in its fluctuations - a machine once retired will stay that way. This 
formulation has the advantage over other models of making explicit the 
decision to retire a part of capacity. 
So far ~n our discussion we have not made use of the constraints 
on exhaustion of resources. If, for example, we focus attention on 
investment ~n further natural gas facilities our investment criterion 
is the special case of equation (1) for k = g: 
gk 
c 
and solving for ~ we obtain 
+ 
+ + 
+ 
gk 
c 
= 
+ 
0 
• • • • • (3) 
~.e. the surplus of benefits over costs for investment in natural gas 
facilities. By our usual reasoning ~ itself represents the effect on 
optimal system costs of a small change in the overall availability of 
natural gas facilities 
Thus from equation (4) we know that 1/1 measures - in terms of 
cost savLngs - the benefit of additional natural gas discoveries, and, 
hence, LS a measure of the attractiveness of exploratory effort in natural 
gas. This benefit is Ln turn (equation (3)) the difference between the 
present worth of a stream of cost savings from having extra natural gas 
facilities and the resource costs of installing these facilities. We 
can make use of equation (3) to throw some light on the problem of natural 
gas reserves. It is often superficially stated that a low rate of 
additions to reserves heralds depletion of possible resources. In fact 
the process goes as follows. Low demand for the final product is 
gk 
expressed in equation (3) by low values for~tyt and Sk' the value of 
additional facilities; this translates into a low figure for che incentive 
to explore: 1/J, and hence a lew figure for additions to reserves. In 
fact the true world situation is not nearly as integrated as this reas~ning 
suggests but it at least pictures the effect that demand variation has on 
every stage of the production process. 
The same reasoning of course applies to the case of hydro 
facilities. Using equation (3) in this case we have as the investment 
rule: 
+ + cf> ) = + 
Which states that for the special category of hydroelectric 
investment, resource costs of capacity - which must be covered by the 
positive benefits of the investment - are of three kinds: 
hk 
c capacity installation cost 
o the shadow cost of the restricted funds Ln the budget 
the shadmv cost reflecting the finite limit on reservoir 
sites which grow more and more scarce. 
This last item ~ , which can be interpreted: 
will eventually tell against hydroelectric schemes and motivate a re-
direction tmmrds other types of capacity to fulfil base and peak load 
requirements. The values taken on by ~ will therefore be one of the 
important factors determining the dates on which Australian elP.ctricity 
authorities begin seriously to consider the adoption of nuclear generating 
capacity. 
Quite clearly our model could be further developed and there 
remaLns the large area of transmission possibilities and constraints to 
be included in an actual application. Ne~ertheless the model we have 
presented here shows fairly well some of the considerations essential in 
global planning of Australian electricity supply; one of the most helpful 
products of the cost minimizing programming exercise is the insight it can 
give into problems like the incentive to look for new natural resource 
stocks or the timing of the introduction of radically new capacity 
options. 
CHAPTER IX 
THE IDEA OF MARGINAL COST IN 
INVESTMENT PLANNING MODELS 
INTRODUCTION 
From our initial discussion of investment planning models 
in general and Turvey's model in particular we know that one of the 
most important objectives in planning is to provide an estimate of the 
cost bases on which prices may be constructed. Indeed, we saw that 
Turvey regarded this information on costs as the main achievement of 
the modelling process. The purpose of this chapter is to consider 
what we can learn about marginal costs using investment planning models. 
Two points are of outstanding initial importance. Firstly, basing the 
measurement of marginal cost on an optimization exercise means that the 
results will be forward looking and related to forcecasts and 
expectations rather than backward looking historical measurements. 
Secondly, we shall have a variety of marginal cost measures to choose 
from. At the end of this chapter we will have drawn together the 
results of several models of the pricing process. It is these results 
that formed the basis of the theoretical introduction to Part I of this 
thesis (on empirical estimation of tariff policies and costs). One of 
the measures of marginal cost that we examined in Turvey's model of 
Chapter VI was 
= 
I 
! 
I 
i 
I 
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~.e. the effect on optimal system costs of a small change in forecast 
demand in year t. However even here we cannot say that we have a 
unique measure of marginal cost. There is a different value for mt 
for every discrete time period in the planning model's horizon. Which 
of these corresponds to marginal cost? The complexity of the concept 
"marginal cost" goes much deeper. We have looked only at marginal cost 
of. output increments - but we could just as easily look at marginal cost 
of financial constraintincrements, resource exhaustion changes and a 
host of other small variations in the authority's environment. If we 
try to relate the programming measure, mt, to textbook definitions of 
marginal cost how are we to treat the well established distinction between 
'-" 
.short run and long run marginal costs and what can we say about the 
relationship between the~e at the otpimum? Given these considerations, 
do we have an adequate measure of marginal cost for p~icing policy? All 
these are questions that Turvey set out to tackle in developing an 
optimization approach to marginal cost measurement. 
THE DUAL VARIABLE MEASURE OF MARGINAL COST 
We can begin the discussion by looking at the marginal cost 
concept developed by Turvey in 1971 
= 
Turvey has written in some detail about the mean~ng of this 
equation (Turvey 197la, pages 53-58). Suppose we have set up a cost 
minimizing model like that of Chapter VI or Chapter VIII in terms of a 
constrained optimization programme; there are several outstanding 
characteristics of the formulation of which we ought to be aware. Of 
course we have the exogenous variables of the model 
- the forecast demand requirements {Xt} from the present stretching 
perhaps to infinity. 
the inherited capacity of the electricity authority or investment 
planning authority. 
- a whole battery of eA~ectations about future running and capacity 
costs and the effect on them of technological progress -
·emphasising the important non stationary character of the model. 
Given all these we have a series of recurring decisions to 
take, planning the further acquisition and utilization of capital. 
equipment in each year of the programme ahead; the most important of 
all the decisions are those relating to the present year's acquisitions 
and operations, because -while all the other years' decisions remain 
hypothetical - the present year's decisions are about to be put into 
practice. Thus we have a picture oj a situation in which a stream of 
forecasts will cause the authority to start off from its inherited 
position on a new sequence of decisions and operations. Suppose now 
that within this long time scale of forecasts the demand requirement 
for the product 1n one future time period changes by a very small 
amount from its previously forecast level to a new forecast level. 
demand 1n y~ar s changes from a forecast of 
to a forecast of (1 + ~) X • 
s 
X 
s 
The least eA~ens1ve way of meeting this demand increment or 
fall - ~Xs - will cause a widening ripple through the investment and 
operating plans for every year ahead of the whole programme: the 
\ 
~~ 
I ' 
I i 
.1ol · 
present worth of total system costs chan·ges by a very small amount as 
a result of a whole sequence of plan changes: 
e.g. some capacity planned for construction in year s-2 may need 
to be constructed in s-3 while some scheduled retirements 
for s+4 may be amended. 
Because of the importance of system interdependence and the 
dynamic effects of technological progress the effect on total system 
costs C - of ~X may be very different from the simple addition of the 
s 
costs of running capacity a little harder in year s; the latter option 
could of course be chosen but may not be the cheapest option available 
and we would expect a systematic analysis of the cost of the marginal 
change to relate to the alteration in costs at the optimum. This is 
the rationale behind the careful examination of the dual variables (mt' 
v 
etc.) the model - that the optimal effects total kt, ~n so on systems 
costs of ~X may be calculated. This is so because we know that under 
s 
general conditions the dual variables reflect small variations at the 
optimum in the exogenous variables entering the constraints on the 
problem. Clearly there arises here the multiplicity of marginal costs 
since there are so many exogenously given variables in the model; any 
potential variation in any one of them would produce an alteration in 
total system costs at the optimum. 
Of course for tariff purposes we are primarily interested in 
the cheapest way of meeting small variations ~n demand requirements, 
hence it is the dual variables associated with {Xt} the mt - which 
I 
. t 
I 
! 
I 
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attract our attention as the basis of tariff schemes. The first 
occas1on on which Turvey emphatically drew attention to the necessity 
of calculating a forward looking measure of marginal cost for tariff 
setting purposes was in his 1969 paper. The programming model which 
later developed was initiated by an article by Littlechild (Littlechild 
1970). Littlechild attempted to give a programming formulation to the 
discursive approach that Turvey had set out. Hence the dual variable 
measures of marginal cost - mt - are really to be seen as programming 
translations of Turvey's pathbreaking and penetrating ideas contained 
in that 1969 paper. From our discussion above we know how to interpret 
these dual variables - however the question remains open whether these 
measures adequately reflect the marginal cost concepts that Turvey had 
originally set out. 
TURVEY'S HISTORICAL DYNAMIC MARGINAL COST 
The ideas on marginal cost associated with Turvey's work were 
first sketched in his book on electricity supply in 1968 and later g1ven 
a larger development in his 1969 paper. Turvey was at pains to relate 
marginal costs to the optimal planning of capacity: 
II what is important however is that the estimation 
of long run marginal cost is consistent with the 
planning of capital expenditure. 
same calculations ••• 11 
Both require the 
(Turvey 1968, page 51) 
.2.o3 
He wanted to emphasise the long term planning aspects of the 
twin problems of car.aci ty accumulation to meet load requirements and 
the pricing of those requirements. In a section of the 1968 book on 
"the time pattern of marginal cost" (pages 54-55) he discusses the 
consequences of the. emergence of a permanent load increment. A new 
. 
demand requirement appears and it is known that this is going to continue 
for the most if not all of the remaining planning horizon. One response 
of the authority might be to find the constant annuity equivalent of the 
costs of meeting this permanent load increment and to set up a long 
term contract for charging for it. He dismisses this idea however, 
firstly because electricity is rarely sold in long term contracts and 
secondly, because of the arbitrariness of using annuity equivalents. 
A better response he suggests is to set up an alternative definition of 
marginal· cost. We attempt to "isolate the share of the increment in 
system costs caused by a given permanent load increment which can be 
attributed to a particular year, n," as: 
't (i) the present worth of the increment of system costs 
resulting from a permanent load increment starting 
at the beginning of year n 
less 
(ii) the present worth of the increment of system costs 
·resulting from the same permanent load increment 
starting at the beginning of year n+l ••• " 
(Turvey 1968, page 55) 
This 'is a very interesting definition of marginal cost and 
a great deal ahead of the typical textbook definition of the first 
derivative of a continuous cost function related to output: 
~ C (X). 
In spelling out the ingredients of a measure of marginal cost defined 
1n this way, Turvey discovers that at least three aspects need careful 
calculation: 
I ·-(i) the present worth of fuel savings associated with new capacity, 
if any t i 
(ii) the distinction between costs associated with annual power I 
I 
I 
increments and those associated with additions to peak capacity 
(iii) the exact nature of the capital charge involved. 
! 
Now clearly the programming models discussed - say in Chapter I 
I 
VIII-do allow.for these three aspects; nevertheless it is not apparent 
t' 
that the definition of ~C*/~Xt covers all that Turvey appears to be 
looking for in his definition above. Summing up: Turvey gives a 
complex definition of marginal cost as a tariff basis and indicates 
some of its ingredients; the programming methods dual variable also 
captures some of the ingredients but is not a definition couched in 
terms of the potential starting dates of permanent load increments. 
It seems just possible that Turvey's interesting 1968 definition has 
not been completely analysed. 
In 1969 1n his paper on "Marginal Cost" Turvey develops his 
radically new definition verbally and diagrammatically. His 
starting point is to 
" survey recent developments in the concept of 
marginal cost with particular reference to 
marginal cost . . " pr~c~ng ••• 
(Turvey 197la, page 282) 
He wants to emphasise that the traditional textbook treatment 
~s not at all useful for practical applications - it is essential to 
develop a historical dynamic concept - a measure which allows for problems 
like system interdependence and amortization calculations. More 
significantly this concept needs to be usuable enough to allow economists 
to 
" 
act as would be insiders who are trying to decide 
what ought to be done ••• " 
(Turvey 1969, page 282) 
He does however point up one textbook result that is worth 
examining in any model: "marginal short and long run costs coincide 
when capacity is optimal", (Turvey 1969, p.293). This theorem 
encapsulates so much complex analysis that it would clearly be a very 
useful result to carry about in practical calculations. (Turvey himself, 
in a much earlier paper, (Turvey 1964) provides an extension to the case 
of tariff setting and capacity installation in a very simple model of the 
electricity supply situation.) 
I 
! 
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Consequently his approach to the problem of survey1ng recent 
work on marginal cost is twofold: can we broaden the textbook 
treatments to give practical answers to tariff setting problems - and 
can we still condense our results into useful theorems about short and 
long run marginal costs? 
He begins - in his 1969 paper - his attempt on the first part 
of the problem by reviewing the contributions of other writers who have 
been worried by the lack of regard paid in the textbook treatment to 
problems like the fixity and longevity of capital equipment and the 
diffusion of technological progress. In particular he admires the \vork 
·Of Salter, which we have already reviewed in Chapter vrr above. While 
these other contributio~s would make-a worthwhile study in themselves, 
we can quickly summarize the main results as emphasising that 
" ••• cost and output have time dimensions ••• " 
fur-thermore cost and output will depend on the extent to which capacity 
is inherited from the past; all this says that 
" ••• a cost analysis which is to be useful in decision 
making needs to be historical dynamics, not comparative 
statics ••• " 
(Turvey 1969, page 287) 
Turvey then proceeds to develop a definition which he thinks 
fits the requirements - and it is completely in sympathy with the measure 
he had earlier developed for the case of electricity supply and which we 
....... 
I [ 
I 
I I 
examined a few paragraphs above. 
Two features of the definition are important: 
(i) the use of the definition is in" ••• making decisions about pr1c1ng " 
(ii) II the nature of the concept required can thus be ascertained only 
with reference to the objective function, to the constraints and .to 
the amount of information available ••• " 
Turvey then makes a point earlier made by Boiteux (1951): 
many price or tariff structures -particularly for a public enterprise's 
products - cannot be changed frequently. In conjunction with the fact 
that consumers' decisions are frequently long term ones, this means that 
" ••• the marginal cost concept which is relevant to pricing 
decisions consequently relates to permanent output changes II 
(Turvey 1969, page 288) 
Turvey then gives his definition of marginal cost under these 
considerations. 
The definition is given 1n the context of an example of an 
enterprise planning for a PERMANENT OUTPUT INCREMENT - an increment which 
is postulated as being "large enough to be noticeable but small enough to 
be marginal". The permanent output increment could begin in any one of 
the future years of the planning horizon, and marginal cost is based on 
the differences made to the present worth of system c~sts by different 
starting dates. A diagrammatic illustration is given in Figures IX,l 
and IX,2. We can tabulate the crucial variables as follows i.e. the 
values for the present worth of system costs and the output stream being 
cos ted. In particular consider the following calculations. 
TABLE IX, 1 
NO. OUTPUT STREAM COST VALUE 
(1) xo xl XS-1 xs XS+l XS+2 PWC(I) 
(2) xo xl XS-1 xs+ll. XS+l XS+2 PWC(II) 
(3) xo xl XS-1 Xs+ll. XS+l+ll. XS+2+ll. PWC(III) 
(4) xo xl ••• XS-1 xs XS+l +ll. XS+2+ll. PWC(IV) 
Output stream (1) can be regarded as benchmark: it shows a 
forecast level of output requirements proceeding from year zero onwards: 
Output.stream (2) shows the same forecast output levels for 
all years except year S; 1n year S forecast output is ll. units higher 
X +ll. 
s 
and output then returns to its previously forecast level. 
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If w~ compare the associated system cost values we have a 
definition of marginal cost corresponding to one earlier Kuhn-Tucker 
analysis: 
PWC(II) PWC(I) 
However, although this is the marginal cost concept that 
figures so importantly in the Littlechild and later Turvey models, it 
is not the basic definition of Turvey's 1968 book or 1969 paper. 
Consider output stream (3); this shows a permanent output 
increment beginning in year S and carrying on 
Suppose this permanent output increment began one year later; 
the butput stream would be (4) 
-~- ~-. 
with cost level PWC(IV). The marginal cost concept Turvey LS interested 
in can then be written simply as 
PWC(III) PWC(IV) 
II marginal cost for any year is the excess of (a) 
the present worth in that year of system costs with a 
unit permanent output increment starting then, over (b) 
the present worth in that year 'of system costs with the 
unit permanent output increment postponed to the 
following year II 
(Turvey 1969, page 289) 
jLIO I, 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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and this measure is clearly going to coincide with m8 in only a 
restricted number of cases. This 1969 definition mirrors exactly 
I 
I the measure used by Turvey 1n his essay on the electricity industries 
problems which we examined above, but it 1s clearly of a different I 
I 
I 
I ' 
nature to the dual variable measure we have been examining. If we 
take these two threads of marginal cost calculation we can follow them 
' out to some interesting insights into electricity pianning, but we I 
have to begin by clearly distinguishing the two results. I I 
Turvey himself 1s not quite explicit enough on the relationships I ! 
between the two measures - in his 1969 paper he simply summarises: 
11 
••• while the concepts presented here are general ones, 
actual measurement requires a cost model specific to 
the industry concerned; ( ••• ) a programming analysis may 
be used which has the great advantage of directly 
producing marginal cost estimate~ as the duals of the 
output constraints II 
(Turvey 1969, page 290) 
In the following pages we try to work out some of these cost 
concepts and we can indicate our main results in the following way: 
(i) Turvey 1s trying to set a price for electricity and this leads 
to his 1968-1969 definitions. 
.2n 
(ii) the global programming model provides (in m8) a measure of 
what looks like the accepted idea of marginal cost: ~C*/~XS 
and at the same time incorporates all those crucially 
important factors of technological progress, dynamic 
amortization and expectations which Turvey wants to 
emphasise is the basis of electricity planning. 
(iii) the most important thing to understand is that we have left 
behind the textbook world of static long run and short run 
scale cost curves. 
Let us begin with point (iii), it is not hard to get the. 
impression from Turvey's 1969 paper that he has tried to maintain the 
concepts of long run and short run marginal cost in his analysis. The 
object of the analysis of investment planning is to achieve the optimal 
adjustment of capacity to demand and this usually is associated with an 
equality between short and long run marginal costs. However having said 
this, Turvey appears to leave some doubt about the nature of his 
definition. His concept appears to be a long run idea because of the 
optimal capacity notion and the permanent nature of the output increment; 
nevertheless, he says, it is misleading to consider his definition as a 
long run concept. 
Kay took up Turvey's ideas in his 1971 comments and criticised 
the analysis relating to the optimal capacity theorem. Turvey, 1.n his 
reply, appeared to accept Kay's strictures by simply admitting 
' "''IIII I • ) i I . 
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" my paper was also a little confused about LRMC 
versus SRMC pricing ••• " 
(Turvey 197lb, page 371) 
There are two points at issue 1.n the Kay-Turvey exchange: 
the optimal capacity theorem and whether Turvey's ~oncept of marginal 
cost can be said to be a long run measure. 
The derivation of the optimal capacity theorem is set out 1.n 
any textbook. It is summed up in a well-known diagram which is 
reproduced below (figure IX,3). The figure shows a short run marginal 
cost curve (SMC) and a long run marginal cost curve (LMC). Short run 
marginal cost depends not only on factor prices and output but also the 
fixed availability of one or more inputs (hereM machine hours). The 
long run marginal cost curve is constructed without any such input 
fixity. If output was to be at the level XA then the fixed short run 
availability of machine hours is exactly that which in the long run 
minimizes costs of production. This is not the case for output ~· 
For small variations 1.n output around XA it makes no difference whether 
existing capacity is worked harder (or less hard) or new capacity is 
installed, since the costs of either action are identical. Consequently 
we can regard capacity as being at the optimal level for output XA. 
We have therefore the general result that when capacity is 
·optimally adjusted to demand (or required output level) short run 
marginal cost equals long run marginal cost. 
$ 
L Me. 
Figure IX, 3 
SMC = F (w, r, X, M) 
LMC = G (w, r, X) 
r, w = factor prices; X = output requirements 
M = fixed amount of machine hours available for the 
short run case illustrated 
REQUIRED_ 
OUTPUT (X) 
It is not hard to see how this carries over to our 
programnung mod.el. We have already noted that this gives both a 
costing and an investment rule. Referring back to figure VI,4 of 
Chapter VI we sec hm1 different types of machine are incorporated into 
the production flow for each period. At the optimum we can compare 
the newest and oldest machines in use; one is on the verge of being 
scrapped with low quasi-rent, while the other is newly in use with 
large quasi-rent, but an increment to output requirements could be met 
from either machine at the margin; this is simply a reflection of the 
textbook choice of working old capacity harder or installing new capacity. 
Turvey sees that this will be the case in his investment. 
planning model but in the context of his reframed definition of 
marginal cost in terms df permanent output increments is reluctant to 
state the proposition in long run-short run cost terms. The optimal 
capacity result is "no more than a truism'' in the context of an 
investment planning model. 
It is Kay who tries to translate Turvey's permanent increment 
cost concepts into the textbook long run-short run distinction. 
He sets out the four output streams that we used above in 
table IX, 1, and he asserts the following defintions: 
(a) short run marginal cost is PWC(II) PWC(I) 
(b) long run marginal cost as defined by Turvey 1s PWC(III) PWC(IV) 
assertion (b) is valid - it is the descr.iption of Turvey 1 s concept we 
illustrated above. Using hypothetical cases for situations I to IV 
Kay then dismisses the optimal capacity proposition - the equality of 
short run and long run marginal costs is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for it. However we can see immediately what Kay's error is; 
no one - least of all Turvey - has claimed that 
PWC(II) - PWC(I) 
is short run marginal cost. Turvey perhaps causes some confusion by 
inserting into his definition of permanent output cost concepts the 
discussion of optimal capacity in the traditional textbook terms but 
he would have been the first to recognize that short and long run 
distinctions do NOT relate to the time length or magnitude of the output 
increment. The short run is distinguished from the long run by the 
fixity of one or more factors. Kay's counter-example is based entirely 
on a misconception of what short run marginal cost ~s. 
Now we showed above how the optimal capacity theorem of the 
textbooks can be coaxed out of the investment programming model. What 
can we say about the short-long run distinction in the context of 
Turvey's permanent output increment ideas? 
About the best thing we can do is to jettison the whole long 
run-short run distinction. We can make it clear from the start that 
we are dealing with optimally adjusted investment progra~~ing models 
incorporating various constraints and operating through time. This is 
a complete description; to bring in the textbook notions of long and 
short run ~s a misleading red herring. 
Havi~g established this, we want to investigate how Turvey's 
permanent output increment concept is to be evaluated in an investment 
planning mode 1. We achieved a measure of margir.al cost 1n the form of 
the dual variable mS but have already decided that it perhaps does not 
contain the full richness of the 1969 Turvey definition of marginal 
cost in terms of the postponement of the starting date of the permanent 
output increment. What we require 1s a reformulated investment planning 
model that will distinguish between permanent and temporary output changes. 
PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY 
OUTPUT CHANGES IN A DYNAMIC INVESTMENT PLANNING MODEL 
. 
In this section we are going to tackle head on Turvey's 1969 
definition of marginal cost. We want to construct a dynamic planning 
model for investment decisions that will allow us to examine permanent 
output increments and the costs that these impose and then to examine 
the cost changes at the margin of varying the starting dates of these 
output increments. 
French electricity enconomists have been particularly active 
in developing such models and much of our analysis will be based on a 
recent though rather difficult French model. As far as we are 
concerned the crucial results will be in answer to the questions: 
(a) does Turvey's 1969 definition of marginal cost translate 
into expressions for running and capacity charges with 
which we are familiar? 
(b) what implications for pricing policy does the 'model throw 
up? 
:Lito 
In 1970 t"tvo economists of Electricite de France - M. Albouy 
and J.C. Nachtigal - set up a continuous time model of electricity 
investment planning which contains enough to tackle Turvey's marginal 
cost definitions. Turvey himself refers to the article in his 1971 
book but does not use its interesting results. The French model is a 
very rich piece of work but part of its richness has to be diluted if 
we try to model Australian or British electricity policy in it. Both 
• • • 41 1n practice and in analys1s Electr1c1te de France has considered one of 
its policy options to be the imposition of selected supply 
interruptions on consumers whenever the social welfare penalties of 
supply interruption do not exceed the costs of supplying the service. 
Hence the French model incorporates these policy phases: 
periods when capacity matches output requirements. 
periods when there is surplus capacity. 
periods when capacity is less than required and selected 
blackouts are used to ration demand. 
Both Australian and British electricity authorities however 
are charged with - above all - providing a continuous supply service so 
that in our models we can only expect to have the first two kinds of 
policy operating periods shown above. 
,. 
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The model we now examine therefore, while b~sed ?n the French 
continuous time n~del so that we can examine the concept of permanent 
load increments, does not allow for all the policy options which that 
model considers. 
The important exogenous variables remain the same as those of 
previous models we have discussed: 
output requirements - which must be fulfilled: X(t) 
running costs per unit of output: r(X, t) 
capacity costs per unit of new capacity installed: c(t) 
There are two important constraints; firstly output 
requirements must always be met, and we could either write this constraint 
explicitly or simply substitute, as we have done above, required output 
for actual output. Thus we will simply use the variable X(t) for actual 
and required output. The second important constraint is that output 
cannot exceed capacity. The manner 1n which we have defined output as 
a continuous function of time implies that the unit of output is the 
kilowatt and this 1s also the unit of capacity. Hence the constraint 
is simply: 
Q(t) ~ X(t) 
where Q(t) is capacity installed. As new investment carr1es on we are 
varying the amount of capacity available to us and we therefore have the 
simple definition: investment - which we shall call u(t) - is the rate 
of change of capacity: 
u(t) = Q(t) dQ(t) 
dt 
Investment, of course, can never be negative: 
u(t) ~ 0 for all t 
.1.1 ~ 
We have now the essence of a very simple investment planning 
model but it is sufficient to examine Turvey's concepts of permanent 
output increments because we can write a permanent output increment as 
a shift in the whole set of output requirements: 
AX(t) 
and this will refer to a completely new output requirements programme 
beginning at a certain date and carrying on to the end of the planning 
horizon. For example AX(t) could be the difference between the two 
output programmes x1 (t) and x2 (t) shown in figure IX,2 above. 
Now putting together the statement of the problem we can 
write: 
m1n1m1ze the present worth of system costs of meeting 
output requirements subject to the capacity restraint; 
and stated mathematically this 1s 
minimize C = £ @<t) u(t) + r(X, t) J e -itdt 
I I 
. 
such that: u(t) = Q(t) u(t)4 0 
X(t) ~ Q(t) 
with given initial conditions, e.g. X(O) = Q(O) Z. 
-it We have introduced the discount factor e v1ith constant 
rate of discount i. In addition it is important to note that the price 
of new investment equipment, c(t), explicitly varies through time with 
the process of technological change; it is this dependence which ensures 
the model is truly dynamic; without it the solution to the model would 
not depend on time - ~n the language of dynamic optimization the problem 
would be "autonomous". 
The appendix sets out the solution conditions of a dynamic 
optimization problem like this; here we will take these conditions as 
given and discuss their economic content. As usual the economist deals 
with a constrained optimization problem like this by redefining the 
objective function to include the constraints with each valued at a shadow 
price to be determined. 
The most crucial part of the solution conditions will clearly 
be an investment rule. As we know from the statement of the problem 
investment can be either positive or zero 
u(t) :;:. 0 
and the investment rule decides this. It ~s quite simple: suppose 
we write 
J. a..o 
as the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier associated. \Jith the capacity constraint: 
X(t) ~ Q(t) 
then following our usual analysis A(t)e-it is the present worth in 
cost saving terms of an extra unit of capacity in year t of the optimal 
plan, i.e. 
= A(t)e-it 
The cost of new investment is c(t)e-it per unit and such new 
investment is only undertaken if the cost savings are recouped over the 
unit of capacity's life. 
u(t) > 0 if 
Thus 
-it 
c(t)e 
where y is simply a dummy variable of integration. If this-condition' 
does not hold, i.e. if 
-it 
c(t)e > 
00 
f 
t 
then we have a boundary solution of zero investment for some time periods: 
u(t) = 0. Thus our optimal investment policy switches between periods 
when u(t) > 0 and periodswhen u(t) = 0. Figures IX, 4 and IX, 5 below 
illustrate this. In the upper figure (4) we show a possible output 
requirement path which at first rises then falls and subsequently rises 
again. The lower figure (5) shows what happens to capacity; at first 
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it is built up, 'then as the optimal policy S\·7itches to .one of no 
investment, capacity remains static; eventually however it is again 
built up as positive investment takes over. From ~ cost viewpoint the 
instants of switching in the policy, Tl and T2 , are of extreme 
importance. (The two points taken here are simply an example, although 
it is always the case that the number of switching Eoints is finite for 
a feasible solution to the problem.) 
There are some other solution conditions which provide 
economically meaningful results. The model provides an instantaneous 
measure of the term we have called A: an instant's cost savings: 
A = (ic - de) 
dt 
This expression sim~ly says that A - an instants cost saving 
is the sum of two terms: an interest cost element (ic) is the first 
term; the second (dc/dt) detracts from cost savings because it reflects 
the loss of technological progress in capacity costs implied by building 
capacity immediately instead of delaying for an instant. 
Apart from providing an investment rule therefore, this model 
provides a simple expression for the cost of one instant's demand: a 
sum of a running cost element, r•"', and an instantaneous capital charge, A. 
Hence over the lifetime of the plan the costs of an infitesimal 
unit of demand are: 
T 1 . 
f (A+r')e-1 tdt + 
T2 . 
, -1_ t f re dt + 
<X) • 
f (A+r')e-1 tdt 
0 Tl T2 
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The first and third present worth terms refer to periods (OT1) 
and (T2ro) and nrc therefore associated with positive investment in 
capacity. During those periods demand requires that capacity be built 
and run. However during ~he period (T1T 2) when demand has slumped so 
that capacity is in excess, each small unit of demand is only responsible 
for a stream of running costs associated with existing capacity (the 
second term in the above expression). 
This expression is the key to evaluating the cost of a permanent 
output increment as defined by Turvey. 
function X(t) and calculate 
~C* 
~X(t) 
We want to shift the whole 
The important factor is the starting date of the permanent 
output increment. Suppose we call it e. a could occur in any of 
the three periods 
If the permanent output increment occurs in the first or the 
third period we know that the optimal policy already requires positive 
investment to keep output up with capacity requirements; any output 
increment starting in these periods will require additional capacity to 
be built starting at date a and incurring a stream of instantaneous extra 
system costs of: 
I 
I 
! I . 
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l1C*/l1X 
co ,. -it 
= J (>..+r )e dt • • • • • • .. • • • ( 1) 
e 
i.e. a stream of instantaneous 'marginal' capacity and runnLng costs. 
However if the output increment begins in the period of surplus 
capacity when investment LS zero, T1 T2 , then no extra capacity costs 
are incurred until after T2 
limits, and then 
when output once more impinges on capacity 
= J 
e 
, -it 
r e dt + co , -it J (>..+r )e dt • • • • • (2) 
T2 
Hence the costs of a permanent output increment depend very 
much on when increment begins. These expressions for !1C*/l1X, labelled 
(1) and (2), are what Albouy and Nachtigal would call "dynamic marginal 
cost". Turvey's 1969 concept is couched in terms of the postponement 
or bringing forward of the crucial starting date e . Taking expression 
(1) first, the case where e occurs in a period of capacity expansion, we 
calculate a variation in e by postponing or advancing the date as 
d 
de 
!1C* 
!1X 
(>..+r')e-ie 
"thus there LS both a capacity and a running charge. 
However when we take the case of a variation in the starting 
date of an output increment that occurs Ln a period of surplus capacity 
we have: 
1 
r 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
= 
' -ie 
r e 
and here there is only a running charge variation. 
This concept Albouy and Nachtigal refer to as "instantaneous 
dynamic marginal cost" and it is as close as we can get to Turvey's 
complex 1969 definition. The interesting conclusion that we get from 
the point of vLew of our previous analysis LS that this definition 
involves us in looking at the sum of an instantaneous running charge and 
an instantaneous capacity charge and the capacity charge depends on the 
extent to which capacity constraints are binding on output possibilities. 
Thus Turvey's interesting definition does not take us on a 
radically different road from the programming analysis we have already 
examined. This makes sense when we think out Turvey's analysis. An 
investment planning authority is forewarned of a permanent rise in output 
requirements and considers how to price it. The .crucial question is when 
will the increment occur? Will it occur Ln a period of surplus capacity 
or in a period when capacity has to be expanded? If prLces are to be 
changed to encourage or discourage this output increment they must reflect 
the date on which it begins. Turvey considers marginal cost to be a 
measure of the cost changes associated with variations in this all 
important date so his definition must capture the instantaneous costs of 
this output increment; naturally these will include a running charge and 
also a capacity charge which varies with the extent of the limitations 
on capacity. All this is exactly what the programming analysis does by 
a different route. 
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· PRICING OF PERMANENT AND TEMPORARY OUTPUT CHANGES 
Turvey raises several new issues 1n pricing polciy in his 
analysis and these same issues have also been discussed by the French 
economists. Most important is whether "dynamic marginal cost" or 
"instantaneous dynamic marginal cost" as we have defined them here is 
to be the basis of pricing policy. A new electricity consumer clearly 
does not expect to switch off his consumption after a short period; 
each new consumer brings along a permanent output increment. In this 
sense one would expect prices to be based on a measure of the costs of 
the permanent output increment. 
The possible schemes can be illustrated quite easily using 
equations (1) and (2) from the previous section. Now we have two 
expressions for the cost of a permanent output increment 
(a) the increment begins 1n a period of capacity expansion 
t:.C* 
t:.X = 
00 • 
f (A.+r')e-1tdt (1) 
e 
(b) the increment begins in a period of surplus capacity 
t:.C* 
!:.X = 
1' 
2 
, -it f r e dt 
e 
+ f = 
1' 
2 
8 (2) 
, 
and (since A. and r are both expected to be positively related to 
output) clearly 
8(1) ~ 8(2) 
·------~~ 
---------------~ 
Thus .charging a contract price equal to the present value 
sums ~(1) or ~(2) will encourage new customers to appear in periods of 
surplus capacity. But how will the consumer actually pay for his 
electricity; - so far we only require that for a long term supply he 
. 
hand over the amount b(l) or b(2) according to his starting date. He 
may prefer to pay uniform installments, e.g. in the form of an annuity 
multiple of ~(1) or ~(2) (a situation which Turvey wished to avoid in 
his 1968 analysis- see the third section of this chapter): 
i.~(l) or i.~(2) 
This however does not differentiate between peak consumption 
periods and off peak consumption periods. As an alternative Albouy 
and Nachtigal suggested a "hybrid solution". The c~stomer may elect 
to pay his investment charges 1n uniform installments: he then pays an 
annuity equivalent of either 
co co 
f 
e 
or f A.e -itdt 
1"2 
and pays his running charges as they arise. This system of contractual 
payments still encourages the "arrival" of new permanent customers in 
periods of surplus capacity but regulates their subsequent peak consumption. 
Turvey however dismisses the contractual payments approach in 
his 1971 treatment of pricing policy. He considers whether new 
customers should be faced with a long term schedule of marginal costs of 
supplying the required service but concludes that: 
II such contracts are only worth making with a 
few· large customers ••• 11 
(Turvey 197la, page 57) 
The basis for this is that such contracts for supply are not 
marginal "in the strict sense of relating to a tiny increment in output". 
He prefers to adopt the idea of instantaneous dynamic marginal cost to 
determine prices on offer to a large number of customers making short run 
(switching on or off) decisions. 
It is rather paradoxical that having established the important 
idea of permanent output increments Turvey prefers to maintain exclusively 
an analysis which splits such increments up into an infinity of 
instantaneous increments. It would be preferable to regard both forms 
of dynamic marginal cost as having a part to play in pricing policy. 
SUMM.'\R.Y OF THESE RESULTS 
We have covered a complex range of marginal cost definitions 
and can sum up as follows: 
(1) we began with the programming approach and the dual variable 
nature of marginal cost. 
(2) .we introduced Turvey's 1969 definition which looked at marginal 
cost from an entirely new direction. 
(3) this new ~pproach makes the static·concepts of short run and 
long run marginal cost irrelevant in a dynamic analysis. In 
particular, Kay's attack on Turvey's results was shown to be 
ill founded. 
(4) it ~s possible to model the permanent output increment definition 
and our model was based on a recent French approach to the problem. 
(5) dynamic economics throw up two marginal cost concepts; one 
related to permanent output increments and one related to 
instantaneous output increments arising from varying the starting 
date of a permanent output change. 
(6) both concepts reduce to an analysis of running and capacity 
charges and the instantaneous dynamic marginal cost is exactly 
identical to the dual variable definition of marginal cost. 
(7) either measure could be the basis of pricing policy according to 
the type of output increment under consideration. 
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MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX TO PART II 
INTRODUCTION 
This appendix covers the mathematical theorems of part II 
of the thesis. Some of these have also been used in the discussion 
of peak load pricing rr.odels in part I. There are four sections in 
the appendix. Section (i) describes the fundamental Kuhn-Tucker 
theorem which is at the heart of all constrained optimization techniques. 
Section (ii) is a brief application of the theorem to the problem of 
short run scheduling of given generating capacity to meet vary1ng loads. 
This is the analysis referred to in chapter VI above. Section (iii) 
of ~he appendix sets out the modern techniques of optimal control theory 
and the calculus of variations and the special cases which are used 
in chapter IX. Section (iv) discusses briefly the essential dynamic 
nature of t~e solutions and the problem of stationarity and autonomous 
solutions mentioned in relation to Turvey's statement of the problem. 
Finally section (v) presents the explicit solution of the model of 
chapter IX. 
(i) THE KUHN-TUCKER THEOREM 
The nature of the problem tackled in this thesis by using the 
Kuhn-Tucker theorem can be expressed as: 
Minimize F (x) subject to G (x) ~ b 
,X 
with x ~ o 
where we may be dealing with either scalars or vectors. 
I 
I 
:Z.3o 
This is the most general formulation of the constrained optimization 
problem. The constraints: G(x) ~ b, where b is a set of constants, 
can include the special case of equality constraints which ~s tackled 
by classical Lagrangian methods; on the other hand linearity of the 
. 
functions F(x) and G(x) makes this a linear programming problem. 
The first step in Kuhn-Tucker analysis is to formulate a 
Lagrangian type function us~ng a set of Kuhn-Tucker multipliers, A 
L (x, A) = F(x) + A (b - G (x)) 
Then, under certain conditions, a certain x* solves the original 
constrained optimization problem if and only if there exits A* such 
that x* and A* together provide a saddlepoint of the unconstrained 
function L(x, A) i.e. a minimum of L with respect to·x and a maximum with 
respect to A. The most important of these conditions is the constraint 
qualification condition which requires that there is some point in the 
feasible region of solutions where all the inequality constraints are 
satisfied as equalities. This is the condition referred to in the 
discussion of the Kuhn-Tucker multipliers as marginal costs in chapter 
VI above. 
This theorem specifies nothing about the differentiability 
·of the functions involved. However, where F(x) and G(x) are 
differentiable then the saddlepoint property is ensured by the 
necessary conditions: 
! ; 
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aF 
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aT 
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0 
= 0 
These can be recognised as the complementary slackness 
conditions used in the text. 
(ii) SHORT RL~ SCHEDULING OF GENERATING CAPACITY 
This elementary version of a programming model is illustrated 
for completeness and as an example of the.Kuhn-Tucker theorem just 
discussed. 
There are several types (k) and vintages (v) of existing 
. . Qvk. generat1ng capac1ty: At any time t, output (Ovk) from each 
t 
cannot exceed existing capacity: 
for all v, k ,and t 
There are certain hourly output requirements Xt which must be met by 
summing output from all vintages and types of capacity: 
(1) 
E E 
v k 
for all t . . . . . . . . . . (2) 
Output can never be negative: 
~ 0 for all v, k, t . . . . . . . . . . ( 3) 
Subje,ct to the restraints (1) .. (2) and (3), the objective is 
to minimize total system running costs in this short run scheduling 
operation. vk If rt is the running cost of vintag~ v, type k capacity 
in hour t, then the Lagrangian of the problem is simply 
Minimize L = ~ ~ ~ vk ovk + 
'-' '-' '-' rt t 
tv k 
+ l: ll 
t t 
• • • • • • • • • • ( 4) 
According to the Kuhn-Tucker theorem, we now have to find the 
set of values O~k, A.~k and llt that provide a saddlepoint of L. 
Assuming differentiability, the necessary conditions are: 
aL 
aovk 
t 
aL 
aA.vk 
t 
0 
0 
0 
0vk. aL 
t aovk 
t 
aL 
a>.vk 
t 
= 0 • • • • . • • • • . (5) 
= 0 • • • • • • • • • • ( 6) 
= 0 • • • • • • • • . • ( 7) 
Using condition (5), the "complementary slackness" condition 
implies that for any Ovk > o - i.e. for any plant actually in production 
t 
at hour t 
2 '03 
= Jlt 
Jlt (= ~C*/~Xt) is, as usual, the marginal generating cost of 
the system. Avk is the Kuhn-Tucker multiplier reflecting the cost t 
saving associated with each plant in each hour. It is the difference 
between marginal generating cost of the plants in operation and a 
particular plant's runn1ng cost in that hour. Plants for which A:k < o 
Plant will be scheduled into operation in the will not be operated. 
Order ;n wh;ch rvtk h .._ .._ approac es Jlt. (Of course Jlt itself varies with 
each hour and with the different plants in operation.) Thus a schedule 
(in descending order) of the variables A:k is identical to the merit-
order schedule of generating plant to be brought into operation. 
(iii) OPTIMAL CONTROL AND THE CALCULUS OF VARIATIONS 
Optimal control theory is ·the outcome of recent ad'!ances in 
the classical problems of calculus of variations. Although most dynamic 
optimization problems can be treated analytically using the Kuhn-Tucker 
programming approach, optimal control theory allows for a more explicit 
treatment of the truly dynamic properties of the solution. The problem 
is formulated in terms of an objective functional rather than a function, 
so that instead of solving for optimal values of the variables, one 
solves for optimal time functions of the variables. 
The technique usually distinguishes between a state variable 
whose path one wishes to control in order to maximize a g1ven measure 
of benefit and a control variable whose path controls the path of the 
state variable. 
The objective functional will.~e some measure of benefit 
measured perhaps as a sum of all the benefits obtainable at each 
instant on the time path of the state and control variables. Thus 
one may seek to 
Maximize J T = f F (x, u, t) dt 
0 
where x = x(t) is the state variable 
u = u(t) is the control variable 
and t = time. 
One wishes to choose u(t) to control x(t) so that J is a 
max~mum. This is applied to some dynamic system whose evolution is 
governed by the differential equation: 
x = dx = f (x, u, t) 
dt 
x(o) = X 
0 
Optimal control theory is flexible enough to treat cases 
where there are constraints operating on the available choice of u(t). 
However it does require that u(t) is a piecewise continuous function 
of time, t. As an example consider the function 
u(t) = -1 
u(t) = +1 
1';;1 < t < 0 
0 < t < 1';;2 
I 
I' 
which graphs as 
Ult) 
+l 
----r------------0+---------~----------~t 
~. 
---------1 -l 
This ensures that there are a finite number of "jumps" for 
u(t) such as the one occurring at t=o. The control variable switches 
from one path to another. 
problem is 
Maximize by choice of u(t) 
such that 
Putting this together, the optimal control 
T J = f F (x, u, t) dt. 
0 
x = f (x, u, t) 
x(o) = X 
0 
u(t) subject to certain restraints. 
There are a variety of conditions governing the existence of 
a solution, but of chief interest here are the analytical conditions 
defining the solution. 
The method is to set up a function incorporating the 
instantaneous value of the objective functional and the basic differential 
equation of the system: the Hamiltonian function 
l 
H (x,' u, t, p) = F (x, u, t) + pf (x, u, t) 
where p = p(t) is knmvn as a co-state variable. The solution is 
found if p(t) exists such that the following conditions hold: 
system. 
(a) p = -im 
(b) X = 
ax 
aH 
ap 
These two differential equations define the optimal dynamic 
One set of boundary conditions is given by x(o) = x • 
0 
There 
may also be the requirement x(T) = xT 
conditions can be developed: 
otherwise some transversality 
p (T) ~ o x(T) p,(T) = o 
Finally the crucial choice of u(t) to be used Ln solving (a) 
and (b) comes from solving: 
(c) Maximize H(x, u, t, p) with respect to u(t). (These 
results are set out and proved in Arrow and Kurz (197l)(pages 33-57.) 
Difficulties arise when T = oo, L.e. we deal with an infinite 
horizon. There are no longer necessary boundary conditions though 
sufficient conditions are (again see Arrow and Kurz (1971) page 46) 
lim .P(t) ~ o 
t-+<» 
lim p(t) x(t) = o 
t-+<» 
A special case arises when there are constraints on the state variable 
x(t); e. g. 
g (x, u, t) = o 
Now, in addition to the Hamiltonian function, a Lagrangian 
is also constructed 
L (x, u, t, p, q) = H (x, u, t, p) + q g (x, u, t) 
Condition (c) remains unchanged but (a) and (b) become 
l (a.') p = -aL 
ax 
X = ClL 
ap 
and the additional constraints must be satisfied. 
These theorems are applied to the marginal costing problem 
1n section (v) of this appendix, below. This section is the basis 
of the results of chapter IX. 
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There is an alternative, more traditional approach to 
problems of dyn~mic optimization in the calculus of variations. 
This treats problems of the nature: 
maximize I JT ~ (x, x, t) dt 
0 
(Simply defining x = u turns this into an optimal control 
problem.) The necessary conditions are given by the second order Euler 
differential equation: 
a~ 
ax = 0 
If however x did not enter the objective functional I in a meaningful 
way, then 
= 0 
and the.Euler equation becomes simply 
a~ = o 
ax 
which is not a differential equation at all, but simply reduces to a 
static condition to be repetitively met each instant of time. This 1s 
the essential criticism of the Jorgenson neoclassical investment model 
described in chapter VII above. Jorgenson's crucial variable is the 
optimal value of the capital stock, K(t), but the rate of growth of 
this stock - although it affects output by augmenting "undecayed" 
capital equipment - has no effect on profits or costs. It can be 
substituted out and the Euler equation reduced to the static case. 
The Gould-Lucas-Nerlove critiques referred to in chapter VII's discussion 
. 
all associated positive "adjustment costs" with variations in K(t) and 
"-
hence ensured that the optimality conditions were differential equations, 
thus maintaining the truly dynamic character of the problem. 
(iv) A SPECIAL CASE OF THE OPTIMAL CONTROL PROBLEM 
This comment is really a development of the comment at the 
end of the last section. Chapter VI emphasised that Turvey had taken 
some pains to maintain the dynamic nature of his solution by explicitly 
incorporating technical prggress, (and hence time, t) into his model. 
This can be shown by using the optimal control theorem described above. 
Suppose that the objective measure of benefit and the basic differential 
equation of the system do not depend explicitly on time 
F (x, u, t) = F (x, u) 
f (x, u, t) = f (x, u) 
then there may be a solution where the following hold (Arrow and Kurz 
(1971) page 50): 
(i) the value of the Hamiltonian function is constant 
'through time 
(ii) the differential equations for x and p are 
autonomous 
In this case certain boundary conditions (starting and 
finishing points) will provide a long run stationary equilibrium 
solution with ~ = p = o - i.e. all dynamic motion ceases. This l.S 
exactly the mathematical analogy of the static solution of the text-
books which Turvey wishes to avoid. Hence to avoid the possibility 
of stationary solutions it is essential that time, t, explicitly 
affects the costs and benefits of the exercise and this can only 
be achieved by specifically allowing for technical progress 1.n 
calculating costs. 
(v) THE DYNAMIC !1ARGINAL COST PROBLEM 
Only the essential economics of the problem is presented 
in chapter IX above and the mathematical background is set out here. 
· The problem as stated in chapter IX is: 
m1.n1.m1.ze C = / 00 
0 
I l -it l__:(t) u(t) + r(X, t) _ e dt 
. 
such that u(t) = Q(t), u(t) ~ o 
x(t) ~ Q(t) 
x(o) = z 
:;l.lfl 
In this case the basic differential equation of the system 
is simply u(t) ~ Q(t) and u(t) is constrained not to be negative. The 
problem is not autonomous, since both running and capacity cost vary 
with time. 
This is an optimal control problem with infinite horizon and 
constraints on the state variable X (t). To solve, set up a 
Hamiltonian function 
H (X,u,t,p) = -it -e {cc t) u ( t) + r (X, t) 7 + p ( t) u ( t) 
and a Lagrangian function 
L (X,u,t,p, ) = H (X,u,t,p) + Ae-it (Q- X) 
(Note, the minus sign appears before the cost terms because 
the problem is one of minimization.) 
Now apply the conditions of the optimal control theorems, 
beginning with the maximization of H(X,u,t,p) with respect to u(t). 
This requires 
0 
If aH/3u = o there is an interior solution with u(t) ? o and 
if aH/au ·< o, then the solution requires u(t) = o 
aH -it 
au - -c(t)e + p(t) 
Thus u(t) switches from zero to positive according to whether 
-it 
c(t)e exceeds or equals p(t). To determine p(t) we use the 
differential equation condition 
i.e. 
p(t) = ()L 
aQ(t) 
= A(t)e-it 
and integrating 
p(t) = frn A(y)e-iy dy 
t 
where y is the dummy variable of integration. 
when 
-it rn ).(y)e-iy c(t)e = f dy 
t 
and u(t) = o when 
-it rn ).(y)e-iy dy c(t)e > f 
t 
Hence u(t) ~s positive 
These are the investment rules presented in the text. u(t) 
will switch from positive to zero and back again according to which of 
these conditions holds at each point of time. 
i 
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PART III 
ESTIMATING THE DEMAND FOR 
ELECTRICITY 
I~ 
.CHAPTER X 
THE RESIDENTIAL DEMAND FOR ELECTRICITY AT THE STATE LEVEL 
INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of the next three chapters is to investigate the 
demand for electricity in the residential sector by·fitting demand 
equations both nationally and at the state level. The residential 
' 
sector is simply defined as those consumers who are metered on domestic I 
!.' 
or residential tariffs as opp~sed to those metered on commercial and 
industrial tariffs. This categorisation is well defined today though 
in the immediate post-war period some consumers were put into 
"unclassified" categories because they were metered on special forms 
of tariff. This problem however had effectively disappeared by the 
beginning of the longest of the sample periods used here, June 1953. 
It is a reasonable approach to consider the residential demand 
for electricity separately from industrial and commercial demands, for 
two chief reasons. Firstly the utilities themselves consider these 
demands as entirely separate and approach the forecasting problems of 
each in different ways. Secondly the development of demand theory has 
distinguished between consumer demand for final products and producer 
demand for intermediate goods. Consequently the application of 
consumer demand models will proceed much more readily in the case of 
residential electricity demand. 
One logical way to carry out the investigation of residential 
electricity demand in a country like Australia would be as follows. 
Beginning at the State level, the level at which most electricity 
consumption data is collected and published, one can attempt to fit 
the conventional models o£ demand analysis, extending these wherever 
possible in the directions especially applicable to energy demand. 
Sooner or later, however, one is faced with two serious problems. 
Firstly, conventional models of energy demand skirt around the problem 
of relating that demand to the demand for the appliances which are 
complementary to the use of any given fuel. It becomes apparent that 
one must bring into the analysis of electricity demand some consideration 
of the factors influencing consumer durable demand in a manner.more 
d . h h f d . h 1. 1 1rect t an as so ar appeare 1n t e 1terature • Consequently, ~he 
number of explanatory variables that can be used in explaining 
electricity demand rises considerably when explicit recognition 1s taken 
of the complementary demand for consumer durables. 
The second problem is that, at the State level, the sample 
period 1s relatively short. Effective classification of residential 
demand begins in some States (e.g. Victoria and N.S.W.) in the early SO's 
and is not adopted by others (e.g. Queensland) till the early 60's. As 
a result the samples using annually collected data can have at the most 
about 19 observations and frequently less. Both these problems - the 
large number of explanatory variables and the small sample size at the 
State level - mean that one must eventually turn towards estimating a 
national demand equation using pooled samples of cross section and time 
series data. This effectively solves the degrees of freedom problem that 
especially arises when one wants to take explicit account of the demand for 
'I 
i 
;' 
i i 
consumer durables. The sample sLze used Ln the national equations 
is greater than those used in most of the well-known macroeconometric 
models in use in Australia. However, it does mean that another data 
problem has to be faced, that of non-homogeneity of subsets of the 
sample when it is pooled from time series and cross section observations. 
It will be seen below how this part of the study is tackled. To sum 
up therefore, the investigation begins with time series equations at the 
State level, which are of prime interest to the suppliers of electricity, 
and when the degrees of freedom problem becomes apparent, moves over to 
pooled sample equations at the national level. Other aspects of the 
data problems will become clear as the study proceeds. 
PRIOR CONSIDERATIONS 
Before we can commence the estimation of the demand equations 
the prLor question of the structure of the economic model we are looking 
at has to be considered. The outs~anding prior consideration in setting 
up demand equations is of course the problem that arLses from the 
possibility that the fitted equation may be a linear combination of a 
demand equation and a supply response. However, consideration of the 
institutional characteristics of the economic setting can often overcome 
this and this has been particularly shown to be the case with energy 
demands and supplies. 
Almost every form of energy production is highly capital-
intensive and none more so than electricity production. As a result 
there are very long lags in the response of supply to any new developments 
in demand characteristics, once a given generating system has been 
installed. 
': 
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It i~ important here to distinguish between instantaneous 
load manipulation and overall load growth. If we investigate the 
demand for electricity as it develops during one 24 hour period we can 
se.e supply responding virtually instantaneously, as the unit of output 
is an additional kWh of already-installed generating capacity up to the 
point of effective full capacity beyond which "load shedding" begins. 
In this case supply response to demand is all important and a form of 
price rationing mechanism between supply and demand must be explicitly 
used. Hence a simultaneous equations model was used in chapter IV's 
treatment of peak load pricing. However if we investigate, as we are 
doing here, the annual growth of demand in some particular sector, the 
responsiveness of supply is completely different. The unit of supply 
is now an extra amount of generating capacity and the provision of 
additional generating capacity requires very long gestation periods. 
For instance, 1n the Victorian State Electricity Commission an example 
of a new unit of supply is the additional power station project at 
Newport which was authorized in 1971 and is expected to be complete in 
all stages (1st and 2nd generating units) by 19782 • Smaller units of 
supply could be adopted but their effective responsiveness to demand 
developments 1s very lagged. This factor makes it essential, in 
annual demand studies, to consider the sort of model that is illustrated 
by the following. elementary example 
Qt = a pt + ut .......... (1) 
pt = b st + vt .......... (2) 
i=n 
st = E c. Q~-i + wt .......... (3) i=l ~ 
Here, Qt is consumption at time t, Pt is pr~ce at time t, St is 
installed generating capacity at time t, and ut,vt and wt are random 
disturbance terms. This model states that current consumption depends 
on a set of prices that are fixed in the current period (equation (1)). 
This is a simple representation of the no-bargaining position between 
electricity utilities and consumers. The utility sets a block of 
tariffs which, for current consumption, the consumer must take as given. 
This set of tariffs will usually reflect marginal costs of producing 
electricity from currently installed generating capacity and will 
usually include some rationing charge for peak-load demands. For the 
individual residential consumer there is no possibility of bargaining 
or haggling over this tariff and in large measure this applies to 
industrial and commercial consumers as well. Although the latter have 
the possibility of negotiating "interruptible" supply contracts, whereby 
at times of system peak demand their supplies are cut off and they 
automatically switch to a standby fuel, (usually oil or gas) for which 
they receive tariff discounts, nevertheless this possibility cannot be 
regarded, at least in Australia, as providing an opportunity for large 
scale bargaining over current tariffs 3 • 
i' 
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Turn~ng now to the second and.third equations, these show that 
the tariff structure is usually set up on the basis of the costs of 
existing generating capacity, which will usually have a fairly high 
average age given the highly capital intensive nature of electricity 
production. Even if a new unit of output was coming on stream each 
year, current tariffs can at most be based on a supply capacity that 
is at least one year old. Equation (2) reflects this formulation of 
price determination. Equation (3) then shows that currently installed 
generating capacity will be some (perhaps complex) function of past 
consumption. The only currently dated variable that might enter the 
right hand side of equation (3) is a forecast of current consumption 
Qt made from previous consumption data. However actual current consumption 
cannot influence current generating capacity. Hence equations (1), (2) 
and (3) reflect two outstanding characteristics of electricity demand and 
supply: the lack of bargaining over current tariffs and the lag in the 
responsiveness to consumption changes. 
The third equation contains only predetermined variables on the 
right hand side and hence can be separated from the model. So that 
eqqations (1) and (2) can now be rewritten in the familiar structural 
form: 
pt 
[_: : -:] vt Qt = 
st 
ut 
'"'111111111 
and the matrix,of coefficients of the jointly dependent variables, 
Pt and Qt is therefore triangular. If we assume in addition that the 
random disturbances operating on current demand, ut, are independent 
of the random disturbances, vt, operating on the pricing of supply from 
existing capacity, then the matrix of variances and co-variances of the 
disturbances: 
1.s diagonal. 
_j 
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As a result of these manipulations, the simple model set up to reflect 
the leading characteristics of electricity supply and demand is apparently 
recursive and hence both equations are just identified (each equation is 
equivalent to a reduced form equation). Hare importantly, ordinary least 
squares provides unbiased estimates of the structural coefficients. 
The models we consider in representing this demand for electricity 
are more complex than the·equations above illustrate. Nevertheless the 
institutional characteristics shown above remain one of the most obvious 
explanatory variables in the demand equation, price, is exogeneous in 
the current time period for almost all consumers and the responsiveness of 
supply is very lagged - with lags at least as great and probably greater 
than the period between annual observations. 
To sum up these considerations pr1or to estimation: economic 
models of electricity demand must pay attention to the fact that price 
is exogenous in the demand equation and current supply is not responsive 
to price. Accepting this means we can sensibly use ordinary least 
squares as an estimation technique and at the same time be sure we are 
estimating true demand relationships and not linear combinations of 
demand and supply responses. 
DATA ON ELECTRICiri IN AUSTRALIA 
All the electricity data in this chapter are obtained from 
annual reports of the Electricity Supply Association of Australia. These 
publish figures on consumption of electricity in each State by summing 
the sales of individual utilities within each State. However, the data 
exclude sales in the Australian Capital Territory and the Northern 
Territory (ACT and NT) as these are not consistently reported over the 
sample periods considered. Furthermore, not all States report their 
data on the same basis, and this has had some relevance for the choice 
of sample period. 
Consistent reporting of electricity consumption ~n each state 
begins in the early 1950's and therefore the starting period of 
observations is the year July 1st 1953 to June 30th 1954. All data 
are reported ~n terms of the financial year, which, unfortunately, is 
a poor choice of observation period for energy data. Given Australian 
geographical conditions, the time of maximum energy demand often falls 
just at the point when one observation period ends and another begins. 
This has the effect of taking, say, a random weather disturbance and 
distributing it equally over two successive consumption observations, 
thereby reducing the variance of the data on consumption. For example 
suppose the months of June and July are particularly cold one year; 
electricity co~sumption should show a p-articularly large deviation 
above trend. However this deviation is split so that part falls into 
the observation period ending June 30th and part in the observation 
period beginning July 1st and the data only reveal two small successive 
deviations above trend. The overall variance of the data is reduced, 
though the movement of successive deviations in the same direction 
introduces an element of serial correlation into the regressions. 
Since in the regressions at the state level weather is treated as a 
random disturbance, this may affect the interpretation of some of the 
results. There is some evidence, in the form of the Durbin-Watson 
statistic, that this may be occurring, though not seriously and not 
especially in the warmer states where it might be expected. 
New South Wales, Victoria and South Australia have the longest 
history of publication of data separately on residential and industrial 
electricity consumption, yielding 18 annual observations in each State 
over the period 1953-54 to 1970-71. West Australia comes next with 17 
annual observations and then Tasmania, the most important state ~n terms 
of electricity consumption per head, with 16 annual observations. 
Queensland has only published separate estimates of residential and 
industrial sales since the early 1960's and gives only 8 annual 
observations. Some idea of the relative intensity of electricity use 
in each state is given by the following table. 
Table X 1. Average residential electricity consumption 
per head: 1962-3 to 1970-1 (KWhr) 
NSW VIC QSLD SA WA TAS 
1140.4 905.6 884.2 1034.6 627.6 1886.7. 
The well-known aspects of received demand and utility theory 
are of course expressed in terms of the behaviour of the individual 
consumer, and for this reason demand equations are conventionally 
expressed in per capita terms, at least for consumers. Of course 
this only scratches the surface of the aggregation problem and, in 
particular, expressing demand data 1n per capita terms involves giving 
equal weight to the behaviour of each customer. To the extent that 
this is a violation of true behaviour patterns, we must regard the 
unweighted average of electricity consumption as a biased estimate of 
the true weighted average. There are additional reasons however for 
using per capita data. Clearly population need not then be included 
as a separate explanatory variable; thereby removing a possible source 
of multi-collinearity although there are models that have been used in 
per capita terms where population has been called on to provide 
explicit explanation of economic phenomena4 • In addition it has been 
pointed out (Houthakker and Taylor (1970)) that demand equations 
regressed in per capita terms often show greater stability in the 
estimated relationships than aggregated demand equations. Bearing 
these considerations in mind, consumption income and durable stocks data 
are expressed 1n per capita terms. 
; . 
Besides electricity consumption, the other important 
electricity variable is price, and several comments are ~n order on the 
use of this variable. Electricity is normally sold on some sort of 
two-part tariff involving a standing charge to recover capacity costs 
by appropriating some of the consumer surplus from electricity usage 
and a running charge, to reflect the cost of the marginal kWhr. 
Hputhakker has pointed out5 that at the margin choices of whether or 
not to take on extra electricity consumption will be sensitive to the 
running charge but not the energy charge. Ideally we should like an 
index of marginal electricity· price to residential consumers at the state 
level. At the time when this demand study was carried out this was 
· not available and enqu~r~es to the Department of National Development 
on this matter reveal t~at even there average revenue ~s the only usable 
estimate of electricity price. Hence this is the estimator used, and 
it should be borne in mind that it contains an element (the energy 
charge) which does not apparently influence the demand for electricity 
at the margin. On the other hand it could be argued that the standing 
charge is an important factor in determining whether new consumers adopt 
6 
electricity as a source of energy at all • However this may no longer 
be a very relevant choice for many consumers except in some rural areas7• 
Unfortunately this is not the only load that the average 
revenue data has to bear. For reasons which are apparently confidential, 
no data is available on gas sales or prices at the state level in most 
states of Australia. The policy of the National Gas Association was 
that all such data after 1961 was not to be generally available at the 
time of writing. As a result the competitive influences of gas sales 
can only be revealed in our analysis by absorbing them into electricity 
prices, as the following example illus~~ates. Suppose there is a 
reduction in the price of electricity and a simultaneous rise Ln the 
price of gas, then any rise in electricity consureption will be due to 
a combination of the two but in the fitted equations will be 
apparently all due to the fall in electricity price. Hence the 
apparent own-price elasticity of electricity demand will be over-
estimated. Of course this effect will not be so serious if gas prices 
and electricity prLces move Ln step in the same direction. Certainly 
electricity prices have fallen steadily in every State over the period 
of the 1950's and 1960's. With gas prices we cannot be certain what 
has happened except to say that the recent introduction of natural gas 
in some states had definitely resulted in falling gas prices. These 
points should be borne in mind when we consider the work done by the 
electricity price variable. 
OTHER VARIABLES 
All the variables expressed Ln monetary terms are deflated by 
the consumer price index operating in the capital city of the state in 
question. The income variable used is personal income per capita 
deflated by the consumer prLce index, and modified to exclude the 
influence of the ACT and NT. All the data apart from the electricity 
figures are published by the Commonwealth Statistician. 
variables are introduced they will be discussed. 
As more complex 
--~""~ 
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STATIC DEHAND MODELS 
As we saw above, the data are used in terms of the "average" 
or "representative" consumer at the State level. In accepted utility 
theory, an individual consumer maximizes his utility flow from the 
amounts of goods he consumes subject to a restraint on his income or 
wealth. The equilibrium conditions of the consumer's behaviour then 
allow us to solve for the demand schedule for the jth good in the utility 
function as: 
Q. 
J 
= f (P~ 1. p' Y) n' • • • • • • • • • • ( 4) 
, 
where Qj is the demand for the jth good, Pi P' are the prices of 
n 
all the goods entering the utility function andY is the consumer's 
income or wealth. In econometric studies we normally adopt a numeraire 
with which to measure relative prices of goods and a convenient numeraire 
is a weighted average of all prices: then P. where 
J 
P. 
J 
n 
= P~/'f. w.P~ J • 1. 1. 1. 
(and where the denominator is a weighted 
average price index) 
is a convenient measure of the relative price of the jth good that 
removes some of the necessity for having pr1.ces of substitutes 1.n the 
demand equation. Thus the usual fitted demand equation is: 
Q. = f (P., Y) 
J J 
• • • • • • • • • • (5) 
Eqt!ation (5) can be fitted in. ·several forms but two of the 
most convenient are the linear form (6) and the double logarithmic 
form (7). 
Q. 
J 
= 
Q. 
J 
= 
a + bP. + cY 
J 
b yC aP. 
J 
• • • • • • • • • • ( 6) 
• • • • • • • • • • (7) 
Equation (6) is the. obvious form for regression purposes but 
has the drawback that the own-price elasticity can be anywhere in the 
interval (- oo, o), and usually some convention has to be adopted about 
where to measure the elasticity. In computational terms, the most 
convenient point is at the respective means of each variable. Equation 
(7) has proved more convenient for many demand studies because the 
regression coefficients in the logarithmic version, (8), are estimates 
of the respective demand elasticities: 
lnQ. = ln a+ b ln P. + c ln Y 
J J 
• • • • • • • • • • (8) 
Both types of formulation are used here, although each implies 
different assumptions about the distribution of the random disturbances. 
In essence this is a static model of electricity demand, since 
·it considers electricity as a final good with no important complements. 
In particular it leaves out of consideration the relationship between 
the demand for electricity and the demand for consumer durables for which 
electricity is an input. However, this purely static model is a 
' I 
I. 
convenient start.ing point for the analysis, s~nce some economists feel 
it reflects what might be called the "short run" demand for electricity; 
~n other words the demand that would appear if all holdings of consumer 
durable stocks were held constant8 • 
Tables X 2 and X 3 report the results from fitting equations 
(6) and (8) to electricity consumption per head in the six Australian 
states. Table X(2) gives the elasticities for the linear model 
computed at the means and table X(3) gives the estimates of the constant 
elasticity demand equation; (in other words the actual regression 
coefficients from equation (8)). 
As it turns out this naive model appears to fit the date quite 
well on the conventional criteria. For the linear version 11 out of 
the 12 regression coefficients have the expected a priori sign and for 
the double log-version 10 of the 12 coefficients have the right sign. 
As might be expected personal income appears to be an important 
determinant of electricity consumption but at the same time there appears 
to be some inconsistency between the two sets of estimates. In the 
linear version the estimated income elasticity appears to be greater 
than one in every state except Queensland (where it is 0.98). This 
suggests that electricity demand is rather sensitive to income changes. 
If we accept this, it is clear that some intervening mechanism must be 
operating since it ~s hard to imagine a consumer raising his electricity 
consumption when his income rises without first buying some new· form of 
consumer durable. Usage of already owned durables will not be 
particularly sensitive to income changes. Clearly then the linear 
version suggests the necessity of examining the link with the demand for 
durables. In this context the logarithmic version of the simple static 
model makes more sense, although the results do not appear to be as good 
I 
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The column labelled D.W. reports the Durbin Watson Statistic. 
Table X 2. Static demand model: Linear version 
STATE PRICE ELASTICITY INCOME ELASTICITY R2 s D.W. 
NSW -0. 97~'<* 1. 32** 0.98 1574.6 2.03 
VIC -1. 51** 1.14** 0.98 1365.6 1.34 
QSLD -1.22** 1.12)'<* 0.97 1067.9 1. 36 
SA -1. 28** 0.98** 0.99 1282.2 0.99 
WA -0.69** 1. 47** 0.98 688.3 1.27 
TAS 0.3 1.12** 0.88 12321.3 1.47 
note: ** denotes that the corresponding regression coefficient is 
at least twice its standard error and * denotes that the 
coefficient is greater than its standard error. 
Table X 3. Static demand model: Double log version 
. 
STATE PRICE ELASTICITY INCOME ELASTICITY R2 s D.W. 
NSW -1.62 (0. 43) 0.76 (0.43) 0.96 0.0069 1.00 
VIC -2.58 (0. 42) 0.45 (0. 32) 0.96 0.0046 1.09 
QSLD -1.42 (0.35) 0.97 (0. 32) 0.97 0.0015 1.31 
SA -2.28 (0.15) -0.45 (0. 23) 0.99 0.0016 o. 90 
WA -1.64 (0.18) 0.48 (0.20) 0.99 0.0027 2.12 
TAS 0.38 (0.48) 1.125 (0.15) 0.85 0.0053 1. 32 
note: figures in brackets after elasticity estimates are the 
standard errors. 
as those of the linear model. In the logarithmic version only 
Tasmania shows' an income elasticity greater than one. Apart from the 
odd result for South Australia, the other states show income 
elasticities lying between 0.45 and 0.76 which perhaps makes more a 
priori sense if the simple static model is to be regarded as a 
reasonable representation of true behaviour patterns. 
Turning now to the price variable, the evidence seems to point 
to a highly competitive structure in the residential energy market. 
Leaving aside Tasmania where price seems to have no influence, the price 
coefficients are everywhere greater than twice their standard errors, 
and the estimated price elasticity is greater than one in 8 out of the 
10 remaining cases. vfuile electricity consumption has grown over the 
period studied, electricity tariffs have been falling, presumably for 
at least two reasons: technical progress in electricity generation and 
competition from gas, especially natural gas. Clearly the price 
elasticity estimates here are picking up a great deal of these competitive 
influences and we should recall at this point the comments made earlier 
about the absorbtion of gas price influences into own-price elasticities. 
If the demand for electricity is really as price sensitive as these 
estimates seem to indicate then, clearly, the tariff-setting policies 
of the electricity utilities are going to be fairly importan~ in social 
welfare terms. The exception to these results ~s of course Tasmania, 
a state with a long history of electricity usage because of the low cost 
supply of hydroelectrical power. The demand and supply situation in 
Tasmania can be expected to be very different from that obtained in 
other states ~n Australia for several reasons .• Firstly there is little 
competition, at least in the residential sector, from other forms of fuel 
so that the opportunities for consumers to substitute between different 
types of energy is very limited. Secondly, opportunities for technical 
progress in hydroelectricity generation may not be as plentiful as in the 
generation of electricity as a secondary form of errergy, so that there 
may have been less opportunity for tariff reductions in Tasmania. 
We may sum up this section by saying that wnile the na1ve model 
fits quite well, it suggests that we might profitably look at "longer run" 
formulations. 
DEMAND MODELS HITH TIME TRENDS 
The point has been made several times (and was emphasised by the 
above results) that the demand for electricity has to be related to the 
demand for electricity using consumer durables. He may hypothesise that 
a consumer will demand a certain flow of services from different durables 
and his demand for this flow of services '·Jill determine demand for 
electricity to use as an input in producing the services from.his consumer 
durables. This section and those following attempt to apply this type 
of hypothesis to the demand for electricity, beginning with a very simple 
model, though one heavily relied on in the past, 9 and extending it to 
include more complex explanatory influences. 
If we let Wt be the individual consumer's holdings of a stock of 
electricity-using durables then his demand for electricity could be 
written as: 
= •••••••o•• (9) 
where kt is ra~e of appliance utilization at time t. The obvious 
determinants of kt might then be the sort of economic variables we 
have been consideri:1g so far. Thus we may hypothesize: 
= • • • • • • • • • • (10) 
so that the demand schedule for electricity becomes: 
= 
. b c 
aPt Y W t t • • • • • • • • • • (11) 
One implication of this precise formulation is that the elasticity of 
electricity demand with respect to durable stocks is one: a 1% r1se in 
durable stocks calls forth a 1% rise in electricity demand, when price 
and income remain constant. This point can be reconsidered when we 
examine our regression estimates. 
If equation (11) is to be used as our demand model we either 
require direct observations on consumer durable stocks or some form of 
equation to determineWt. In our case we have to rely on the latter, 
although, in any case, data on holdings of durables has been notoriously 
deficient wherever it has been used. 
There have been several noteworthy attempts to derive 
equations for variables like Wt' usually based on some kind of trend 
curve incorporating a saturation point. As a working approximation to 
a more sophisticated growth curve we could hypothesize the simple 
exponential: 
J..(o3 
(12) 
where r is the instantaneous rate of growth of electricity-using 
consumer durables. Combining equations (11) and (12) and writing 
aW as B we have: 
0 
= . . ......... . (13) 
and this simple model.then incorporates into the demand for electricity 
some allowance for the demand for the services of a stock of consumer 
durables. Rewriting in the form of natural logarithms gives our 
regression equation: 
ln Qt = ln B + b ln Pt + c ln Yt + rt (14) 
so that aga1.n regression coefficients are estimates of elasticities and 
the coefficient on the time trend is an estimate of the rate·of growth 
of electricity using durables. Table X 4 presents the results for 
fitting this model to the sample periods described above. (For 
computational reasons the model was actually fitted in first difference 
terms: so that r was estimated as the intercept term. This has the 
effect of removing some serial correlation from the residuals.) 
Table X 4. Demand model with time trend. 
STATE PRICE ELASTICITY INCOME ELASTICITY r% 
NSW -0.20 0.10 6.45 
. (0. 20) (0.28) (1. 28) 
. 
VIC -0.20 0.17 5.64 
(0. 31) (0.26) (1. 26) 
QSLD -0.27 -0.07 5.85 
(0. 24) (0.19) (1. 25) 
SA -1.08 0.07 3.14 
(0. 34) (0.15) (1.45) 
WA -0.92 0.03 4.63 
(0.09) (0.16) (0.88) 
TAS -0 .. 49 -0.10 4.13 
(0.20) (0.12) (0. 73) 
note: figures in brackets are standard errors. 
It was pointed out above that a rise 1n income would probably 
not induce an individual consumer to raise his utilization of already 
owned durables but might encourage him to buy new durables and thereby 
raise his derived demand for electricity as an input. This seems to 
be borne out by the results here. The estimated income elasticity 
drops considerably (its highest value is now 0.17, in Victoria) and 
income does not appear to be a significant determinant of electricity 
demand in any State at all, since none of the income elasticities exceeds 
its standard error. It might be argued therefore that the use of a time 
trend to represent durable-related demand for electricity has been so 
important that it has completely driven out the influence of the 1ncome 
variable. This certainly seems to suggest that hypotheses that 
include assumptions abot;t the influence of durable goods on electric"ity 
demand are more powerful than, say, the static demand model used 
previously. 
It would appear also that in the static model the downward 
trend of relative electricity prices was picking up some of this 
"durables" effect. Electricity price still seems to have an important 
influence on electricity demand since 4 out of the 6 pr1ce elasticities 
exceed their standard errors, but the sensitivity to price changes has 
been considerably reduced with, now, only one elasticity being greater 
than 1. Interestingly enough, incorporating the rough measure of 
durables demand has made pr1ce more influential in Tasmania's equation, 
where the elasticity now has the expected negative sign and 1s more than 
twice its standard error. 
In every case, the exponential trend reflecting holdings of 
durables is highly significant. It is not however easy to compare the 
different estimates of r, the rate of growth of durables holdings, 
between different States, because, as was explained above, the sample 
periods used differ significantly
0
between different states. We can 
however compare the three states with the longest sample period, Netv 
South Wales, Victoria, and South Australia. The first two show 
relatively high growth rates of durable holdings per capita over the 
1950's and 1960's, of 6.45% and 5.64% respectively, while South Australia 
has barely more than half these rates at 3.14%. It would seem clear 
that some (probably social) influences were at work in South Australia 
to differentiate it from its eastern neighbours, and several hypotheses 
may be put forward about these. However, more light may be shed on 
this feature if we can compare this model across all States. To do 
this means sacrificing many degrees of freedom to bring each State's 
sample period down to that of Queensland, which is 1962-3 to 1970-1. 
The results of these regressions are compared in Table X 5. Along with 
these results are the results from fitting the static model in its 
logarithmic version over the same sample period so that the effect of 
including a trend for durables holdings may be observed. 
It now becomes apparent that South Australia rather than 
Tasmania is the "odd man out" in electricity demand over the 1960's. 
Leaving South Australia on one side, we may discuss the other results 
first. The income effect of course becomes noticeably less important 
when the static model is extended to become the trend model to allow for 
the influence of consumer durables. Income ·elasticities are conside·rably 
I 
Table X 5. Static Demand Model and demand model with time 
trend; common sample period 1962-3 to 1970-1. 
STATE PRICE ELASTICITIES I INCOME ELASTICITIES r% 
-
STATIC I TREND STATIC I TREND TREND HODEL 
NSW -0.99 I 0.43 0.76 I 0.38. 6.53 
(0.31) I (0. 37) (0. 30) I (0.16) (1. 42) 
I 
I I 
VIC -0.90 I 0.39 1.03 I 0.40 4.88 
(0.80) I (0.34)' (0.52) I (0. 25) (1.28) 
QSLD -1.42 I -0.27 0.97 I -0.07 5.85 
(0.35) I (0. 24) (0.32) I (0.19) (1. 25) 
I I 
I 
SA -1.53 I -1.46 0.14 I 0.26 -0.38 
(0.13) I (0. 67) (0.16) I (0.25) (3.2) ' 
WA -1.34 I 0.26 0.68 I 0.08 9.6 I ·. I (0. 71) (0.42) (0. 65) (0. 21) (1. 9) I I 
TAS -1.34 I -1.18 0.25 I -0.19 2.40 
(0. 37) I (0. 26) (0.19) I (0.16) (1.10) 
reduced, go~ng from positive to negative ~n the cases of Queensland and 
Tasmania, and also lose some statistical significance when compared 
with their standard errors. Only in the case of South Australia does 
the income elasticity ~ncrease. The effect of introducing the trend 
variable also reduces the effect of falling electricity pr~ces over the 
sample period. In the static model own price elasticity is everywhere 
negative and nearly one or greater. When allowance is made for the 
influence of consumer durables, however, the elasticities frequently 
become positive and little different from their standard errors 
suggesting again that price was picking up some reverse trend effect in 
the static model. Nevertheless in Tasmania and South Australia price 
remains an important influence on electricity demand. It would appear 
in the case of Tasmania~ that influen·ces that differentiated consumer 
behaviour from that in other states in the longer s~ple period have 
relatively disappeared in the 1960's. 
The estimates of the rate of growth or per capita consumer 
durable holdings are however the most interesting feature of Table X 5. 
New South Wales, Victoria and Queensland have relatively high growth 
rates of durable holdings. However Western Australia has the out-
standing growth rate of 9.6% suggesting that this State really "took 
off" in terms of personal consumption in the 1960's. The build up of 
mining exploration and consequent settlement and housebuilding has been 
reflected in significant growth of holding of consumer durables. 
Tasmania, on the other hand, still exhibits some of the characteristics 
of a sluggish market with growth of only 2.4%. 
The e~ceptional results are those of South Australia. In 
this State demand becomes more sensitive to income changes after 
allowance is made for the influence of consumer durable holdings, and 
at the same time, price remains just as significant a determinant of 
. 
electricity demand: 1n both models the elasticity is more than twice 
its standard error. Even when the trend is explicitly accounted for, 
own price elasticity in South Australia is relatively high at -1.46, 
suggesting falling tariffs have been very important determinants of 
electricity demand movements over the 1960's. The estimated growth 
rate of durable holdings is the oddest feature of the South Australian 
results since it is negative though small and several times smaller 
·than its standard error. An initial hypothesis to explain these 
results could be that South Australia, like Tasmania is a relatively 
sluggish market. 
We inserted a trend variab.le to pick up the influence of 
durable holdings and at the same time noted that the price variable 
itself exhibited a declining trend over the sample period. It might 
be arguable therefore, that the price and income variables are picking 
up the influence of consumer durables holdings instead of the crude 
representation that apparently \vorks in other states. This suggests 
the necessity of incorporating consumer durable influences on electricity 
demand into our equations in some more sophisticated manner than the 
crude approximations used here, and we turn to this task below. However, 
first of all, a few more comments may be made about the model under 
discussion. In discussing equation (11) above it was pointed out that 
it implies an unit elasticity of electricity demand with respect to 
durable holdings. Suppose however this elasticity was not 1 but, 
~ -~-----------
'J-7o 
plausibly, less than one. Then the estimate of r ~n the fitted 
equations would be biased downwards since it would be ~n fact an 
estimate of (d.r) where d is the elasticity of ele~tricity demand 
with respect to durable holdings. Hence a low elasticity figure, 
d, may account for the estimate of r being not significantly different 
from zero in the case of South Australia. Again, this failure to 
identify a parameter of the model suggests the need for a more complex 
model to pick up the influences we are discussing. 
Finally a point made by Fisher and Kaysen may be recalled. 
They hypothesized that more urbanized states would show greater 
elasticities of income and price in a demand model like this, because 
rural populations would show a greater concentration of major 
electrical appliances in their holdings of electrical durables than 
urban populations because of the opportunity for substitution provided 
by local laundries and supermarket freezers in urbanized communities. 
To a very small extent this is borne out in the data: New 
South Wales and Victoria both show higher income elasticities than 
Queensland, a state less urbanized. 
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l:OTES TO CHAPTER X 
1. The two leading academic investigations of residential energy 
demand that have been published, and to which further references 
are made, are: Fisher and Kaysen (1962) and Balestra (1967). 
2. See the annual report for 1970/71 of the State Electricity 
Commission of Victoria. 
3. In conversation with the marketing department of one of the largest 
Australian utilities (SECV), it was pointed out that "interruptibility" 
facilities are only rarely used in Australia and that effectively all 
customers, residential and industrial, have to take tariffs as given. 
4. Balestra (1967). 
5. Houthakker (1950). 
.--··. 
6. This point is made by Prest (1963). 
7. This study of residential demand forming Chapter X of the thesis was 
completed before the collection and analysis of the detailed tariff 
data reported 1n part I, Chapters II to V. It was felt that it was 
reasonable -to leave it as a self contained analysis. However the 
chapter following (Chapter XI) does make use of the later tariff data 
in analysing demand for electricity, this time in the industrial sector. 
8. Both Fisher and Kaysen (1962) and Balestra (1967) use this model to 
represent short run demand for energy usage. 
9. See Fisher and Kaysen (1962). 
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CHAPTER XI 
STOCK ADJUSTMENT MODELS OF RESIDENTIAL DEMft~D 
INCREASING THE SANPLE SIZE 
It has been obvious in the preceding chapter that the demand 
models used are too crude to make much sense of the electricity demand 
situation especially in its relationship with the demand for consumer 
durables. However these crude models are worth discussing because they 
can be applied at the state level without severe damage to the degrees 
of freedom in their estimation. (Economic models at the individual state 
level are regrettably few in Australia.) Nevertheless we have nm.; come 
· to the point where, in considering more complex models of demand, we are 
compelled to change ove~ to demand equations fitted at the national level 
with pooled data from time series and cross section samples. 
It was especially noticeaole in the case of Tasmania that the 
equations in the previous chapter performed sensibly and could be 
compared well in the period of the 1960's. As a result, the pooled 
sample used from this point on consists of 10 annual observations on each 
State for the period 1962-62 to 1970-71, with the exception of Queensland. 
The sample size is therefore 50 and the observation matrix is X 
X= 
(1) X 
x(2) 
where X(i) is the matrix of 
annual observations in the 
.th 
1- state. 
r·····-
We could have chosen a slightly smaller s~ze of sample and 
included Queensland but it seems to make slightly more sense, in us~ng 
large numbers of variables, to maximize the degrees of freedom. For 
this reason the sample of 50 observations on 5 States over 10 years is 
preferred. 
STOCK ADJUSTMENT 
Since we now have a sample s~ze that is more than adequate, 
an attempt to formulate some relatively more complex models can be 
made. In developing a research strategy to do this it was impossible 
to ignore the body of literature on stock adjustment models. For this 
reason it was decided to experiment with such models as much as possible 
before attempting any other analyses. Stock adjustment models that 
have appeared in the literature are stringent in the requirements put 
on the estimating equation and their main drawback is that they impose 
an all or nothing choice on the investigator. Either the precise form 
fits well or the whole rationale of the model has to be re-thought. 
However their impact has been such that it was essential at least to 
report experiments with them. 
We investigate two closely related stock adjustment models 
here that have been successfully used in studies in the U.S. The first 
model (Houthakker and Taylor (1970)) was developed to be applied to 
every category of consumption demand reported in U.S. Statistics; ~n 
other words it shows the most general assumptions possible about 
consumer behaviour over a whole range of products. The second model, 
(Balestra (1967)) was developed ~n an attempt to apply the Houthakker-
Taylor estimating equation to a particular energy 'market, but 
incorporating a slightly different rationalization of the 
estimating equation. 
Both models rely heavily on special estimation techniques, 
for several reasons. The estimating equation can easily contain 
over-identified parameters when it is extended to include nevJ variables 
and Houthakker and Taylor consequently used an interative estimating 
technique (three pass least squares), to identify the structural 
parameters they were particularly interested in. Balestra, besides 
tackling the identification ~~oblem by iteration, hypothesized that the 
fact that a pooled sample was being used was having an important 
influence on the specification of the error term, and used a two-stage 
procedure to obtain Generalized Least Squares estimators of his 
structural coefficients. The problems involved will become clear as 
we proceed. We begin by outlining the models used. 
The estimating equation finally arrived at looks fairly 
familiar in stock adjustment models: 
(1) 
where Xt is a vector of observations on exogeneous variables at time 
t, and vt is an error term. 
The generalized Houthakker-Taylor model is rationalized in 
these terms 
= + • • • • • (2) 
--- --- ---- -----·---
Equation (2) ~ays demand for a commodity depends on some physical or 
psychological stock, St, and some exogeneous variables, e.g. personal 
income, price etc. St is a very general variable in the model and 
may represent nothing more than the habit-formed level of Qt. In terms 
of fuel demand we would obviously like to interpret it as the habit-
formed level of service flows from a stock of consumer durables. 
In turn 
= (3) 
Or simply the rate of change of the stock variable is new demand less 
depreciation. It is rather difficult to conce1ve of a depreciation of 
psychological stock or habit formation; we can really only conce1ve 
of a gradual shedding of old preferences and an adoption of new ones. 
Thus the drawback of the Houthakker-Taylor model is that it is so 
general that its particular application to any one commodity raises 
conceptual problems. In any case, using (2) and (3) and the fact that 
from (2), 
gives a first order differential equation, which can be approximated 
as a difference equation if we define 
= 
to yield the estimating equation (1)1 • The essence of this model is 
that once a habit-formed psychological stock of consumption has been 
built up we can use the depreciation concept to obtain an estimating 
equation that contains only observable predetermined variables besides 
the observed demand. In our case the obvious exogeneous variables to 
use in equation (1) are price and income so that our estimating equation 
is: 
y + as y 1 + u t t-:- t (4) 
The work of Balestra (1967) tries to apply this general 
equation to the fuel market using a more sensible rationalization, which 
proceeds as follows, (see also Balestra and Nerlove, 1966). 
The starting point 1s to relate the demand for energy (E ) to 
t 
the stock of appliances (St) by some utilization rate (k) 
If r of these appliances wear out each year then (1-r)St-l is the 
stock of appliances available in year t to require fuel demand of 
k(l-r)S 1 t-
In period t however, actual fuel demand will not only include this 
demand level but also any new demand that has arisen over the period 
(5) 
(6) 
(t-1 to t). Actual fuel demand will be given by equation (5) so that 
the new fuel demand will be 
k(l-r)St-l • • • • • • • • • • (7) 
Substituting this equation into equation (6) 
+ rE 1 t- • • • • • • • • • • (9) 
Thus we started with the notion of relating demand to a stock 
of appliances and have arrived at a relationship between new demand and 
demand levels previously established, in the process eliminating the 
level of appliance stocks. There will be a similar relationship for 
each particular form of energy used, including electricity 
+ .. • • • • • • • • • (10) 
where rQ is the depreciation rate of electricity using appliances. 
It now remains to set up the behaviour patterns determining 
demand, and to relate these to the identities we have just established. 
The Balestra model is quite simple in this respect: ,.·. 
new electricity demand is determined by new energy demand and the price 
of electricity 
= • • • • • • • • • • (11) 
and actual energy demand depends on a vector of exogeneous variables, Xt 
= • • • • • • • • • • ( 12) 
Then,combining equations (9), (10), (11), and (12) we 
b . h . . . 2 o ta~n t e est~mat~ng equat~on 
• • • • • (13) 
where vt ~s an error term. 
The only difference between (13) and (4) is that own price 
does not enter with a lag. Now, Balestra hypothesizes that 
the main element in the vector of exogeneous variables will be personal 
income accompanied perhaps by population. Hence the estimating 
equation will be 
• • • • • (14) 
To sum up the form of stock adjustment model used, .the 
equations fitted are: two forms of the Houthakker-Taylor equation (4), 
with price and without price, and the Balestra and Nerlove equation (14). 
The important question now ~s what do the regression estimates 
tell us about the underlying stock adjustment model? If in particular, 
we adopt the Balestra rationalization of the stock adjustment 
equation, we can begin to obtain estimates of the depreciation rates of 
electrical appliances in particular and of household energy using 
appliances ~n general. 
THE SAHPLE 
It has already been pointed out that the data consist of a 
pooled sample of cross section and time series observations, and there 
is a possibility of problems of non-homogeneity of the data ar~s~ng. 
Characteristics of electricity demand in a state like Western Australia 
can be expected to differ from those of a state like Tasmania. Almost 
certainly if there are interstate differences they will be largely 
related to differing weather patterns. These weather patterns may cause 
demand in one state to differ by a given level from demand in another 
state. 
There are several ways of tackling this situation and two were 
adopted ~n this study. Firstly we could add to the regression equations 
a variable to represent weather trends over the states and the period. 
It may be recalled that in the individual state regressions no weather 
variable was used. The objective wps to investigate the explanatory 
power and plausibility of various elasticity estimates, and nothing was 
lost by considering the randomly distributed weather patterns as 
components of the disturbance term. However in the pooled sample 
approach it becomes advisable to recognize that explicit recognition 
of the weather variable may be necessary. The weather variable used 
is mean maximum temperature observed in the period July 1st to June 
30th in each state in each year calculated from monthly data provided 
by the Commonwealth Meteorological Information Service. 
An alternative strategy for dealing with interstate differences 
is to use a set of state-specific dummy variables. With this approach 
we can investigate whether the regression intercept terms differ 
significantly across states. The procedure for carryLng out such 
tests is described in Johnston (1972). Essentially an analysis of 
co-variance test is carried out to determine whecher the use of 
separate state intercepts adds significantly to the "e:x-planation" 
of the overall varLance. 
The results of these two approaches using a weather variable 
and using state dummies - is discussed in the presentation of the 
results below. 
RESULTS FOR STOCK ADJUSTMENT MODELS 
The first stock adjustment model estimated here is the one 
described by Balestra and derived above as equation (14). The resu.lts 
are first reported without the inclusion of the weather variable: 
= 58.78 + 
(113.35) (0.03) (11. 99) (3.40) (0~ 34) 
0.99 d.f. 45 
The fit of this equation LS not particularly good in terms of 
the standard errors of the coefficients. Recalling the derivation of 
equation (14), we can estimate depreciation coefficients from the 
regression coefficients on Y 1 , ~yt and Q 1• t- t- The implied 
depreciation rate for all fuel using durables is 0.14, which does not 
.18( 
seem unreasonable, though ~s possibly rather high. However, the 
implied depreciation rate for electricity using consumer durables is 
negative at -0.99 which does not make any kind of sense at all. Clearly 
the Qt-l term is picking more effects than it should. 
If we now include State dummy variables to try to pick out 
non-homogeneity over states the equation becomes: 
Q = 52.25 t 
(275.58) 
+ 0.92Qt-l 
(0.14) .. 
-34.2l(DVIC) -5.72(DSA) 
R2 = 0.99 
+ 16.06LW t 
(15.01) 
-24.30(DWA) 
+ 
(17.05) 
.72.39(DTAS) 
d.£. = 41 
- 0.37Pt 
(0. 70) 
Where (DVIC), (DSA), (DWA), and (DTAS) are dummy variables for 
the states of Victoria, South Australia, West Australia and Tasmania. 
The depreciation rates have now reversed. The plausible estimate is 
that for electricity using durables, 0.08, but the depreciation rate for 
all fuel using durables is 0.69 which ~s improbably high. The other 
interesting coefficient ~n this model is that of long run pr~ce elasticity 
which can be estimated from the equations as: 
model without dummies: -0.04 
model with dummies -0.06 
Clearly the stock adjustment model suggests electricity demand 
is much less price sensitive than the naive models used earlier. When 
. the naive model using price and income as the only independent variables. 
·I 
is run for the,pooled sample with state dummies, the estimated price 
elasticity is -0.21. 
The use of the ~tate dummies had the effect of making the 
estimates of the underlying structural coefficients slightly.more 
plausible but it did not clearly improve the overall fit. The latter 
can be tested as was said above on an analysis of variance test. The 
reduction in unexplained variance by assuming different intercepts 
yields a calculated F value of 0.45 when compared with the regression 
that does not have different "intercepts. On comparison with the 
tabulated F distribution, the hypothesis that different states have 
different intercepts is rejected. Hence non-homogeneity of the da.ta -
at least on this test -·does not app~ar to be a serious problem. 
The alternative method of allowing for interstate differences 
was by inclusion of a weather variable. The estimated equation with 
Wt· as the weather variable was: 
-63.56 + + + 0.92Yt-l- 0.22Pt + 170.33Wt 
(236.61) (0.04) (12.10) (3.72) (0. 34) (288.53) 
R2 = 0.99 d.f. = 44 
The weather variable is rejected as insignificant so again we 
have not found a difference between states 1n electricity demand. However 
the coefficient on Q 1 remains implausible. t- Recalling that it was 
plausible when state dummies were included (even though these dummies 
were statistically insignificant taken "together), the equation with 
weather and state dummies was tested. The results were: 
Qt = 404.16 + 0.93Qt-l + 13.39~Yt + 10.67Yt-l + 0.32Pt + 504.79\\Tt 
(617 .04) (0.13) (15. 69) (17 .18) (0. 71) (790.25) 
-51.74(DVIC) -9.28(DSA) -10.07(DWA) -20.9(DTAS) 
R2 = 0.99 d.f. = 40 
The depreciation and elasticity coefficients are then 
estimated as: 
depreciation rate 
on all fuel using 
durables 
depreciation rate 
on electrical 
durables 
price elasticity 
of demand 
model 
without 
dummies 
model with 
dummies 
0.07 
0.79 
-0.97 -0~04 
0.07 -0.06 
As might be expected from the negligible effect of weather on 
the overall explanation the results are virtually unchanged, from those 
of the model without the weather variable. 
~ I 
This,suggests one interesting though negative result; weather 
differences between states do not appear to explain the apparent 
differences in responsiveness of electricity demand to changes in 
economic variables. 
The position that we have now reached is that there appears 
to be no significant interstate differences in the sample but only when 
state dummies are present do both the depreciation coefficients show the 
expected positive signs. Consequently a compromise equation was 
adopted. The estimates of rQ - the depreciation rate of electricity 
us1ng durables - was 0.07 in the equation just estimated. If this is 
taken as an estimate of the true rQ we could derive the following 
constrained estimating equation: 
where vt 1s an error term. 
This is equivalent to estimating the basic equation subject 
to the restraint that rQ = 0.07. (See Johnston 1972, pages 155-159.) 
The results of running this equation are: 
without a weather variable: 
= 330.16 + + 0.51 yt-1 1.08 p t 
(64. 22) (12.83) (3.62) (0.17) 
R2 = 0 50 . d.f. = 46 
and with a weather variable: 
Qt- 0.93Qt-i = 459.45 
(122.23) (12.76) (3.89) (0. 26) (235. 88) 
R2 = 0 52 . d.f. = 45 
These results certainly seem to be a substantial improvement, 
~n terms of plausibility of the coefficients and in terms of their 
relationship to their standard errors. 2 (The reported R 's are not 
comparable with those for the unconstrained equations.) 
The implied depreciation coefficients are then: 
electrical durables: 0.07 (a) 0.07 (b) 
all fuel using durables: 0.04 (a) o. 17 (b) 
where (a) refers to the equation without a weather variable and (b) 
refers to the equation with a weather variable. ·since weather has 
made some contribution to the explanation (its regression coefficient 
exceeds its standard error) it seems more sensible to adopt this second 
version of the constrained stock adjustment model. 
It appears from the second equation that pr~ce ~s still an 
important determinant of electricity consumption in the residential 
sector, (the regression coefficient is more than three times its standard 
error); the estimated long run price elasticity of demand is -0.15, 
which does not· seem implausible on a prioti grounds. This elasticity 
estimate suggests hmvever that while price has been significant 1n 
explaining movements in electricity demand, non optimal pricing 
policies that set price in excess of or below marginal cost may not 
have caused very large losses in the consumers' surplus of residential 
electricity consumers. 
Care has been taken in this chapter to investigate fully the 
application of a stock adjustment model to residential demand. Such 
models could not be ignored b~cause they have played a significant part 
in the econometrics of demand. However, it is only with difficulty 
that anything like satisfactory results have been achieved, and it 
therefore seems worthwhile turning attention away from such model forms 
where the particular form of the estimating equation-is of such importance 
to more general models of demand. This is done in the next chapter; we 
take with us the results that interstate differences and the influence of 
different weather patterns are both of negligible significance in 
explaining demand in the residential sector. 
NOTES TO Cllfli>TER XI 
1. Proceed as follows: 
• • • • • • (2) 
• • • • • • (3) 
Then differentiating with respect to time: 
from (2) 
Qt = bSt + eXt • • • • • • (2a) 
and from (3) 
st Qt d lQt- eXt J = - b a - • • • • • • (3a) 
Solving for Qt from (2a) and (3a) 
Qt = (b-d)Qt + ad + cdXt + eXt (3b) 
We now convert to discrete time functions by setting 
Then: 
giving 
Q t = -=--=a_d-::-:-
1-(b-d) 
+ 1 Qt-1 1-(b-d) 
+ c(l+d) t:.Xt 
1-(b-d) 
+ cd 
1-(b-d) 
which simplified is: 
2. The derivation of equation (13) is the following: 
From equation (10) 
* Qt = Qt + (1-rQ) Qt-1 
* . . Qt = bO + b1Pt + b2Et + (1-rQ) Qt-1 from equation (ll) 
Qt = bo + b1Pt + b2 (L\E + rE 1) + (1-rQ) Qt-1 from equation (9) t t-
(12) 
which can be rewritten: 
= 
where vt is an error term; this is equation (13) 
Depreciation coefficients can be identified from the restrictions 
CHAPTER XII 
A GENERALISED MODEL OF RESIDENTIAL DEMAND 
INTRODUCTION 
Not being entirely satisfied with the stock adjustment model 
we discussed the possibility of fitting a more general model of demand. 
One model which has stood the test of time in demand studies 1s the 
partial adjustment model. This would simply relate electricity demand 
to its own past value and a series of exogenous variables which are 
thought to determine the demand for the flow of electricity services 
= f (Qt-1' x2t ••• ) 
This sort of model has a much less specialised form than the 
stock adjustment model previously discussed and allows the researcher to 
experiment substantially with the explanatory variables x1 x2 etc. 
Several experiments of this sort are reported here. However the next 
section - which is in the form of a digression - presents a model of how 
an estimating equation like this could be derived from an explicit 
consideration of the simultaneous determination of the demand for the 
services of a stock of durables and the demand for electricity as an 
input to provide these serv1ces. Such a model seemed to be the essential 
next step from naive demand models and a first attempt at it is found in 
the stock adjustment models of the prev1ous chapter. 
DEI-1AND FOR CONSUHER DURABLE SERVICES 
The model to be discussed here is an attempt to consider 
explicitly the simultaneous determination of the demand for the services 
of a stock of consumer durables (d) and the demand for electricity as an 
input to provide those services. 
We can describe the serv1ces of a stock of durables at the time 
t as c(t) and the utility from those services as u [c(t)] • Since 
durables have usually a significant life the consumer's planning horizon 
will be relatively long, so that his maximand will be the discounted value 
of the utility he desires from his durable holdings: 
JT -rt e u 
0 [c(t)J dt • • • • • • • • ( 1) 
where r is the consumer's rate of discount. However the costs of 
obtaining these flows of services are the expenditure on durables and 
expenditure on electricity input: pdd + pqq. If we assume 'these 
terms reflect completely the cost involved in using his stock of durables 
then the consumer maximizes 
- p d - p q l dt d q - • • • • • • • • (2) 
One restraint on this maximand is the limit to serv1ces which 
a stock of durables can provide when combined with electricity input, 
i.e. the services production function: 
f(c,q,d,) = 0 • • • • • • • • (3) 
Finally, the depreciation of the stock of durables should be 
considered. If h is new purchases of durables then: 
h = d + gd • • • • • • • • ( 4) 
where g is the rate at which durables depreciate. If now equation (2) 
is maximized subject to the restraints embodied in equations (3) and (4) 
(a problem in the calculus of variations) we obtain as one of the 
consumer's equilibrium conditions: 
u' (c) 
Pq 
= 
dq 
de 
. • . . . . . . (5) 
which simply states that the ratio of the marginal utility of services' 
consumption to the price of electricity equals the rate at which 
electricity input increases when services consumption increases. In 
other words the consumer equates the marginal utility form extra 
consumption of services to their marginal cost. 
We may put very general formulations in the functions involved 
here, and two obvious ones are: 
u [c<t[J = 
and: c = 
1 c(t)l-v 
T-v . . . . . . . . ( 6) 
. . . . . • . . ( 7) 
~ 
I 
(6) is simply a constant elasticity of marg~nal utility 
function to represent the consumer's preferences; it has several 
useful properties in consumer theory, e.g. positive but diminishing 
marginal utility of consumption, and constant elasticity of marginal 
utility with respect to additional consumption: 
i.e. u' (c) 
u'(c) + oo as c + 0 
u''(c). c/u = 1/1-v 
(7) is merely the Cobb-Douglas formulation of the serv1ces 
production function. 
us to write (5) as: 
q = 
Using (6) and (7) 1n the above analysis allows 
a 1-v 
c 
. . . . . . . . ( 8) 
where a is the elasticity of output of durable goods services with 
respect to electricity input. 
Using (8) as a model allows us to incorporate the demand for 
the services of durable goods directly into the demand for electricity 
when we interpret c as the usage of or demand for the services of a set 
of consumer durables. We need now an equation to determine c. 
i. 
l 
It can be expected that a variety of social demographic and 
econom~c factors will determine the desired flow of services of a stock 
of consumer durables and quite a degree of experimentation is carried 
out here. If these variables are represented by the vector z1 ••• zn' 
. 
the estimating equation becomes: 
q* 
an+l 
z v 
n 
. . . . . . . . (9) 
where v is some error term, and q* is desired electricity consumption 
rather than actual. This can be used to allow for some lag in the 
operation of maximizing utility, so that 
[ J
w q* 0 
qt-~ = ........ (10) 
Writing pr~mes for logarithms· the estimating equation then becomes 
q' 
t = wa' + walp' + wazz'l 0 qt t 
and this is the equation that is experimented with. 
Each structural coefficient ~s identified as: 
. • • • • . . . (11) 
where ·m. is the ith particular regression coefficient and m 1 is the 1 n+ 
coefficient on q't-l• 
SPECIFYING THE DE~~D FOR ELECTRICITY 
The introduction indicated that a general model to explain 
the demand for electricity as derived from the demand for consumer 
durable services could be formulated. Having seen in the above section 
one way in which such a model might be rationalised, we now return to 
the main theme and consider what variables might be used to eh~lain the 
demand for the services of consumer durables. 
Without attempting a detailed social-psychological approa~h, 
it nevertheless makes sense to include some long term social variables 
that will affect the demand for consumer durables. · As each new 
generation becomes independent, new family units are set up and 
consequently an impetus is given to the demand for consumer durable 
services, especially with the well known tendency for the setting up 
of nuclear rather than extended kinship family units. Hence it makes 
sense to include the variable, marriage registrations (M), to pick out 
this effect. However, new demand for consumer durables often ar1ses 
when an existing family unit moves house and from this point of view 
some measurement of new house ownership is required. The variable 
used here is Completions of All New Homes and Flats (A). Almost 
certainly this will be collinear with M, even when normalized by 
population changes so we may only be able to pick out sensible effects 
from one of these variables. Both of these variables can be expected 
to influence the long term equilibrium ovnership of consumer durables. 
f i 
Before demand reaches this point however, it can be expected 
that economic factors will be influential in determining consumer 
durable demand and hence derived electricity demand. Since we have 
begun to expand on the familiar partial adjustment model by including 
social influences on durable demand, it also makes sense to expand the 
list of likely econom~c influences. Price and income of course are 
obvious candidates. Given the current state of published statistics, 
we are compelled to use instrumental variables in many cases. 
As an instrumental variable for prices of electricity using 
consumer durables the published Price Index of Household Supplies and 
Equipment (PD) is used. 
So far for estimation of income effects studies including 
this one have used current real personal income. Ho~evcr the usefulness 
of a measure of permanent income is well known in applied econometric 
studies and it is used here. The measure is a weighted mov~ng average 
of past incomes with the weights decaying geometrically. 
truncation point, n, current permanent income Yp is: 
t 
yP 1 n 0.1632 = = 
7 
I si Y . t n 
si 
I i=O I i=O t-~ 
i=O 
With a given 
(0.9)~ y . 
t-~ 
when S is chosen as 0.9 and n is chosen as 8. (These parameters 
were suggested by the Reserve Bank of Australia's macro-econometric 
model's consumption equations; see Norton, 1970.) 
However, it is apparent that while permanent ~ncome makes a 
sensible budgetary constraint, it does not exhaust the sources of 
funds for purchase rf durables. Hence as an estimate of additional 
funds available, another variable is used: Instalment Credit balances 
outstanding with Retail Business (RCR). 
Having described the variables used to measure social and 
econom~c influences, it, finally, seems wise to take account of another 
well known factor in consumer durable demand - the demonstration effect. (l) 
The demonstration effect suggests that the desire for services 
of a new durable arises from contact with economic units already owning 
the durable. To use Fisher & Kaysen's analogy the growth of durable 
ownership is like the spread of a contagious disease. For this reason 
we could pay attention to the variable: (stock of consumer durables at 
beginning of period t) as determining the demand for services of 
electricity using durables during period t and hence the derived demand 
for electricity. The closest we can come to an estimate of stocks of 
electrical goods is to build up an estimate of stocks of all durables. 
The method used here ~s that outlined by Stone and Rowe (1957) which is 
briefly described as follows. 
New purchases of consumer durables at time t, Ct, can be 
regarded as the sum of replacement demand and new additions to stock, 
Ut and Vt respectively: 
+ 
If we assume that the amount of stock used up approximates 
declining balance depreciation at a rate of 1/N per period, and if we 
assume a smaller proportion 1/M of new purchases depreciates per period, 
we have 
where St is the stock at the beginning of period t. If we now define 
the stock at the beginning of period t + 1 as the sum of stock at the 
beginning of period t and net additions to stock during the period t 
we have 
+ 
By substituting in the previous equations we then obtain 
= 
N-1 
N + 
M-1 
H 
In other words stock at the beginning of period t + 1 is a 
linear function of stock at the beginning of period t and consumption 
during period t, with weights (N-1/N) and (M-1/H) which are both functions 
of the depreciation rate 1/N: 
1 
M = 1 - 1/N log e 
A set of data on stock of consumer durables is then built up 
using the equation for St+l in the foll~wing manner. An initial value 
(stock at the beginning of 1959) is obtained from a Reserve · Bank Study 
for Australia as a whole( 2) and allocated to each State on the basis 
of the contemporaneous population. Five different values of N are then 
chosen (N = 2, 3, 4, 5, 6) and the equation estimated. (Actually 
estimated for financial year estimates of the starting value, obtained by 
linear interpolation.) These five series for each State can then be used 
in estimating an equation like (9) or (11) and effectively, by choosing the 
series which yields overall maximum R2 we obtain maximum likelihood 
.. (3) 
estimates of our structural parameters • 
To sum up therefore the variables thought to contribute to 
movements 1n the demand for the services of consumer durables are a 
sub-set of: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(PD) t 
yP 
t 
st 
(iv) Mt 
(v) At 
(vi) RCRt 
(vii) P t 
= price of consumer durables at time t 
= permanent 1ncome 
= stock of consumer durables at the beginning of 
time period t 
= marriage registrations 
= completions of all houses ana flats 
= credit balances outstanding with retail businesses 
in real terms 
= price of residential electricity consumption 
f'"" 
r 
!' 
r 
I. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
1 
i' 
f•' 
THE DENONSTRATION EFFECT 
We begin this part of the estimation by considering what 
values of St we could use. The method I have chosen for this is to 
run separate regressions for each State using the simple equation: 
= (PD) t 
The optimal series of St could·then be chosen for each State 
from the values of the R2 and standard error of estimate. These Stock 
values might then be used in the pooled sample estimation of this model, 
to capture the demonstration effect. The results of the experiment 
are tabulated in Table XII, 1. They are rather surprising. The 
iterations do not seem to have converged as successfully as might be 
2 hoped on a maximum value of R . Only in the case of Victoria and West 
2 Australia does a max~mum value for R stand out. In the other states, 
no clear maximum is obtained, and several turning points occur. The 
most interesting result is that it· is the shortest· estimate of durable 
life that does best in explaining electricity demand. (Stone and Rowe 
found similar corner max~ma at the lowest value of N when they applied 
a form of this model to British data, Stone and Rowe (1960).) This 
suggests that, if the stock of durables is indeed giving rise to a form 
of demonstration effect in determining the derived demand for electricity, 
it is the more recent purchases that are having the greatest influence; 
1n other words the stock series that does best in 3 out of 5 cases is the 
one which gives highest weighting to its most recent components, or writes 
off new items of stock most quickly. Now this is not at all implausible. 
3oo 
TABLE XII, 1 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the depreciation 
coefficient in Consumer durable stocks. 
N = 2 y = 3 0.9933* 0.9945* 0.9755* 0.9218 
N = 3 y = 6 0.9927 0.9939 0.9762 0.9973 o. 9150 
N = 4 y = 8 0.9906 o. 9915 o. 9710 0. 9915 0.9266 
N = 5 y = 10 0.9913 0.9827 0.9843 0.9826 o. 9544i~ 
N = 6 v = 13 0.9915 I ~ 0.9-784 0.9914* 0.9751 0.9441 
* = max~mum 
NOTE: N is the reciprocal of the fraction of Stock 
written off ~n one year; Y is the number of years 
taken to write off 90% of the initial value of a 
unit of stock, when 1/N is the depreciation 
coefficient. 
~----------------------:-------------,---
It makes sense to say that it is the most recent (and therefore most 
1n accord with current fashion or taste) acquisitions of consumer 
durables that have the greatest demonstration effect. On this basis, 
3ol 
it can be argued that a series on recent acquisitions alone will give 
the best representation of' the demonstration effect; in addition, the 
failure of the iterative estimation to converge within the reasonable 
interval of durable life (3-13 years), suggests replacing the stock 
variable with a measure of recent acquisitions. Hence in the 
regressions which follow the variable used to capture the demonstration 
effect is the deflated value of personal consumption expenditure on 
household durables, lagged one period (PCED/PD)t-l' 
RESULTS 
The results from experimenting with this formulation of the 
demand for electricity in the residential sector are shown 1n the large 
table, XII, 3. Before looki~g at individual results in detail, the 
overall specification of the model can be examined by looking at table 
XII, 2. In this table the estimates of W, the rate of flow adjustment 
parameter, and the estimates of the exponent of the price term in the 
optimizing condition U' (c)= p (dq/dc) are shown. It may be recalled 
that in looking at one theoretical basis of the estimating equation, 
the exponent of the pr1ce term turned out to be unity (see the second 
section of this chapter). If this overall specification is to make 
any sense at all we clearly require W lies between zero and unit and 
that the exponent of p be approximately u~ity. We may recall lagged 
consumption persistently entered with a coefficient greater than unity 
in the estimation of the stock adjustment models, until some restrictions 
30.;t. 
TABLE XII, 2 
Estimate of Exponent 
Regression No. Estimate of u on pr1ce term 
1 0.08 1.3 
2 0.08 1.3 
3 1.15 1.1 
4 0.11 1.0 
5 0.16 1.5 
6 0.19 1.3 
7 0.14 1.3 
•, 
8 0.14 1.2 
9 0.05 
10 0.16 1.5 !! 
' 
11 0.24 1.2 
1: 
I 
12 0.09 1.3 
I! 
13· 0.08 1.3 
14 0.15 1.3 
15 0.09 1.3 
16 0.07 1.0 
17 0.08 1.5 
18 0.08 1.2 
19 0.08 1.2 I , I 
i 
,, 
20 0.07 1.3 
No. Constant Qt-1 pt (PD) t 
1 1. 20 0.92 -0.11 0.27 
(0. 98) (0.03) (0. 08) (0.20) 
2 1.02 0.92 -0.10 0.23 
(0. 87) (0.03) (0. 07) (0. 17) 
3 3.36 o. 85 -0.17 0.57 
(1. 64) (0.05) (0.09) (0.27) 
4 1. 73 0.89 -0.11 0.32 
(1.14) (0. 04) (0.07) (0.20) 
5 2.40 0.84 -0.23 0.24 
(1. 23) (0. 06) (0.11) (0.19) 
6 3.62 0.81 -0.24 0.47 
(1. 65) (0.06) (0 .11) (0. 29) 
7 1. 78 0.86 -0.18 0.17 
(1.03) (0.05) (0. 09) (0.18) 
TAJ:SL~ Xll~ 
(PCED/PD) t-1 yP . t Mt At 
0.004 -0.04 
(0.01) (0. 09) 
-0.006 
(0. 05) 
0.02 -0.11 
(0.01) (0.10) 
·' 0.009 
(0.05) 
0.01 0.06 
,. 
(0.01) (0.11) 
0.02 -0.02 
(0.01) (0.13) 
0.10 
(0.09) 
(RCR)t Tt 
-0.34 
(0.21) 
-0.16 
(0.16) 
0.03 
(0. 02) 
0.02 -0.25 
(0.02) . (0. 23) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
-2 R 
0. 99Lf42 
0.9%54 
0. 99lf63 
o. 991+53 
0.99463 
0.99462 
0.99465 
d.f. 
44 
. 45 
43 
44 
43 
42 
44 
oJ 
0 
IY 
No. Constant Qt-1 pt (PD)t 
8 1. 95 0.86 -0.17 0.21 
(1.16) (0. 05) (0.10) (0.22) 
9 0.59 0.95 
(0. 23) (0. 02) 
10 3.21 0.84 -0.23 -0.03 
(1. 41) (0.06) (0.12) (0. 27) 
11 7.74 0.76 -0.29 0.30 
(2. 27) (0.06) (0.11) (0. 28) 
12 1. 58 0.91 -0.10 
(0. 77) (0. 03) (0.07) 
13 1. 45 0.92 -0.11 
(0. 98) (0.03) (0. 08) 
14 2.29 0.85 -0.21 
(0. 87) (0.05) (0. 09) 
TABLE XII~ (cont'd) 
(PCED/PD)t_1 yP t Mt A t 
0.09 
(0.10) 
-0.09 0.20 -0.02 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.03) 
0.02 -0.09 0.23 0.007 
(0.01) (0.15) (0. 15) (0.03) 
0.06 -0. ~7 0.43 0.05 
(0. 02) (0. 20) (0.17) (0. 03) 
' 0.03 
(0. 04) 
-0.002 0.05 
(0.009) (0.07) 
0.15 
(0. 08) 
\ 
(RCR)t Tt 
0.02 -0.06 
(0.02) (0.19) 
0.04 
(0.02) 
0.03 -0.68 
(0. 02) (0. 27) 
0.03 
(0.02) 
R2 
0.99452 
0.99454 
0.99461 
0.99522 
0.99445 
0.99432 
0.99467 
d. f. 
43 
45 
41 
40 
46 
45 
45 
VJ 
0 
-f 
No. Constant Qt-1 pt (PD) t 
15 0.60 0.91 -0.12 
(0. 81) (0.04) (0. 07) 
16 1.19 0.93 -0.07 
(0. 81) (0.03) (0. 08) 
17 1. 76 0.92 -0.12 
(0.86) (0.03) (0.08) 
18 1. 54 0.92 -0.10 
(0.80) (0. 03) (0. 07) 
19 1. 39 0.92 -0.10 
(0. 76) (0.03) (0.07) 
20 1. 48 0.93 -0.10 
(0. 79) (0. 03) (0.07) 
TABLE XII~ (cont'd) 
(PCED/PD) t-1 yP t Mt At 
0.04 -0.003 
(0. 05) (0. 03) 
-0.06 0.14 
(0.07) (0. 09) 
0.003 
(0. 005) 
0.07 
(0. 05) 
0.009 
(0.02) 
(RCR\ .· Tt -2 R 
0.99432 
0.99454 
0.99434 
0.0002 0.99434 
(0. 009) 
0.99456 
0.99434 
----------~ 
d. f. 
45 
45 
46 
46 
46 
. 46 
(>J 
0 
-1=" 
? 
-..! 
3o5 
were put on the estimating equation. This problem does not ar~se 
with the model estimated here. Nevertheless we cannot be entirely 
satisfied with the estimates of the rate of adjustment. In most 
cases they suggest that be~ween 10% and 30% of the difference between 
last year's consumption and this year's desired consumption, in logarithmic 
terms, is made 9P by the difference between last year's consumption and 
this year's actual consumption. This is a very slow rate of flow 
adjustment, though more plausible a priori than the rates estimated ~n 
the stock adjustment models discussed 'previously. The estimated exponent 
on the price term also lies acceptably close to its a priori value and 
overall these results suggest that investigating the demand for electricity 
by a direct utility maximizing specification rather than the more indirect 
familiar stock adjustment models, results in equations that behave more 
realistically, at least in working with this type of 'pooled sample. 
However, one obvious problem to be expected when this direct 
approach is made to explain determinants of the demand for consumer 
durable services is that severe multicollinearity in the specified 
explanatory variables will obscure their individual effects. There is 
evidence in several of the equations of a problem of multicollinearity. 
One particularly odd set of results is associated with the permanent 
income variable. This often has the wrong sign and is not significantly 
\ 
different from zero when there are fairly large numbers of other 
explanatory variables included. At the same time, in the first ten or 
twelve regressions the variable (PD)t relative price of household 
supplies and equipment, also performs very oddly, consistently having a 
3o~ 
positive sign. It is apparent from looking at the raw data that 
durable prices'have been rising 1n step ·with permanent income over the 
1960's. Consequently the only reasonable estimating approach is to 
discard one of the variables caus1ng the multicollinearity and the 
sensible one to discard is (PD)t since it consistently was the wrong 
a priori sign. The results presented 1n Table XII, 3 begin by showing 
equations that are quite large in the number of explanatory variables 
and proved by a process of elimination to develop a sensible estimating 
equation that picks up a workable approximation to the behavioural 
specification derived above. 
INDIVIDUAL VARIABLES 
We may exam1ne the performance of the individual variables in 
turn. Lagged residential electricity consumption, Q 1 , and the t-
constant term are important 1n the degree of explanation achieved. The 
estimated rate of adjustment is fairly low, as already pointed out, but 
this seems to be a frequent result in estimating this type of equation 
by ordinary least squares. 
The price variable, Pt, relative average price of electricity, 
remains as important as ever, its regression coefficient always exceeds 
its standard error by a large amount and we have already concluded that 
its true exponent in the a priori behavioural relation has been estimated 
sensibly. This result in particular is a welcome s1gn that this approach 
to estimation makes sense, and that the general formulations imposed on 
the model are not too restrictive. The short run elasticity of demand 
I 
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with respect t9 price (ignoring, for the moment the restrictions on 
the dynamic model), as estimated by the partial regression coefficient 
in these logarithmic regressions, varies between -0.07 and -0.20. 
Thus, although pr1ce is a significant determinant of demand, the short 
run elasticity is quite low. It is not possible to be dogmatic about 
the implications of this for electricity pricing policy. Roughly we 
know that, in consumers' surplus terms, the higher the own price 
elasticity, the greater the welfare loss from setting price in excess 
of marginal cost. While no attempt is made at this point to quantify 
this welfare loss, we may say·that if the bottom range of the estimate 
is accurate, the welfare loss is very small in partial equilibrium 
consumers' surplus terms. On the other hand, the equations that seem 
to be most acceptable on a variety of grounds, (discussed below), provide 
estimates of the short run elasticity that lie in th~ top part of the 
range, say about -0.2; however, this 1s still a relatively low figure. 
At this point therefore it may be s~ggested that, in the residential 
sector at any rate, non-optimal pricing policies would not be likely 
to involve great welfare loss, at least as estimated by this method. 
As was pointed out above, the variable (PD)t representing 
consumer durable prices and measured by the index of household supplies 
and equipment, performed very oddly wherever it was included. It only 
had the correct sign once, in regress1on no. 10, and was very 
insignificant in that case. Hence it was dropped from regressions 
12 to 20, which resulted in an improvement in the performance of the 
permanent income variable, yP t" 
It was also pointed out above that the best way to capture 
the demonstration effect on demand for consumer durables resulting 
from their increased ownership throughout the economy seemed to be to 
use the most recent acquisition of durables as an explanatory variable. 
Real personal consumption expenditure on durables lagged one period, 
(PCED/PD) 1 was used for this purpose. t- It seemed more plausible not 
to deflate it by population since what was wanted was a measure of new 
durable ownership in the economy as a whole. On the whole this variable 
performed reasonably well, (it only once had the wrong sign and was 
twice its standard error on 4 out of the remaining 7 occasions) but was 
also associated with poor performance of the permanent 1ncome variable. 
This latter result does not make a great deal of sense since, on the 
whole, we might feel happier with an equation 1n which permanent income 
influenced the demand for durables rather than relying on an estimated 
demonstration effect. Nevertheless, recent expenditure on durables does 
appear to influence the demand for elect~icity, and this must really be 
a form of demonstration effect. Superficially, we could argue that 
demand for electricity must go up when people have more durables simply 
because of the production function for the output of durables services. 
But recent expenditure on durables will not pick up this production 
effect unless it happens that newly acquired durables are (a) a very 
large part of the stock of all durables owned and (b) new durables are 
less efficient in us1ng electricity than older durables. Since both 
these assumptions are implausible, we are left with the conclusion that 
some type of demonstration effect is operating. 
It has already been pointed out that the performance of the 
permanent income variable, Y~, was very sensitive to the other 
explanatory variablP.S included ~n the estimating equation. However 
when a smaller model is estimated, (leaving out (PD)t and (PCED/PD)t-t 
the performance of the permanent income variable makes some sense. Its 
overall impact, however, remains small, and this makes reasonable sense. 
We saw in an earlier chapter that explaining electricity consumption by 
income, though a fairly obvious approach, nevertheless requires careful 
reationalization; it is clearly naive to hypothesize that electricity 
consumption by the average co~sumer rises just because his income rises. 
Rather, it makes more sense to envisage permanent (or even transitory) 
income as representing the position of the consumer's budget restraint 
in his durable purchases, and this seems to be the effect picked up in 
this model. Electricity demand, as formulated here, is subject to a flow 
adjustment process operating when electricity is viewed as the input into 
the production of a flow of durable services. Consequently Qt-l will 
be a very significant variable and the influence of Y~ will ~nly be felt 
when it is used as a principal determinant of the flow of durable 
services, in its function as part of the consumers' budget restraint. 
This hypothesis makes for a realistic rationalization of the performance 
of Y~ in determining electricity demand, especially when it appears that 
the specification estimated here works more plausibly than most of the 
models in the literature. 
The other variable included to pick up the effect on the demand 
for durable services of shifts in the consumer's budget restraint is 
(RCR)t, real per capita borrowings from hire purchase organizations. We 
need to be very careful about using a variable of this nature. In a 
macro-consumption function a variable of this sort is sometimes included 
as a wealth or liquidity constraint, with the obvious drawback that 
credit conditions are as endogenous to a macro model as consumption 
itself. However it can be argued here that the partial equilibrium 
nature of the model makes the use of a variable like (RCR)t permissible. 
The performance of the variable is quite reasonable. It always has the 
expected positive sign, and exceeds its standard error in 6 out of the 8 
cases used. It is apparent therefore that movements in the consumer's 
budget constraint are important determinants of demand for durable 
services and therefore for the flow of electricity input. 
Several "social" or "demographic" variables were included with 
the specific purpose of making the model as general as possible. The 
"social" variables used here are Mt and At; respectively, the number 
of registered marriages per head of the population and the number of 
new dwelling units constructed per head of the population. A model 
emphasising social variables was run as equation 9, but did not give 
plausible results. -2 The R was comparable with other formulations but 
the individual regression coefficients on Yi and At were unacceptable 
and an extremely low rate of flow adjustment was implied by the 
coefficient on Q 1 . t- Re-running this regression with individual state 
dummies added nothing whatsoever. Nevertheless one social variable, 
Mt, performed quite well when used in conjunction with economic 
variables in a form of mixed model. To the extent that new family 
units move into existing accommodation rather than new dwellings, it ~s 
clear that Mt will have greater influence on the rising demand for 
durable services than At. 
Weather was experimented with as a variable (Tt) but 
performed so badly in having wrong signs and insignificant coefficients 
that it was discarded in the later regressions. 
This completes aiscussion of the effects of individual 
variables. It remains now to consider overall equation performance. 
The coefficient of multiple determination corrected for degrees of 
freedom (R2), the general significance of individual coefficients and 
their a priori plausibility make up three reasonable grounds for choosing 
between different equations, although it has already been pointed out, 
evidence of multicollinearity limits the choice of explanatory variables 
that prove acceptable. For this reason equation, No. 11, though it has 
-2 the highest R cannot be adopted. The variables Y~ and (PD)t do not 
work well together. Nevertheless this equation does show the highest 
rate of flow adjustment observed, 0.24. 
-2 The next best equation on the grounds of highest R is equation 
No~ 14 and this has much to recommend it. -2 Besides achieving high R , 
all the regression coefficients are well in excess of their standard 
errors and the estimated rate of flow adjustment is in the top part of 
the range of estimates. This model contains only "economic" variables: 
the variables determining the demand for durable services are permanent 
income and real per capita credit balances. This model suggests that 
the only important determinants of the demand for durables are the 
variables in the consumer's budget restraint; ~n other words there is 
a large unsatisfied market for durables and any outward shifts in the 
i ! 
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average consumer's budget plane allow him to raise immediately his 
purchases of durables, and hence his purchases of electricity. This 
is a significant result for electricity authorities ~n particular and 
fuel suppliers in general. It suggests that there is room for rapid 
expans1on in durable sales to the average consumer in Australia as a 
whole whenever the level of aggregate demand and flow of credit are 
expanded. None of the other specifications work ~s well as this one, 
which suggests this purely economic flow adjustment model is the best 
choice for understanding the determinants of residential electricity 
consumption. 
The equations that are only just less satisfactory than this 
one suggest similar results. Equation 7 is identical to equation 14 
except for the inclusion of the variable (PD)t, which has the wrong 
sign but is not significantly different from zero. Equations 5 and 6 
lose precision in the estimates of the coefficients on (PD)t andY~ 
but (RCR)t still has the right sign, though a lower degree of 
significance. Overall, therefore, economic variables seem most 
important in determining durable demand and wherever social variables 
are used they add nothing or even detract from the overall performance 
of the equation. The economic variables of prime importance are 
those representing the budget restraint of the consumer; relative 
price of durables and the demonstration effect do not perform nearly 
so well in considering the overall reasonableness of the equations. 
! ' 
NOTES TO CHAPTER XII 
1. For some British evidence on this, see Williams (1972). 
2. See the comments ~n Norton and Broadbent (1970). 
3. For a proof, see Ner1ove (1960). 
CHAPTER XIII 
TESTING FOR PRICE INFLUENCES IN INDUSTRIAL 
AND CO}frlliRCIAL ELECTRICITi DE~UU~D 
This closing chapter in the empirical demand section has a 
limited purpose. As already explained, the main empirical work on 
demand - for his residential sector - was the initial part of the work 
for this study. That work, reported in the previous chapters, reviewed 
and estimated a variety of electricity demand models in the usual 
approach of the econometrics literature. 
However of great interest to economists is the attempt to 
measure price elasticities. In the course of preparing this thesis 
data on actual tariffs were collected (as reported in Part I), and as 
a final exercise it seems reasonable to try to take advantage of this 
data in looking at the demand in two sectors that were not analysed 
previously - the industrial and commercial sectors. 
The purpose of this chapter therefore is simply this: to 
investigate the price elasticity of demand using the conventional 
average price measures and to contrast this with estimates of price 
elasticity using the newly collected data on actual tariff rates. The 
researcher may ask himself: 
(a) on what basis should the price of electricity be calculated? 
(b) what differences will show up in the economically important 
estimates of price elasticity of demand? 
i ' 
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(c) how are these differences to be evaluated and what lessons 
are to be learned from the exercise? 
PREVIOUS EXERCISES 
As has already been"seen many of the previous electricity 
demand studies adopted the device of a single average price for 
electricity in the particular sector in question. The average price 
is simply the average revenue associated with kilowatt hour sales. 
There is no doubt that this is a convenient approach and 
faced with the multiplicity of published electricity prices many 
researchers have considered that it is the only possible approach. 
In the industrial and commercial sector itself, previous studies -
1 
which are rare - have used this approach, e.g. Baxter and Rees (1968) 
and Bell (1973). 
Nevertheless, the early classic electricity demand.study of 
Houthakker2 rejected the use of average revenue as an adequate measure 
of the price of electricity, and it is worth considering the arguments 
for and against this practice. 
There.is no obstacle to using average revenue when only one 
figure is g~ven as "the price of electricity" in the tariff schedule 
itself. The problems arise when some form of two part or multi-part 
tariff ~s used. Revenue in a simple two part tariff is: 
R =A + pQ 
.... 
. i 
~ . ·, 
,. 
where A is the standing charge, p the variable charge and Q is sales 
volume. Average revenue is then 
R 
Q = (p + ~) 
which is negatively related to the quantity purchased, (Q). 
The effect of this can be illustrated in a simple demand 
equation. Suppose quantity demanded is related to an index of final 
production and to price. Using average revenue as a measure of price 
gives: 
where X is final production and u LS a disturbance term. 
If this equation LS fitted several consequences may result: 
(i) by hypothesis Q and u are related, but Q is used as an explanatory 
variable as well as being the dependent variable. What we have 
is a special case of the disturbance term not being independent of 
the explanatory variables. It is well known that inconsistent 
estimates of the regression coefficients may result; (see Goldberger 
1964, page 278). This is the sort of problem that arises Ln 
simultaneous equation models when single equation estimation 
techniques are used. 
Usually we would hope to avoid the .problem by formulating some 
sort of simultaneous equation model. However in the sense that 
our faulty equation arises from a problem o~ the data and its 
measurement, this way out is not really available to us. The 
argument of Houthakker who first raised the point was that only 
"marginal price" data will do. Average revenue data by itself 
is economically meaningless. 
(ii) The situation may be even worse than this. Rather than a mean-
ingless correlation we may obtain a fitted equation that performs 
well, theoretically and statistically but is in fact misleading. 
By definition there must be a negative relationship between 
Q and (p + A) Q 
and this·may persuade us that demand is more negatively related 
to price than is the case. 
There therefore seem to be two constraints on estimating 
these demand functions. If average revenue and true marginal price 
are compared the following results might be expected: 
(i) If using "marginal price" really is an improvement in the data 
matrix, then the overall degree of explanation ought to improve. 
Improving our data will give more efficient estimators resulting 
in a lower overall standard error of estimate, a higher ;z - the 
degree of explanation obtained. 
,;-""0 
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Thus if there is a significant negative relationship between pr1ce 
and quantity demanded, us1ng "marginal price" data should improve 
the estimation of this relationship. 
(ii) On the other hand however, if the effect of using average revenue 
is not to pick up imperfectly a significant relationship, but rather 
to impose a spurious relationship, using marginal price data will 
result in a much poorer overall explanation and may ra1se the 
possibility of wrong (i.e. positive) signs on the price variable. 
With these factors in mind, several experiments were carried 
out to compare average revenue and marginal price relationships with 
quantity demanded. 
DATA 
Average revenue is of course easy to calculate; obtaining 
a "marginal price" for electricity is much harder, given the multiplicity 
of available tariffs. Only a partial solution is available to the 
problem. For different states we can think of many tariff series which 
are candidates for "marginal price". After some careful consideration 
two or three were isolated. These were large block discount rates 
chosen to correspond as nearly as possible with the theoretical ideal 
of the expenditure on the marginal unit of electricity. 
Using the coding introduced in Part I of the thesis, the 
representative marginal pr1ces were: 
Victoria: CBV4 fourth block discount for 
commercial use 
BV3 · third block discount for industrial 
use. 
South Australia: ES8 eighth block discount for all 
customers 
RBS2 second block discount for day usage 
in industry. 
West Australia: BW4 fourth block discount for industrial 
power. 
Tasmania: CBT3 third block discount for commercial 
use 
BT4 fourth block discount for industrial 
use. 
Initially we make the assumption that these rates represent 
the price of electricity for commercial and industrial ·use at the margin 
of choice. This assumption is discussed again in the conclusions to 
this chapter. 
DEMAND EQUATIONS 
We now want to specify a hypothetically reasonable demand 
function for commercial and industrial use. This function has to be 
largely free of specification errors but as general as possible since 
we want to compare results for the same equation simply using different 
measures of "price": i.e. average revenue or "marginal price" as 
., 
represented by the actual tariff rates already chosen above. 
<:I 
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The form adopted reflects (a) .. the idea that demand for 
electricity input depends on the demand for final output and relative 
prices and (b) that there is a lagged adjustment between actual demand 
and equilibrium demand. This gives us a simple adjustment equation: 
= + + 
where Qt = demand for electricity in year t 
Q = demand for electricity in year t-1 t-1 
It = the ANZ bank index of industrial production for all 
states in year t 
RPt = relative price of electricity in year t; this 1s either 
(a) average commercial or industrial revenue deflated by a 
general index of prices 
or (b) marginal tariff rate for commercial or industrial demand, 
again deflated by a general index of prices. 
This equation is identical to the formulation that Baxter and 
Rees 3 found to fit electricity demand "best" in terms of overall degree 
of explanation. We have fitted the equation in logarithmic form so 
that the regression coefficients directly measure the constant 
elasticities of demand with respect to the different explanatory 
variables. 
I ! 
For each category of demand reported: separate industrial 
and commercial demand for Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania, and 
total industrial and commercial demand for Hest Australia, the equation 
is fitted twice. Once average revenue is used to calculate price and 
once a marginal tariff rate is used to measure price. The equations 
can then be compared on standard errors of each regression coefficient 
d 11 1 . -z h ff. . f d . . an on avera exp anat~on: R , t e coe ~c~ent o eterm~nat~on 
corrected for degrees of freedom is used for the latter. 
RESULTS 
.. -: 
The simple formulation performed very well in total. N:one of 
the equations exhibited any indication of serial correlation of the. 
residuals on the usual tests. 
The detailed results are presented in Table XIII,l below, and we 
can organize our comments about them under several headings. 
Overall explanation is high even for Tasmania which shows up 
the poorest results. As expected industrial production has always a 
positive impact on electricity demand, and ~n most cases the elasticity 
of demand with respect to final production is less than one4• The 
lagged dependent often improves the explanation but is by no means a 
dominant influence, and in several cases ~s unsignificant - particularly 
in the Tasmanian results. 
TABLE XIII,l. Industrial and Commercial Demand in four states; 
relative price tests. 
Regression coefficients and standard errors of explanatory variables. 
Dependent Variable Industrial Production Average Revenue Marginal Price Lagged Dependent -2 R 
-
la Victorian Industrial 0.48 -0.49 o. 33 0.98 
(0.19) (0. 25) (0. 11) 
lb Victorian Industrial 0.65 0.12 0.36 0.96 
(0. 34) (0. 38) (0.17) . 
2a Victorian Commercial 0.45 -0.25 0.69 0.99 
(0.50) (0.43) (0. 32) 
2b Victorian Commercial 0.47 -0.093 0.74 0.99 
(0. 64) (0.45) (0. 38 
3a South ~ustralian Industrial 0.28 -1.79 -0.04 0.99 
(0.43) (0. 28) (0.14) 
3b South Australian Industrial 1.58 -2.37 -0.43 0.98 
(0.43) (0. 47) (0. 20) 
w 
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Dependent Variables Industrial Production Average Revenue Marginal Price Lagged dependent -2 R 
4a South Australian Commercial 0.83 -0.83 0.28 0.99 
(0. 30) (0.42) (0.13) 
4b South Australian Commercial 1.10 0.84 0.64 0.99 
(0.25) (0. 40) (0.12) 
5a West Australian Industrial 0.92 -0.69 0.43 0.99 
and Commercial (0.17) (0.19) (0.08) 
.· 
5b West Australian Industrial 1.04 -0.54 0.50 0.99 
and Commercial (0.28) (0.41) (0.13) 
6a Tasmanian Industrial 1.59 -0.39 0.022 0.67 
(0. 7 8) (1. 27) (0. 44) 
6b Tasmanian Industrial 1. 63 . 0.47 -0.05 0.68 
. 
(0. 77) (1.10) (0.47) 
7a Tasmanian Commercial 1.60 -0.97 -0.87 0.74 
(0. 95) (0. 27) (0. 67) 
7b Tasmanian Commercial 0.68 -2.35 -0.13 0.64 
(JJ 
(1.19) (0.82) (0. 83) p IJ.l 
-I 
Our main interest however ~s directed towards the price 
) 
11ariable. When average revenue is used as a measure of price, the 
elasticity of demand is always negative and in four cases out of seven 
is clearly significant at the five per cent level. The elasticities 
estimated this way are usually less than unity, with the exception of 
the case of South Australian industrial demand. In this latter case 
the average revenue variable appears to have swamped the influence of 
the lagged dependent. 
On this basis we are tempted to report significant negative 
relationships between price and quantity demanded. However examining 
the use of marginal tariff rates to represent price we see a very 
different picture. To.begin with the overall degree of explanation. 
usually falls, though the change is often very marginal. In only one 
case does the precision of the estimated equation improve when marginal 
price rather than average revenue is used; (this is the case for 
Tasmanian industrial demand). It looks therefore as if using "marginal 
price" does not amount to an improvement in the data, since we cannot 
detect an overall better fit for the equations. Our estimates become 
less rather than more efficient. 
Does this mean that average revenue data introduces a 
spurious correlation which disappears when marginal tariff rates are 
used instead? This ~s indeed arguable. The marginal price variable 
shows a negative relationship with demand ~n only four out of the seven 
cases, and in only one of those cases (Tasmanian commercial demand) is 
the elasticity statistically significant. 
The usual effect of using ma~ginal price seems to have been to 
throw more weight on the lagged dependent variable as an explanatory 
influence on demand. In one case this is even c>ssociated with a 
significant positive relationship between marginal price and demand. 
The overall impression of the results therefore seems to be: 
(a) us1ng marginal pr1ce does not result in a more prec1se fit of an 
already established price-demand relationship. 
(b) rather it is the case that us1ng average revenue seems to introduce 
a negative relationship that disappears when marginal tariff rates 
are used to measure price. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The overall impression of the results is clear enough. In 
this concluding section however several counter arguments on the 
problems of testing can be suggested. 
It was suggested that marginal price was the relevant econom1c 
factor influencing demand - rather than average revenue. Against this, 
it has often been suggested that complex pricing structures make it 
extremely difficult for consumers to calculate marginal price. Turvey 
has often argued for simplicity in tariff schedules5• If there are 
information costs in calculating the price of electricity at the margin, 
what is the consumer to use as a rule of thumb? It may be that average 
revenue (or average bills) is the indicator of electricity price that the 
consumer uses. Hawkins (1973) suggests that the consumer may use such a 
measure as a less costly way of evaluating price. 
This obviously raises difficulties for using the theory of 
demand to predict behaviour. If the consumer uses average revenue as 
an indicator of price he may falsely think marginal pr1ce 1s falling 
when simply sales volume is rising. The question is - does he therefore 
react by expanding demand so that the negative relationship between 
average revenue and demand is a true behavioural result rather than 
simply a spurious correlation 
It is clear that a great deal of theoretical and empirical 
work needs to be carried out relating demand to the price which 
consumers think reflects choice at the margin. At the moment it 1s 
difficult to decide whether or not to question the conventional approach 
of us1ng average revenue as a meesure of price at the margin. 
There are also more practical reasons for not using the 
results of Table XIII,l to reject the conventionai approach. Houthakker's 
original argument implies that all electricity pricing is on a two part 
basis. But this is certainly not the case. There is a huge variety 
in tariff types used. This could mean two things. Firstly the term 
A/Q 
which forms part of average revenue in a simple two part tariff may in 
practice be negligible in calculating an overall average revenue for a 
large electricity authority which uses a whole variety of tariff types 
from flat rates through max1mum demand charges to peak and off peak 
differentials. It can conceivably be the case that even with 
multi-part tariffs, average revenue remains in practice a good 
indicator of the price of electricity. There is a corollary to this 
·argument. To represent marginal price we had to use a selection of 
marginal tariff rates as "representatives" of the concept we are trying 
to measure. However these are by necessity imperfect representatives -
not every consumer will qualify for the largest block discounts, and not 
every consumer will pay the representative tariff or perhaps even 
anything like it. 
The counter arguments therefore can be summed up as: 
(i) marginal pr1ce is difficult to calculate; consumers may use 
average revenue as their price indicator. 
(ii) in a complex tariff system, there is no guarantee that the simple 
two part tariff example does not over-emphasise what could be a 
negligible influence from fixed charges. 
(iii) representative marginal tariff rates may be themselves imperfect 
guides to choice at the margin. 
What we have discussed in this chapter indicates the 
difficulties involved in demand estimation. The conventional approach 
with its apparently successful results - has come under fire, but the 
criticisms themselves may be open to doubt. 
! 
NOTES TO CHAPTER XIII 
1. The reference to Baxter and Rees (1968) is an implied one. 
This study 1s discussed below, but in this context it 
apparently (but did not explicitly state the fact) used 
average price of electricity measured by industrial average 
revenue. Bell (1973) repeats some of the Baxter and Rees 
experiments and explicitly states the use of average revenue 
data. 
2. Houthakker (1950). 
3. Baxter and Rees (1968). See reference to 1 above. 
4. Bell (1973) has several comments to make on whether or not 
this result is to be expected. 
5. e. g. Turvey (l971a) pages 32-42. 
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PART IV 
CONCLUSION 
• I 
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CHAPTER XIV 
SUMMING UP 
This study has tried to exam1.ne some of the interesting econom1.c 
questions that fall within the competence of an outside observer of the 
Australian electricity industry. These aspects are both theoretical and 
empirical, though investigation of actual behaviour has to be limited to 
those areas where published statistics are readily available. 
PART I 
The price mechanism and its working is of perennial interest 
to the economist and the actual pricing behaviour of various Australian 
electricity authorities is investigated in the first part of the thesis. 
The number and complexity of the pricing schemes in use is something that 
iunnediately strikes the observer; nevertheless it was shown (in chapter 
II) that there can be an economic or engineering rationale for most of 
the tariff structures adopted. What has to be tested is whether these 
tariff structures in practice achieve the objectives that they are 
designed for. The bulk of the evidence on tariff and capacity and 
running cost correlations presented in chapter III seems to suggest that 
the tariffs used 1.n the four states in the sample were notadequately 
reflecting their underlying theoretical principles. Many of the 
standing charges were more closely correlated with running costs and 
many of the marginal energy charges seemed to be related to capacity 
cost movements. The overall impression was of a badly organized tariff 
structure in many cases covering all of the states 1.n the sample. 
3~1 
Such a finding begs two questions at least: are significant 
costs involved in the failure to allocate resources optimally and is 
demand sensitive enc·ugh to respond to tariff re-structuring? Chapters 
IV and V attempted a beginning on the answers. Chapter IV tried to 
examine the influences determining unit costs in varLous categories for 
different electricity authorities. A good deal of attention was paid 
to load factor as a measure of the degree of peak spreading and an attempt 
was made to measure the cost savings of achieving higher load factors. 
The conventional econometric techniques used gave grounds for believing 
that rises in load factor well within the historically established 
capabilities of the electricity authorities could provide substantial 
cost savings to the authority (and, in passing, this was related to the 
controversial Lake Fedder Conservation issue). 
Chapter V was concerned with modelling the determination of 
load factor on the basis of economic behaviour. The burdens borne by 
the available data were heavy but we observed the e~ected result that -
to a certain extent - load factor variation could be attributed to the 
availability or otherwise of time of day tariff differentials. A 
simultaneous equation model gave an estimate of the elasticity of load 
factor with respect to the peak - off peak price ratio. 
Very briefly, Part I could be said to have posed the questions: 
(i) how have tariff principles been formed? 
(ii) have the principles operated Ln practice? 
(iii) does it matter Ln cost terms if tariff principles are abused? 
(iv) can tariffs in practice affect demand variability? 
and to have provided the following answ~rs: 
(i) in many ways 
'' 
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(ii) no 
(iii) yes 
(iv) yes 
PART II 
The second part of the study moved into much more abstract 
territory. Any observer of the economics of electricity cannot fail 
to take account of the enormous advances made in recent years in 
investment planning principles for electricity generation. This part 
of the thesis - the theoretical as opposed to the empirical aspect of 
the title - examined the nature and developments of investment planning 
models. In this area, the nawe of Ralph Turvey stands out and chapter 
VI presented a detailed study of one of his most famous models - that 
contained in his 'Economic Analysis and Public Enterprise' (Turvey, 
197la). This model has to be seen ~n the context of other Turvey models 
and frequent reference was made to his other writings. Chapter VI tried 
to bring out some of the more neglected aspects of the Turvey approach -
for example the formal nature and problems of evaluating Kuhn-Tucker 
multipliers as marginal costs, and more importantly the extensive 
implications for optimal amortization rules and their relation to the 
pricing and investment rules which Turvey highlights. 
Hmv-ever, Turvey is neither the first nor only economist to 
tackle capital theory in general or optimal investment and amortization 
in particular. Ch~pter VII examined a series of models and 
contributions - selected from a vast literature - which have most 
closely been related to the Turvey approach. Harold Retelling's 
classic article on depreciation (Hotelling (1925)) was among the first 
and best of these. There have been similar attempts in the accounting 
literature \vhich are surveyed and recent neoclassical investment theory 
is also examined. The over\Vhelming impression that emerges is that to 
ensure a model is dynamic, th~ variables must depend systematically on 
time through allowing for technological progress, time dependent capacity 
and replacement costs or time dependent demand requirements. Simply 
"dating" the variables and discounting does not make a model dynamic 
in the sense that one part of the chosen solution cannot be isolated 
from another. It is regrettable that so many so-called dynamic models 
o£ investment planning fail to be more than a sequence of static models, 
each quite separate from the others. Quite a lot-·of the neoclassical 
investment models are at fault here. This particular point is 
illustrated mathematically in the appendix to part II of the study. 
Chapter VII, in addition, discusses some work by W.A. Lewis which once 
more shows how this writer was able many years ago to anticipate so 
many of the modern advances in price theory and investment planning. 
Chapter VIII is a slight digression from the theme of the 
theoretical discussion. It presents a practicable investment planning 
model for an Australian electricity authority using the Kuhn-Tucker 
programming analysis discussed previously. Rather than use a set of 
monthly, daily or even hourly output requirements as the basis of the 
model, it uses a yearly output programme measured in terms of two 
factors: an average annual committment to supply and a peak load 
demand occur~ing for part of the year. This allows us to develop 
clearer expressions for peak and off peak marginal costs and shadow 
prices than are provided By the more conventional model of chapter VI. 
Additional constraints are also considered in analysing the investment 
programme. 
Chapter IX returns to an aspect of the model that also appears 
extensively in the earlier chapters: the calculation of marginal costs. 
This is not of course the usual text-book vers~on; Turvey's analysis 
rejects this out of hand in a long run model allowing for technological 
progress. Previous chapters had already established the programming 
interpretation of marginal cost whereby it is calculated from the Kuhn-
Tucker multiplier associated with a given output requirement constraint. 
In addition to this version, Turvey in his paper on "Marginal Cost" 
(Turvey (1969)), and his book on "Optimal Pricing and Investment in 
Electricity Supply" (Turvey (1968)) had suggested a much more 
revolutionary definitionof marginal cost as the addition to total system 
costs from advancing by one time period the starting date of an already 
forecast permanent rise in output requirements. Turvey did not provide 
a specific way of calculating such a measure that related to the 
programming version. Chapter IX tries to do this - and in the process 
examines and amends a French model of investment planning which attempted 
to extend the marginal cost concept into dynamic economics, (Albouy and 
Nachtigal (1970)). The problem is to measure "historical dynamic 
marginal cost" - and Chapter IX tries to show several ways of doing 
this and obtains two measures: dynamic marginal cost and instantaneous 
dynamic margin~l cost; the latter is identical to the revolutionary 
version of Turvey (1969). In this exercise several insights into 
criticisms of the Turvey model and into dynamic optimization and pricing 
are gained. 
PART III 
In part III of the study, the empirical side is taken up aga1n 
with a consideration of the demand for electricity. The problems of 
data collection loom largest here, particularly since detailed economic 
data on incomes and spending patterns did not receive attention from the 
official statisticians in Australia until relatively recently. 
Chapter X considers some naive though interesting demand 
models for the residential sector estimated at the state level. The 
outcome of this exercise is a realisation that residential demand for 
electricity has to take account of the demand for the services of a stock 
of electricity using durable goods. This presupposes the use of some 
rather more sophisticated and complex demand models. These in turn are 
demanding in their data requirements so that, to keep sample sizes 
relatively large, a pooled estimation approach has to be adopted. 
Chapter XI uses pooled cross section and time series data to 
fit one particular model of demand that has had a significant place in 
the econometric literature. At first sight it seems to be a model that 
exactly fits our requirement of investigating simultaneously the demand 
for electricity and the demand for durable goods services. This is the 
dynamic stock adjustment model (Houthakker and Taylor (1970)). The 
il 
i 
results from us1ng the model are not entirely satisfactory however, and 
similar difficulties with it seemed to have been found in natural gas 
demand analysis in the U.S. (Balestra 196JO. Consequently Chapter XII 
tries to incorporate the demand for durable goods more directly into 
the demand for electricity with a partial adjustment model that tries to 
be as general as possible in its choice of explanatory variables. This 
attempt is relatively successful. 
The bulk of the demand analysis has been concentrated on the 
residential sector. Chapter XIII therefore turns finally to the 
industrial and commercial sectors to investigate demand patterns. 
The particular objective is the study of price response. The work on 
residential demand used the conventional "average revenue" estimate 
for price in the demand equations, but there are reasons for believing 
this may be unsatisfactory in the complex tariff cases of electricity 
demand. Therefore the availability of, detailed tariff data collected 
for part I of the thesis (undertaken some time after the residential 
demand study) presented an opportunity to use the industrial and 
commercial demand estimates to test price response in more detail. 
Chapter XIII discusses the results of fitting a standard demand equation 
with different sets of price data and the arguments that follow about 
measuring price response. It is found that the "marginal price" 
estimate produces a far lower or insignificant responsiveness of demand 
than a price measure based on average revenue. Because multipart 
tariffs mean that average revenue must by definition fall as sales rise 
.............................................. _ 
it could be argued that the convention~~ measures of elasticity 
' I 
overestimate demand response and cannot be consistently estimated. I I 
However, there is an equally strong case for sugr,esting that the 
"marginal price" of electricity is a poor guide to how consumers 
measure the overall price of electricity, so that the controversy 
over measuring price elasticity is not easily resolved. 
This concludes my theoretical and empirical study of the 
supply and demand for electricity in Australia. 
--
r 
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